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Karpov Cited on C. Europe Forces Accord

PM2002165190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov, by special correspondent A. Shalnev; date not given: "Mutual Concessions in the Common Interest"]

[Text] Ottawa—As has been reported, at the Ottawa meeting of Warsaw Pact and NATO countries' foreign ministers there was an announcement of an accord between the Soviet Union and the United States—an accord proposing a reduction of Soviet and U.S. armed forces in central Europe. I asked USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.P. Karpov for amplification.

The task, V.P. Karpov said, was first to fix an upper limit for Soviet and U.S. armed forces in central Europe—a limit set at 195,000 men on either side—and, second, to fix a limit for U.S. forces in peripheral areas. It has been agreed at the level of 30,000 men. For the Soviet Union the question (of our presence in other parts of Europe—A. Shalnev) does not arise: since the recently declared willingness to withdraw forces from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, if the Polish Government so wishes, Poland. There remains only, in fact, the question of our forces' presence in the GDR.

[Shalnev] Without this accord, was there any suspicion that the United States, despite the proposal by its own President, might raise the numerical strength of its forces on the periphery above 30,000?

[Karpov] I do not know how events might have developed in the future. Perhaps the Americans intended to transfer forces from central Europe to, say, the southern flank—to Greece or Italy. But, according to the present agreement, the Americans cannot do this: If they reduce their troop contingent in the FRG, they will be obliged to withdraw these forces to the United States. This provides a definite guarantee that the United States will not increase its armaments in other parts of Europe.

[Shalnev] In other words, it is a mutual concession, not unilateral....

[Karpov] Of course, a mutual concession. The siphon, so to speak, for transferring forces from one area to another, is now closed off.

[Shalnev] A high-ranking representative of the U.S. Administration stated the other day that a united Germany could announce its renunciation of nuclear weapons, but, when I asked whether this meant that the United States would have to remove its nuclear weapons from German territory, he answered "no." What is your comment?

[Karpov] The FRG and the GDR are already nonnuclear states. The nonnuclear status is fixed by their membership of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the right of continuity must be observed. As for the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the FRG, the nonproliferation treaty does not prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of nonnuclear states, although under the control of the the side to which they belong. From this viewpoint, no new legal grounds would arise. But that is not the point: Our policy is that Europe must be rid of nuclear weapons. We are proposing talks on tactical nuclear weapons and are prepared to consider various NATO ideas on minimal nuclear deterrence. We are also prepared to take unilateral action: If NATO agrees to commence talks, we will make some unilateral reductions in our nuclear weapons in Europe without waiting for the outcome.

[Shalnev] Now I want to ask you what happened recently in Moscow, at the talks with U.S. Secretary of State Baker. I would like to hear details of what we achieved—or did not achieve—on the matter of strategic armaments.

[Karpov] Before the Moscow meeting with Baker there were two main groups of disagreements—on sea-launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. As for sea-launched cruise missiles, the United States has at last overcome the barrier which it created itself: Previously it had categorically refused to discuss any limitations on these missiles at all. Now it has accepted the proposal we made in Wyoming last fall, in connection with the treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic arms, to exchange binding statements which would not be subject to ratification. These would be political commitments like, for example, the Helsinki Final Act. But these political commitments will remain in force throughout the duration of the treaty on strategic nuclear arms. This is the idea: Over a five-year period, both sides will exchange information on the number of deployed cruise missiles, and the sides will pledge not to exceed the given number throughout this period. A rigid limit will be established.

[Shalnev] Are there accurate figures determining the limit?

[Karpov] So far we have not discussed the limit, but the principle has been discussed. The Americans agreed for the first time to make provision—as far as sea-launched cruise missiles are concerned—for the exchange of information on the type of surface ships and submarines which will be fitted with these cruise missiles.

There are, however, two issues on which we differ. The United States insists that only missiles with nuclear charges should be included in the accord on sea-launched cruise missiles. We believe that, in view of the standard specification of long-range cruise missiles, nonnuclear missiles should also be included in the agreement. Second: We propose that missiles with a range in excess of 600 km should be the subject of the accord—the Americans insist on including missiles with a range in excess of 300 km. Due to historical reasons, we have in service a larger quantity of short-range antiship missiles with nuclear charges. Evidently, the United States wants

to do us out of something. But antiship missiles are not strategic arms; they are tactical weapons used in naval combat.

Now about air-launched cruise missiles. We agreed that calculations in the package with other elements should be based on each U.S. aircraft carrying 10 missiles and each Soviet aircraft carrying eight. We also agreed that not a single U.S. aircraft could be fitted with more than 20 missiles and not a single one of ours could be fitted with more than 12 (but even so, calculations will be based on the 10-8 formula—A. Sh.). But we also agreed that the Soviet Union could have 40 percent more aircraft than the United States. According to calculations by the Americans themselves, within the framework of these limitations they could have approximately 110 aircraft with cruise missiles, while we would have 150. This, in fact, is what we have today.

[Shalnev] As far as I can understand, both we and the Americans are already saying that it will be necessary to embark on the second stage of the strategic offensive arms talks immediately following the signing of the strategic offensive arms treaty. Please explain.

[Karpov] The conversation will center on how to reduce further still the level of strategic arms, ensuring strategic stability in the process and effecting a a rearrangement of the structure of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces which would rule out any possibility of delivering a first strike. A lower level would mean a reduction by, for example, a further 50 percent.

[Shalnev] In other words, down to 25 percent of the present level?

[Karpov] Yes. As regards the reaarangement of the structure, one of the points we have in mind is to reduce the quantity of charges on every missile. We will be able to take the path of gradually decommissioning multi-charge missiles, both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, and replacing them with single-warhead missiles. We propose that we embark on such talks right after the first strategic offensive arms treaty is signed.

[Shalnev] And what is the U.S. side's response?

[Karpov] In essence, this was the first time the United States has said that it is examining our proposal on this score in a positive light.

Soviet-U.S. Consultations Open in Geneva

LD2002211190 Moscow TASS in English 1935 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Geneva February 20 TASS—A regular round of Soviet-U.S. bilateral consultations on banning chemical weapons opened here today.

Packed agenda of this round focuses on ways to speed up drafting a convention banning chemical weapons, and on a bilateral agreement on mutual Soviet-U.S. obligations before the convention enters into force.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the February meeting in Moscow of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, these obligations include the destruction of a considerable part of chemical weapon stockpiles by the two powers. The two sides will also discuss a number of issues that need to be coordinated.

Ryzhkov's Asian Trip Promotes Cooperation

LD2002135790 Moscow TASS in English 1349 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—"Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov's three-nation Asian tour, which ended last week, signalled the USSR's desire for vigorous cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

He noted that the USSR previously paid inadequate attention to these countries, and underestimated the benefits of economic cooperation with them.

Utilising the advantages of international economic ties, primarily with industrialised states, helped them at that time to catch up with the most advanced powers.

The Soviet premier's first visit to Thailand, Australia and Singapore put Mikhail Gorbachev's words, as expressed in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, into action.

At that time, the USSR issued a call to all Asia-Pacific countries to search for ways to revamp relations among the countries in the region, enhancing security and cooperation.

Significantly, the leaders of the public in all three countries voiced support for the policy of perestroika in the Soviet Union, the spokesman said.

Ryzhkov's tour sought to involve the Soviet Union in the regional economic structure. If earlier talks concerned mostly trade, now the USSR is ready for cooperation in a great diversity of areas, including joint projects in the Soviet Far East.

An Australian trade and industrial exhibition, scheduled to be held in Vladivostok in the summer of 1990, will facilitate such projects.

Bilateral talks also focused on arms production conversion plans to set up social economic zones in the USSR, and a convertible rouble.

As a result of perestroika, the monopoly of state trade ceased to play a decisive role in developing the USSR's foreign economic ties, the spokesman stressed. Any Soviet firm, any association and enterprise can conduct export and import operations now. About 1,400 enterprises involving foreign capital have been formed in the USSR.

It is evident, however, that the future of our relations in the Asia-Pacific region will depend not only on the USSR's entrepreneurship but also on the good will of all parties concerned, the spokesman emphasised.

The present policy of the Soviet Union opens the door to fruitful, mutually beneficial cooperation with all states.

Reportage on Perfilyev's 20 Feb Briefing

Thatcher on Germany

LD2002140590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow 20 Feb (TASS)—The Soviet Union has taken heed of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's recent utterance on inter-German affairs, said Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry information directorate, at a briefing today. In the opinion of the Soviet side, he said, it shows a "balanced approach and a responsible understanding of the fact that the development of events in the direction of rapprochement between the two German states is of enormous significance for the overall situation in Europe and for international relations generally."

It is perfectly obvious, went on Vadim Perfilyev, that the process of unification of the German states must take account of the security interests of all countries in Europe and must not lead to the emergence of a new source of instability on the continent.

"One can agree wholly with the words that none of us—whether in East or West Europe, including the Soviet Union—must feel less secure following German unification," stressed the diplomat.

The British side's approach to the work of the machinery for drafting the international context to unification, as agreed recently in Ottawa—the four powers plus the GDR and the FRG—is close to the Soviet approach, went on Vadim Perfilyev. "Unquestionably, the foreign aspects of German unification must be the subject of very serious consultations among the 'six', so as to analyze the whole gamut of problems that stem from German unification and work out solutions that go farthest toward meeting the security interests of all European states," he said. "Clearly, there should be no delay in starting such consultations at expert level."

"Of course, the Soviet and British approaches are not absolutely identical," the Soviet diplomat stressed in conclusion. "But Great Britain's readiness to take account of the interests of all parties concerned is heading in the direction of generally acceptable accords."

U.S. Forces in South Korea

LD2002153890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—In Moscow, attention has been drawn to reports that during the recent visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney to Seoul, it was agreed to begin talks on a partial reduction—of 5,000 men—of the number of American troops in that country. This was stated at a briefing today by Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the Information Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"If Washington," noted the representative of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "is proceeding from a serious intention of promoting a reduction in tension in Korea, then the accord that was reached in Seoul can be assessed positively, as the start of a process of reduction, and in the future possibly of complete withdrawal, of U.S. troops from South Korea." At the same time, stressed Vadim Perfilyev, one cannot but note that "the planned reduction—numerically a small one—only affects auxiliary units and is, as is being reported, primarily dictated by financial considerations."

The Soviet diplomat also drew attention to the fact that the defense ministers of the United States and South Korea spoke a great deal in Seoul about the continued existence of the so-called "threat from North Korea." He assessed such statements as without foundation. In this context, he recalled that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is advancing a considerable number of initiatives aimed at reducing armed forces in the North and South of Korea.

In the Soviet Union, Vadim Perfilyev stated, it is considered that the elimination of military confrontation in Korea will create a favorable political climate for breaking the impasse in the dialogue between the Koreas and for a peaceful and just settlement of the Korean problem by the Koreans themselves. He added that this would be promoted to the greatest extent by implementation of the constructive proposals made by both Korean sides and by the reduction to zero of the number of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula.

U.S. 'Rigidity' on COCOM

LD2002155390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1432 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—At a briefing today, Vadim Perfilyev, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's information directorate, expressed perplexity in connection with the U.S. position in the Coordinating Committee for Control of Exports (COCOM) regarding limits for the Soviet Union.

Referring to a report by the U.S. Government radio station "Voice of America," the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that at the meeting of the COCOM member countries "the United States spoke against weakening export limitations as regards the USSR." Moreover, Vadim Perfilyev said, a high-ranking U.S. spokesman, commenting on the U.S. position at the meeting of this body, noted that access for the Soviet Union to Western technology cannot be facilitated since the USSR, he said, represents "a real threat to the West."

"The Soviet Union," the USSR Foreign Ministry representative stated in this connection, "is not asking for, and does not intend to ask from the United States or anyone else, special privileges as regards 'strategic' technology and goods and is fully able to manage with its own not insignificant capabilities. But we do not want artificial barriers to brake the process of forming Soviet-U.S. cooperation, including the economic and trade sphere."

Such "rigidity of position," Vadim Perfilyev added, goes against the stated U.S. Administration's position as regards the Soviet Union and against "what we are told at talks by even higher ranking U.S. spokesmen."

"Plans to introduce obstacles on the path to mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States harm not only Soviet-U.S. dialogue," he stressed, "but contradict the whole complex of East-West international cooperation and European cooperation and the task of overcoming the division of the world into opposing blocs."

Vadim Perfilyev also indicated that neither are they compatible with the spirit of recent Soviet-U.S. agreements, "the main aims of which are to encourage the natural process of broadening economic links between the two countries, cooperation in a mutually advantageous division of labor and coproduction, and an increase in compatibility of Soviet and U.S. economic mechanisms."

Aviation Cooperation Deal

LD2002183490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] The USSR Government has taken the decision to open Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Bukhta Provideniya as international airports, for one-off flights for the time being, Comrade Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate, announced today at a briefing.

Apart from this, the matter of opening Anadyr and Magadan as international airports is also being considered. This is the outcome of talks in Washington, as a result of which a memorandum has been signed on cooperation between the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and the USSR Ministry of Civilian Aviation. This document in particular defines cooperation in the sphere of coordination between the air traffic administration bodies of the USSR and the United States, the organization of new international routes between Alaska and the Far East.

Other matters were also considered at the briefing.

TASS Summary

LD2002182390 Moscow TASS in English 1640 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—The recent statement of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with regard to German reunification was noted in the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

"The Soviet side is of the opinion that the statement shows a balanced approach and the awareness that

developments towards rapprochement of the two German states are of great importance for the situation in Europe and international relations," Perfilyev said.

"The Soviet and the British approaches are certainly not absolutely the same," he said. "But Britain's readiness to take into consideration the interests of all the parties concerned, promotes the achievement of mutually acceptable arrangements."

The spokesman then commented on reports that the United States and South Korea have agreed to begin talks on a partial reduction of American troops in South Korea.

The agreement, reached during U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney's recent visit to Seoul, is about negotiations to cut the U.S. contingent in South Korea by 5,000 men over the next three years.

"If Washington seriously intends to help ease tension in Korea, the Seoul understanding can be welcomed as heralding the start of the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea and their subsequent complete withdrawal from that country," Perfilyev said.

He noted, however, that "the projected cuts, which are limited, will cover only support units and have been reportedly dictated first of all by financial considerations."

Perfilyev commented on results of a recent seminar on the Palestinian people's rights, held in Buenos Aires.

He said the Soviet approach to a Middle East settlement, set forth by the Soviet delegation headed by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vladiislovas Mikuchyauskas, was received with understanding by other participants in the seminar.

The seminar called for the early convocation of an international conference on the Middle East and for the active involvement of the U.N. in its preparations.

Seminar participants emphasised the importance of efforts to start a direct Palestinian-Israeli dialogue.

Pointing to the danger of the Israeli leadership's plans to settle immigrants on the occupied territories, they said such actions would be illegitimate and would complicate the achievement of a just and comprehensive solution of the Palestinian problem.

Asked about reports that Afghan opposition groups were ready to "help" protesters in Tajikistan, Perfilyev recalled Afghan President Najibullah's statements on this subject and a press conference by the Soviet ambassador in Kabul.

"Any interference in any event of another country is impermissible," the spokesman said. "The Soviet Union has always abided by this stand and any attempts to speculate on the developments in the USSR can only be described as interference."

Reshetov Cited on Currency, Free Travel

PM1602121590

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 February 1990 Morning Edition carries on page 5 under the headline "We Are Prepared To Receive COCOM Inspectors" a 600-word report by "our correspondent" G. Charodeyev on a "routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists" addressed by G.I. Gerasimov and Yu.A. Reshetov. The report cites Gerasimov on COCOM and Atkinson's proposal at the WEU Assembly and continues:

"Yu.A. Reshetov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry directorate for international humanitarian cooperation and human rights, then spoke.

"A correspondent from the newspaper AKAHATA asked him: Why are USSR citizens still forbidden to have hard currency?

"'If you, as a citizen of the USSR, have currency which has been earned legally,' the Foreign Ministry spokesman replied, 'no one can prevent you from using it as you see fit. A bank has been created for this where the possessors of currency have their own personal accounts. It is another matter when, because of bureaucratic red tape, it is not that simple to obtain your currency in this institution when you travel abroad. Not only are Soviet citizens not forbidden to have currency but, on the contrary, with every passing day there is an increasing number of people who possess dollars or pounds.'

"A SANA agency correspondent asked: Soviet citizens now have the opportunity to go to live permanently abroad. When will they have the right to free movement within the country?

"'A decision in principle was taken recently on preparing a legislative act on the passport system within whose framework it is proposed to resolve the question of registration. This will be done in the next few months.'"

EC Ministers To Debate European Bank Plan

PM1602161190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Package of Problems"]

[Text] Brussels, 12 Feb—Questions of creating a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and strengthening the integration of "Common Market" countries were the center of attention at a routine session of the EC Council of Ministers which opened today. The finance ministers of the "Twelve" taking part in it will familiarize themselves with the results of recent consultations with representatives of the EBRD founder countries as regards its status. As the EUROPE bulletin, which is closely connected with

leading EC circles notes, the first results of the consultations make it possible to expect that its status will be ratified in April of this year.

Nevertheless, several unsolved problems remain, including the problem of conditions for the Soviet Union's participation in the EBRD. According to reports in EUROPE, the overwhelming majority of EC countries believe that these conditions should not be too harsh "so as not to create additional difficulties for the USSR."

The ministers will also discuss problems connected with the creation of a financial-economic union by the 12 "Common Market" countries, the first stage of which will start 1 July this year. The session will discuss forming a mechanism for consultations which will make it possible to coordinate the policies of the West European partners in this sphere.

The FRG delegation is expected to brief the participants in the session on Bonn's proposals for forming a currency-financial union with the GDR. EC leading organs have not yet expressed their opinions on this idea, but the fear is being expressed in circles closely connected with them that its implementation may have negative consequences for the European monetary system, which regulates the correlation between the exchange rates of the "Common Market" countries' currencies.

Shishlin on Failure of Socialism, Future Options

PM1602161390 Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 23 Jan 90 p 15

[Article by "CPSU Central Committee senior official" Nikolay Shishlin: "The Death of Communist Ideology"]

[Text] The avalanche of changes in the East European countries is dismantling the seemingly monolithic structures of the Stalinist model of social organization. State institutions and parties are disintegrating, and the old ideological attire is falling to pieces. Perestroyka to some extent prepared the ground for the changes.

What the East European countries are abandoning is obvious. People have said "no" to the authoritarian system and to the absolute monopoly of power by a single party. People are saying "no" to ideological obscurantism, baseness, corruption, and the conduct of the majestic holders of power. The list of these "nos" could be continued, but, I repeat, there is some clarity about the matter.

It is much more difficult to answer other questions. What path will the East European countries follow? In what direction will social thinking go? What features will prevail in the development of the states regarded yesterday as countries of the socialist community?

Briefly, the answers could be as follows:

First: Socialism has failed. Communist ideology is dead. The future lies in a return to the democratic bourgeois organization of society.

Second: In the international confrontation between communists and social democrats, the latter had truth on their side. Social democracy's prescriptions should be used to cure the ills of the East European states.

Third: The revolutionary changes will lead to the purification of the socialist ideal. Emancipated society will be able quite soon to recover what has been lost, will put an end to false values, and will attain truly socialist values.

Each of the above-mentioned opinions is feasible, but, in the first place, I do not believe that it is possible to draft a single program for the states which have opted for the path of renewal.

Second, not a rigid alternative but a synthesis of individual and worldwide experience accumulated during the advance toward the future is more likely. Undoubtedly, the national tinge of the decisions taken could be intensified, initially.

At the same time, I believe that reference points such as democracy, the consolidation of individual rights and freedoms, the preeminence of human values, the surmounting of mankind's alienation with relation to ownership, the creation of a self-regulating economy, and the careful handling of each people's moral and spiritual values will determine the actions of the social forces with which rests the key role in the destinies of our country and of the friendly states.

The abandonment of the past inevitably has a dramatic, and in some cases, bloody character, which is to be regretted. Comment is superfluous.

It would be dangerous for social well-being if people's energies, renewed under conditions of freedom, were used entirely to settle scores. Each society will be able to advance if it accords priority to creative aims and if reason and justice triumph in social relations.

Certainly, 1990 will be a hectic year for the Soviet Union and for the East European countries. Surprises— not always pleasant ones—also await us, but I am convinced that the changes in favor of democracy will be all the more stable the more diverse, rich, and harmonious the character acquired by relations among the CEMA founder countries. Countless very difficult tasks lie ahead.

But the changes which have been made create a good basis for performing them in stages. I would like the new opportunities to be accompanied by a new sense of responsibility. Then the success of renewal will be guaranteed.

Doctrine Seminar Will Advance Vienna Talks

PM1602165690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 5, 4 Feb 90 p 1

[Vladimir Ulyev interview with Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy; date, place not given: "This Was Useful"; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A seminar on military doctrines within the framework of the Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe is now in its second week. Participants include high-ranking military representatives, diplomats and prominent scientists from 35 countries. MOSCOW NEWS's Vladimir Ulyev queried Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation.

Q: Can the first assessments be given?

A: Never before in the history of Europe have the chiefs of staff from practically all European countries plus the USA and Canada come together around one table. A year or two ago just the thought of it might have seemed heretical. Frankly speaking, when we suggested the idea of having such a seminar, at the talks on confidence-building measures here in Vienna, we saw the task as modest: to compare and discuss existing military doctrines and thus promote better understanding of each other's intentions. The first result is confidence - it has definitely increased.

And here's the second result. Even in the first week the discussions threw light on many points of contact in the approaches of East and West. This does not mean, however, that all participants have identical views as to what levels and what structures of the armed forces can be considered consistent with the criteria of reasonable sufficiency.

We tried to explain our concerns in connection with NATO concepts like "flexible response", "nuclear deterrence", and "follow-on-forces attack", with the existence of the North Atlantic Alliance's powerful offensive potential, including the naval force and the "rapidly deployable force." And NATO countries voiced their concern that the armed forces of the Soviet Union were still larger than need be.

These discussions will hardly dispell all doubts, but they will definitely help in looking for a solution to the specific disarmament problems.

Q: Can the current discussion on military doctrines affect the course of the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe?

A: I believe that the seminar will be instrumental in their advancement. Besides discussing doctrinal questions, the seminar participants have shared extensive and detailed information on the composition, structure and the mechanism for controlling and manning their national armies, the weapons and hardware systems. Needless to say, with this "data bank" at our disposal, it is easier to work at the talks.

But the most important thing is that the seminar has helped create a favourable political climate on the European continent, and eliminate suspicion and mistrust among Europeans. And this is the best way to promote understanding at the Vienna talks.

Moscow Radio Views German Reunification Issue

LD1602191290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From the "International Situation—Questions and Answers" program presented by Yevgeniy Osipovskiy, foreign political commentator, with Aleksandr Zholkver, political observer]

[Text] Greetings, comrades. Letters continue to come in to our program from listeners asking about the situation in the countries of East Europe and about problems of the future of Europe as a whole. In this connection, questions about the reunification of Germany are particularly prominent. And here many people do not conceal their disquiet and write about the threat of the GDR's being swallowed up and the revival in Germany of nationalist, neo-fascist, and revanchist forces. We have asked Aleksandr Zholkver, political observer, who in the past has been our correspondent in Berlin and Bonn, to reply to these letters.

[Zholkver] At the start of this month I once again had occasion to visit the FRG where, since the opening of the frontier with the GDR, there are now very many guests from the other German state. And I saw the degree of importance that various people were giving to restoring the unity of their homeland. But I also saw something else. After the initial euphoria, many are now asking how this process will proceed. Will it not cause new complications, including economic and social ones, both in the GDR and the FRG?

These problems have just been discussed in Bonn at a meeting between FRG Chancellor Kohl and Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers Modrow. Their approaches to the question of German unification differ. Modrow's plan envisages gradual progress from a treaty-based community of the two German states to their confederation based on joint responsibility to the german people and all the peoples of Europe. This would serve the interests of stability and trust in the region. The Modrow plan also envisages preserving the interests and rights of the four powers of the anti-Hitler coalition set down not only in the Potsdam agreement but also in the UN charter. At the same time, the head of the GDR Government proposes settling all the issues which arose as a result of World War II and in the post-war period, including the presence of foreign troops on German territory and the two German states' membership of military alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It also involves the matter of concluding, at last, a peace treaty with Germany.

The essence of what are known as Kohl's ten points which were confirmed in his governmental statement in the bundestag this week is quite different. They are in effect aimed at including the GDR within the FRG and thus in NATO. At the same time direct interference in the GDR's internal affairs is being committed by imposing on it the FRG's currency and its economic and social model.

True, there are other opinions in the FRG, too. During the discussion of the government statement in the Bundestag, Vogel, leader of the Social Democratic opposition, called for the plans for anschluss of the GDR to be renounced and for the unification of Germany to be carried out in the spirit of partnership with the preservation of the democratic bodies and social achievements in the GDR. The West German Greens Party also calls for restraint in the gradual drawing together of the two German states.

But, apart from this, everyone understands that as well as the purely internal problems of the unification of Germany—from the relationship between the currencies of the two German states to levelling out their economic and social systems—there are other, no less important questions which directly affect the interests of many other countries and their borders and security. As I have already noted, this affects primarily the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition. It is no coincidence that during the talks which took place this week in the Canadian capital, they put forward the proposal to hold in the very hear future a special meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Britain, and France, and also the FRG and the GDR, to discuss the external aspects of the unification of Germany. This was also discussed during the recent conversations between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the heads of government of the two German states; during the whole range of meetings which Comrade Shevardnadze had in Ottawa; during the talks between Great Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher and FRG Foreign Minister Genscher; and at the Paris meeting between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl.

Despite all the differences in the level and character of these meetings, it was noted everywhere that the settlement of the German question could not be separated from strengthening peace and security in Europe and overcoming the split in Europe.

Of course, the methods proposed to achieve this vary greatly. Thus, for example, U.S. President Bush and NATO General Secretary Woerner who are meeting in Washington these days have declared that a united Germany should be a member of the Atlantic alliance. Chancellor Kohl adhered to a similar point of view in his government statement in the Bundestag.

However, because so many people, and not only in our country, have pointed out the illusory nature of such a position, Bush himself does not exclude flexibility on the question of where exactly NATO troops should be located. In any event, it is quite evident that they should not advance to the western border of Poland. By the way, the Polish Government itself is now particularly insistently calling for the Oder-Neisse to be confirmed, something which unfortunately the present head of the FRG Government still does not agree to at all.

Let me add that in recent days the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Norway, and Italy have made appeals for a close link to be established between the unification of Germany and the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. And the Austrian president has considered it essential to particularly stress that the unification of Germany should not in any event lead to a new anschluss of his country.

Thus, there are more than enough different aspects in building Germany unity, including questions of the security of neighboring countries. And it is a very good thing that all of these questions will soon be taken up by the ministers of the six states.

United States & Canada

Shevardnadze Addresses Canadian Parliament

PM1902144590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
First Edition 16 Feb 90 p 5

["Address at Canada's Parliament"—TASS headline]

[Text] Eaduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign minister, who was paying an official visit to Canada, addressed a joint session of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee and the Committee for Financial, Trade, and Economic Affairs, and the Senate Affairs Committee 15 February. Addressing the parliamentarians, E.A. Shevardnadze said:

Esteemed Mr. Chairman!

Ladies and gentlemen!

It is a great honor to address the members of the Canadian Parliament.

In conversation with M.S. Gorbachev on the eve of my departure for Ottawa, I mentioned the fact that this kind of meeting was on the program of the visit. Remembering well his address before the permanent committees of the House of Commons and the Senate during his visit to Canada in 1983, he asked me to convey to you and to all your fellow citizens his best wishes for success and prosperity.

The "Open Skies" Conference which is taking place here in Ottawa has become the background for our meeting. This important and major landmark in the history of international relations signifies the further assertion of glasnost in politics, or to put it more precisely, of honesty and frankness.

The great Russian playwright A.N. Ostrovskiy approached this problem in his own way, calling one of his plays "Truth Is Fine, But Happiness Is Better." Indeed, what is preferable: the worry that comes from knowing the truth, or the peace that comes from ignorance?

In our country, perhaps, we have taken too long to solve this dilemma, though we have finally said decisively that truth is better and that there can be no happiness outside the truth. True, not everyone agrees with this, and those who follow our internal debates have been able to convince themselves of this with some very fresh examples.

But the essence of perestroyka has been, is, and will be in this choice of society in favor of truth. We are confident that it is only through truth that we will indeed be able to arrive at a humane and democratic socialism, at a law-governed state.

We said to ourselves: If we call ourselves a socialist society and want to be such, then we must consistently implement the principles of equality and freedom. They cannot exist when one party has a monopoly on power. They cannot exist without a full set of forms of ownership, without freedoms for the individual person, without real rights for collectives and associations, without real rights for every republic and any national formation and national minority.

They cannot exist without full democracy, supported by a highly developed feeling of civic responsibility and respect for the law. That is why the question has arisen today of establishing in the country the institution of presidential authority, one that possesses full power. We felt that it would be difficult without this.

The introduction of a democratic political system is essential in order to transform our economy. Only a lawful authority elected by the people will be able to obtain its support in implementing such painful measures as a reform of price formation and structural changes in the national economy.

Yes, our country is now ailing. We are grateful to those who sympathize with us, who want Soviet people to deal with, who want to deal with the difficulties more quickly and emerge from the crisis. We do not even make claims against those who gloat over our condition and our problems these days. On the contrary, we are willing to sympathize with them, for they prefer self-deception and self-glorification to the truth.

Everyone who wants to understand what is taking place with Soviet society has to ask the main question: Is it beginning to get sick or is it setting off along the road to recovery?

I don't think that there is even anything to discuss here.

A society which has said that it will live according to the truth, that it will place above all else values common to the whole of mankind and the dignity of the individual, and in them seek happiness, cannot fail to cope with its difficulties.

There is no need to fear for a country which rejects force as a means of solving internal or external problems of whatever kind. A state which does not want confrontation but cooperation and interaction, which does not invent enemies for itself but which seeks friends, will certainly survive.

We believe in the success of perestroyka, we believe that we will be not only a large and strong country, but that we will be a well- appointed, truly civilized human home.

Of course, time will be needed for this. Time, not only for material development, but for the psychological adaptation of people to the changes and to the new realities.

One sometimes hears reproaches that perestroyka is going slowly, that the most radical methods are not being

selected. Evidently, it is meanwhile forgotten that the entire society has to accomplish the transition to a new condition, that we cannot move forwards while abandoning those, who for various reasons, do not accept or cannot withstand a rapid pace of change.

More than once in the history of our state there have been attempts at radical and abrupt change to not only the conditions of life, but also to the people themselves. These attempts have ended in great tragedies. Humane socialism, moreover, may not be built upon casualties, although, why try to hide it: Some people would like to advance even perestroyka by force, while others would like to halt it by force.

I have no doubts that a consensus in favor of regular, consistent movement towards the stated goals, movement that is kind to people, has formed in our society in the past five years. We are advancing along such a path, understanding that because of this, not everything gets done as quickly as one wishes.

I would like to turn the theme of truth and happiness, and the interconnection between them, to a somewhat different set of issues which, in my view, are today very topical both for the Soviet Union and for Canada.

I have in mind European affairs, and primarily the question of German unity. But first of all, I would like to say a few words about those changes that have taken place in the countries of Eastern Europe.

We unambiguously and unreservedly welcome the democratic revolutions that have taken place there. We and our allies are moving in the same direction; we are moving away from impracticable, imposed administrative-barracks models of the organization of social life.

In the context of Eastern Europe "socialism"—in the forms in which it developed there—is a phenomenon not only alien but also running counter to the historical experience of the countries of that part of Europe and to the natural development of their civilization. Such a distorted "socialism" could not exist for an indefinite period, anyway. Perestroyka, which began in the USSR, predetermined its end and created the conditions for implementing democratic changes in the countries of Eastern Europe.

I would like to say straight out that this is not an attempt to put a good face on things. It is in our national interest, our historical, and even our daily interest to ensure that the states that are our neighbors are stable and prosperous. We can only gain from this.

Just as Canada is linked by many threads with its neighbor in the south, so we have deep and consequential links with all the countries of Eastern Europe. This is the factor which will, to a considerable extent, determine the future, too.

The USSR, for example, does not fear going over to trade and economic relations with payments being made in convertible currency and at world prices. If the GDR and the FRG, for example, are to have a common currency, this will be to our advantage. Last year, we supplied the GDR with 17 million tonnes of oil and about 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

The USSR is a major market for engineering products and consumer goods from East European countries. We expect that the volumes of our reciprocal trade will remain high and the quality of goods will be higher.

We have no political problems on the question of the presence of our troops. Two years ago we said our aim was not to have a single soldier outside our national borders. We have now made the political decision to withdraw our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and reduce the number in Poland. Soviet troops in Germany are a special case. They are staying.

There is one difficulty here. We would like to have time to carry out the necessary conversion measures within the country to provide housing and jobs for the servicemen returning home.

I am sure that in the future, too, we will have very good-neighborly relations with neighboring states based on respect and mutual advantage.

Believe me, today you must go a long way and look hard to find a country with which the USSR has bad relations. There are problems, but no really acute ones and certainly no enmity.

I would particularly like to dwell on the question of German unity. Needless to say, here very complicated material has been touched on that has many aspects—acute, sensitive, and psychologically loaded ones.

This is a case where at least two truths collide, and it is very difficult to reconcile them.

No one doubts the right of the Germans in the GDR and the FRG to self-determination. But equally certain is the right of Germany's neighbors and the European states to have guarantees that a united Germany, if it is created, will not be a threat to them, that it will not raise the question of a review of European borders, and that Nazism and fascism will not revive in it.

We and Canada were allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Canadian sailors conducted convoys of ships along the most dangerous sea route—across the Barents Sea to Murmansk. Quite recently more than 70 veterans of these aid convoys received Soviet awards. People in the USSR remember our comradeship in arms in the most terrible of wars.

I am discussing this to remind you that millions of people in our countries experienced this war. It has scorched millions of families.

They do not harbor hatred or other unfriendly feelings toward the German people, but they have the right to warn politicians of their responsibility both for the past and the future.

Here the interrelationship between truth and happiness turns a new face to us.

It is probably unpleasant for Germans both in the East and the West to hear a few things, and they do not want to be reminded of certain periods in the past. New generations have grown up that have nothing to do with what happened. But are there not neofascists today and does not the Republican Party have support?

I think that above all, the Germans themselves need to know how all this is perceived by others. Perhaps I am wrong. That is why I proposed the idea of an all-European referendum with Canada and the United States participating in order to learn the view of people in the world and in Europe concerning the idea of German unity. I will explain once again: It is not a matter of deciding the question of the Germans' self-determination in this way, but only of elucidating the attitude towards it in other countries concerned.

I admit that in some places, they will want to conduct referendums and opinion polls in some form or other, and in other places, parliaments and public organizations will have their say.

The German question has come to us at a very difficult time. It so happens that some dozen European countries are now simultaneously in transition from one state to another. Among them are both the Soviet Union and Germany. In the very best of circumstances, such a period entails great dangers.

And it would not be farsighted to regard the present European situation in isolation from worldwide realities, from the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, from the state of the world economy, in particular from the growing indebtedness of many countries, from ecological problems and the continuing threat of a nuclear catastrophe and other possible shocks.

Europe is not quite the entire world. The former does not exist without the latter, and that is why Europe cannot live without paying attention to what is taking place in other regions, without falling into step with such giants like China, India, Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, and many other countries.

Thirty-five states are a great force. Their authoritative view and practical participation can also help in settling conflicts in various regions—in the Near East, in the Mediterranean, in Central America and elsewhere—and in spreading the processing of disarmament and eliminating structures of military confrontation.

There are various attitudes one might take towards the present situation in the world as a whole. But one is bound to recognize that for the first time, it has acquired an acceptable degree of political stability and steadiness.

And now before our eyes many things—very difficult ones, moreover—have started to budge and move in unpredictable directions.

In such a situation, it is essential to weigh up each move, to act with caution and circumspection.

There are some politicians, however, who want to play out a game of political speed chess with a five-minute time limit. Would this be sensible when the peace and the security of all peoples—without exaggeration—are at stake?

We are not alone in believing that it is absolutely essential to proceed only one step at a time, stage by stage, on this matter, to abandon one thing for another only when the consequences are clear.

People naturally tend to set their sights on good results, but in politics, one has to take into account the very worst scenarios as well.

The German question teaches us another lesson too: One must not put off until later the resolving of issues related to war and peace. If we managed to reach an agreement and begin implementing a program to dismantle the structure of the military confrontation in Europe, there would be a calmer attitude and more understanding towards the problem of German unity as well.

We have not rushed into scrapping nuclear weapons, ending nuclear tests, or reinforcing the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regimen, and we are now attempting to find hasty answers to nightmarish questions: what would happen if...

Or else, let's take the situation regarding the military-political blocs in Europe. A lot is now being said about them possibly playing a stabilizing role in German affairs, and yet it's clear that they will only be able to play such a role if they are fundamentally reconstructed, if they are transformed from mechanisms of confrontation into an instrument of maintaining European political balance and stability in Europe.

The fact that we have, nonetheless, managed to shape and push forward the all-European process is somewhat encouraging. If you remember, attitudes towards it were not always unequivocal, to put it mildly.

Today this is, essentially, the one insurance mechanism on which we can rely in the matter of maintaining European stability.

It would be extremely unwise if in Europe "flights" from one condition to another took place outside this insurance network. The German question must remain and be discussed within the general European process and go in the same direction that all Europe is going—toward the strengthening of security and the development of cooperation.

It should, in our view, become one of the main subjects on the agenda for the summit meeting of the European countries, Canada, and the United States in 1990.

And if this is the case, then we must embark more swiftly on its preparation. For instance, it could be possible to

hold a conference of experts of 35 states as early as March. Further, it undoubtedly would require a gathering of foreign ministers who could agree on an agenda and draft documents for the "big meeting."

We believe that the leaders should not only sign agreements on conventional arms and confidence-building measures, but should also discuss the question of further steps in the sphere of disarmament and security in Europe.

I think a serious conversation should take place on military doctrines. They are the root of military structures. One must speak out unequivocally for the transfer of all the major member-states of the general European process to the principle of minimum sufficiency for defense needs.

The seminar held in Vienna was a very useful measure, but it is time to move from discussions to concrete deeds.

The main thing is that the top leaders of the member-countries of the Helsinki process should determine the political approaches to the new processes in Europe, first and foremost in connection with the problem of rapprochement between the two German states.

It is important, in our opinion, to begin shaping a system of general European dimensions, including legal and humanitarian ones. In this context it is possible, too, to examine the concept of a political declaration on the principle of free, democratic elections. It is very important to develop the general European economic structures more boldly.

When speaking of the Helsinki process, we cannot avoid the question of the need for new forms of security and cooperation within its framework. For example, we should not delay in tackling the issue of establishing a center to avert military danger.

The time has come to think about setting up a permanent body—a committee of foreign ministers, for example—and establishing some kind of permanent working bodies, even modest ones, something like a secretariat or a documentation center.

Quite a few ideas exist on this score. Interesting proposals have been expressed, particularly by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Skubiszewski.

In short, we must begin acting immediately and actively and impart new dynamism to development of the pan-European process.

It is very important for the great powers, which bear particular responsibility for German affairs, to interact closely with each other and with the two German states.

It is good that a very important mutual understanding was reached here, in Ottawa, at the meeting of the foreign ministers of six countries, on commencing discussion of the issue of the external aspects of the movement toward German unity, including problems affecting the security of neighboring countries. Let us hope that your capital is "a lucky one." Ottawa also has "blessed" another very important accord—the one on ceilings for the numbers of Soviet and U.S. troops in Europe.

These agreements are the start of a series which, in the event of its successful continuation, might make this year, 1990, unique for its progress in the area of security.

I think the issue of conventional armed forces reductions in Europe has been predetermined to a significant degree by what has been achieved here, in Ottawa.

It is necessary to bring tactical nuclear weapons into this process as well. I want to remind you that the Soviet Union would accept a considerable reduction in its missiles in this class right from the start of serious negotiations with NATO on them. There is confidence now that we will manage at last to make the skies open at the next round of talks in Budapest.

The talks with Mr. Baker in Wyoming and Moscow increased by another order of magnitude the possibility of elaborating a treaty on 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons and taking a big step towards a nonnuclear world as early as this year.

The Soviet Union and the United States are close to concluding a bilateral agreement, according to which, even before a convention banning chemical weapons comes into force, they will destroy the greater proportion of their arsenals of those weapons.

The "cold war" is receding into the past but, to prevent its return, the material basis of confrontation and military opposition must be destroyed.

The year 1990 could be decisive in this respect. Whether it will be or not depends on our common desire and joint efforts.

I think that I cannot leave this platform without assessing the state and future of Soviet-Canadian relations. They are now being built on the firm foundation of the political declaration signed by the top leaders of the USSR and Canada, reflecting both the new thinking in mutual views on the world and each other, as well as the aspiration of the two countries and peoples to build qualitatively new relations.

This, incidentally, is also demonstrated in parliamentary links. In the autumn of last year, a Canadian parliamentary delegation headed by Mr. Fraser, speaker of the House of Commons, and Mr. Charbonneau, speaker of the Senate, went to the USSR on an official visit.

Now a delegation of USSR people's deputies is preparing to come to you.

We are pleased with the increasing volume of human contacts. You see, for many Canadians, the Soviet Union is the land of their forbears. Now the citizens of both countries have the opportunity to reestablish family ties.

The treaty basis of our relations is also being consistently strengthened. We possess a sound packet of operating bilateral agreements which are significantly broadening the range of mutually advantageous cooperation.

A major step forward was made in the course of the visit by Prime Minister B. Mulroney to the USSR in November 1989. A document was signed on the encouragement and mutual protection of capital investments and the Canadian-Soviet business council was established. Over 20 agreements on the creation of joint ventures, providing for Canadian investments in the Soviet economy to the sum of $1 billion [Canadian dollars], have been concluded.

After McDonald's acquainted Muscovites with the "Big Mac" many people felt the taste of real business cooperation. At the other extreme of this are heavy, all-terrain vehicles for the Arctic which will be produced together with the Foremost Company. There are important projects in the sphere of the timber, pulp and paper, oil and gas industries.

Recalling my Ottawa meeting with Canadian businessmen in 1986, I can see that they have developed wisely and well.

Our 20 years of cooperation in the Arctic are unique. Now this cooperation will be implemented on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement.

Ecology also has long been our common concern. In this sphere, the previous agreements have added by four more, including a document on environmental protection in the Arctic.

Contacts are developing between our union republics and Canadian provinces. A corresponding agreement on this was signed during B. Mulroney's visit.

The bilateral political dialogue at the summit level—my conversations with Mr. Mulroney and with my colleague Minister Clark—revealed an increased degree of agreement on a broad circle of international problems, proximity, and, in a number of cases, similarity of approaches to the search for ways of settling various conflict situations burdening world politics.

Of course, disagreements do exist but the general tendency is now such that they do not separate but rather stimulate the desire to understand and take account of each other's interests.

A particular place in our cooperation is occupied by the Arctic aspect of security, because the Arctic is our common northern "roof." The USSR consistently comes out in support of turning the Arctic into a zone of peace, free from nuclear weapons, for reducing military activity and the level of military confrontation in this region. The initiatives put forward in Murmansk go precisely in this direction and are, in our view, a good basis for deepening dialogue with Canada.

We are doing a lot together, and I think that we are doing it quite well, but we should do it even better so that our peoples can live in the common European and world home as good neighbors.

Here in Canada, I have once again been convinced that human togetherness and the belonging to a single civilization stand above and transcend the narrowness of dogmatic ideologies and the limitations of class-based approaches.

We have had talks with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney which were surprising for their frankness and warmth. A shared outlook has made it possible for me and my friend Joe Clark to work very productively and to reinforce trust and understanding.

The meetings with the parliamentary faction of the ruling Progressive Conservative Party proved to be emotional and will be memorable for me. We saw here ardent support for our perestroyka, people's hopes for its success, and respect for the renewed Soviet Union. It is said that two great creators—history and nature—have seen to it that our countries should be natural partners with coinciding interests, both national ones and ones common to all people.

Soviet people have always seen a friend in the land of the red maple leaf. And we can now say with great justification that they have not been mistaken.

Moscow TV Queries Matlock About Baker Visit

LD1702194290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Interview with U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock by Valeriy Korzin on the "International Panorama" program in studio, date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Korzin] Good afternoon or even perhaps good evening. The first subject of our meeting today is Soviet-U.S. relations. It is understandable that the world's political barometers are very sensitive to any changes in relations between Moscow and Washington. We can state with satisfaction that the these barometers' readings are moving increasingly from gloomy clouds to clear weather. You know very well that quite recently U.S. Secretary of State James Baker paid a visit to the USSR. It is by discussing the importance of this visit that we wish to open our conversation with our guest Mr. Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR.

[Matlock] I think that this visit has produced a great many results. It had a whole number of aims and tasks. The important ones among them were concluding an accord on key questions of the treaty on the 50-percent reductions of strategic weapons. Now there are still three

major questions left that we did not quite resolve during the visit of the secretary of state, but we have advanced a great deal, in my view, toward resolving all thse issues. There was another aim of creating mutual understanding on the question of scrapping chemical weapons, but even as far as this matter is concerned, we have mutual understanding on the way we should proceed toward it. This means, in my view, that this visit did in fact create more positive soil for a summit.

[Korzin] Nevertheless in a number of his speeches President Bush still voices, continues to voice certain apprehensions. For example, quite recently I read one of his most recent speeches. What did he say there? He said that the USSR still has substantial forces. Therefore, military threats to democracy still exist in both hemispheres. Do you think this view was expressed to please the conservatives in some ways or does it reflect Bush's firm convictions and his thinking that the USSR still presents a considerable threat?

[Matlock] You know that presidents must take into account not only intentions but also capabilities. The fact remains that the USSR still has enormous military might, even more so considering it continues to supply arms to some countries that are threatening their neighbors even now. This of course worries us.

The point is that although we do, of course, approve of the Soviet policy course in general, we still cannot act as though a very powerful Soviet Union no longer exists precisely in the military sphere.

[Korzin] What if I were to ask if Washington had more fears or hopes?

[Matlock] I think there is a lot of hope.... Well, I think there is hope. Of course, there is a degree of caution, but I think this is perfectly legitimate, perhaps. [laughter from both]

[Korzin] What can you say about conservative forces in the United States themselves? These exist too.

[Matlock] First, you know I don't think there is a substantial group or, rather, that there is a group with political influence that is opposed to improvements in Soviet-U.S. relations. The vast majority of Americans, I would say 80 percent if not more, are in favor of improving mutual relations and in favor of restructuring's objectives being successfully implemented, and so on. Second, I would say that those we call conservatives should not be confused with those you call conservatives. They are different, completely different trends. Generally I prefer not to apply labels. This sometimes confuses one's understanding of things.

[Korzin] All the same, publications do appear in the United States calling for relations with the Soviet Union not to be developed too hastily.

[Matlock] There are articles of that kind. There are various voices in the United States. That is the essence of democracy. However, you know, what is most important is that our government and President Bush's administration have spoken unamibiguously about that fact that we would like more cooperation.

[Korzin] Continuing with your last thoughts on cooperation, you know, I get the impression that this cooperation, and I mean first of all economic cooperation, is developing far less rapidly and far less efficiently than one would like, and undoubtedly, than is possible.

[Matlock] I agree that improvements in the economic realm are fairly moderate and are not what they should be as of yet. However, I would cite three main barriers: hard currency, red tape, and one could say, the failure of economic mechanisms to dovetail—mainly economic issues, then. Of course, the fact that the ruble is noncovertible is a great barrier. Every firm and businessman wants to be confident that if there is a profit, say, in a joint enterprise, he can ultimately receive it. Without a convertible ruble, such confidence is impossible.

Second, as for red tape, of course your bureaucracy is no worse than ours, but you do have more of it than we do [laughs], and of course for people in business, time is money. Third, there is now a period of, I would say, obscurity because in the process of restructuring some institutions have lost authority; others have not fully gained it; and it is sometimes unclear to whom one should go, who can make decisions, and so on. Perhaps this is merely a transitional phase. That's what I think, but it gets in the way nonetheless. Americans, however, and not only the majority but an overwhelming majority, do wish you success in restructuring and we want more cooperation. I am convinced that this is our future: cooperation, that is, rather than rivalry.

[Korzin] Thank you for talking to us.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Usmanov-Led Delegation Visits Southeast Asia

Group Arrives in Vietnam

PM1402141190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS reports under general heading: "Delegation's Visit"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City, 11 Feb— A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, arrived in Ho Chi Minh City today. The delegation was met at the local airport by Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong, vice chairman of the SRV National Assembly; Le Khac Binh, chairman of Ho Chi Minh City People's Committee; and other officials.

The Soviet guests toured the city of Vung Tao, administrative center of Vung Tao-Con Dao District, where they met with its leaders. The delegation was briefed on the

activity of "Vyetsovpetro" Soviet-Vietnamese joint venture, which has been prospecting for and extracting oil and gas from the continental shelf of the southern SRV since 1982; it also visited the joint venture's mainland base and port and had conversations with Soviet and Vietnamese petroleum industry workers.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation was received tonight by Vo Chi Cong, member of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV Council of State. During the conversation, which proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding, they discussed questions of Soviet-Vietnamese relations and exchanged opinions on the course of the processes of perestroyka in the USSR and renewal in Vietnam.

Over the last few years, Vo Chi Cong declared, there have been turbulent changes in the world, but Soviet-Vietnamese relations have remained sincere and durable. They are based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The process of renewal in Vietnam, Vo Chi Cong emphasized, is in harmony with the process of perestroyka in the USSR. We are learning from the Soviet Union, we are learning from perestroyka, and we are striving to utilize your experience with due consideration for Vietnam's specific conditions.

G.I. Usmanov conveyed cordial greetings from M.S. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. People in the Soviet Union, he said, follow with great attention and sympathy the processes of renewal in the SRV and wish the CPV and the Vietnamese people great successes in this important work. The Soviet delegation head spoke of the achievements and difficulties of perestroyka in the USSR and described the results of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, the Soviet Communists' preparations for the 28th party congress, and the questions of nationwide importance now being solved by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Usmanov Meets Vietnamese Leaders

PM1502145390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Developing Friendly Ties"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh, 13 Feb—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by G.I. Usmanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, paid an official visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV] 9-13 February at the invitation of the SRV National Assembly. The delegation laid a wreath at the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, visited the Ho Chi Minh museum house, laid flowers on the monument to V.I. Lenin in Hanoi, visited Ho Chi Minh City and the Vung Tao-Con Dao special zone, and was familiarized with the work of the "Vyetsovpetro" joint Soviet-Vietnamese petroleum exploration and extraction enterprise, along with that of a number of light industry enterprises cooperating with the Soviet Union.

The delegation was received by Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, and Vo Chi Cong, chairman of the SRV Council of State, and had a meeting with Le Quang Dao, chairman of the National Assembly. In the course of the conversations G.I. Usmanov briefed Vietnamese leaders on the results of the work of the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum. The mutual desire of the CPSU and the CPV and the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples to develop and improve the relations of friendship and unity that have taken shape between the two countries and strengthen cooperation in the international arena in fighting for the peoples' peace and security was confirmed.

Soviet parliamentarians held talks with a SRV National Assembly delegation headed by Vu Oanh, CPV Central Committee secretary, which took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding. The sides informed one another of the activity of USSR and SRV party and state bodies to resolve the tasks of restructuring and renewal in both countries. The delegation head confirmed that solidarity and friendship with the communists and people of Vietnam and the development of comprehensive cooperation with the SRV are the immutable policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation welcomed the Vietnamese working people's success in implementing the Sixth CPV Congress course of renewing society and wished them fresh achievements in this. The Vietnamese parliamentarians expressed gratitude to the CPSU and the entire Soviet people for their years of effective aid and support for Vietnam. They wished the coming 28th CPSU Congress fruitful work and expressed the conviction that the communists and people of the Soviet Union will overcome the difficulties and successfully implement the task of perestroyka. This will help strengthen the USSR and boost its prestige in the international arena.

Expressing satisfaction at the level of development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, the representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the SRV National Assembly advocated the need to enhance the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in the economy and other spheres and study with interest one another's experience in resolving the tasks of party and state building and social, cultural, national, and other problems.

The importance of the accords secured at meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and Nguyen Van Linh for restructuring and adding dynamism to Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation at the contemporary phase was underlined. There was a useful exchange of opinions on questions of further strengthening ties between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the SRV National Assembly and broadening the exchange of work experience

between committees, standing commissions, and groups of deputies from the two countries' supreme representative bodies.

During the discussion of international problems the steady growth of USSR-SRV cooperation, including cooperation between the two countries' parliaments, in consolidating world peace, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific region was noted with satisfaction. The Soviet side expressed support for the constructive efforts made by the SRV and the countries of Indochina with a view to transforming Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and cooperation. Stressing the tremendous significance of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, the Soviet and Vietnamese parliamentarians advocated a political solution to the Cambodian problem with UN involvement on the basis of respect for Cambodia's sovereignty.

Usmanov Comments on Vietnam Visit

LD1702211890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 17 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Comrade Usmanov has been visiting Vietnam. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Usmanov] Perestroyka in our country and renewal in Vietnam are creating new conditions for deepening our cooperation. It is time to change our attitude to Vietnam as a country we have only helped. Our friends have many wishes, and in this they are having no little success in balancing our cooperation to put these questions on a new qualitative basis and enhance the effectiveness of this process. [video shows carpet factory; Usmanov being interviewed] [end recording]

Delegation Begins Cambodia Visit

LD1402104890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0748 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Phnom Penh, 14 February (TASS)—A visit to the State of Cambodia by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by G.I. Usmanov, USSR People's Deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee has begun.

Talks have been held between the Soviet delegation and a delegation from the State of Cambodia's National Assembly led by Mat Ly, member of the Politburo of the KPRP [Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and vice-chairman of the National Assembly of the State of Cambodia. Questions of further developing and deepening relations between the highest representative bodies of the two countries were discussed.

The Soviet parliamentarians informed the Cambodian side about the activity of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the current stage of perestroyka and about the results of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies as well as about work further to improve the country's legislation aimed at deepening democratization, improving the economy, and raising the people's standard of living.

For his part Mat Ly told the Soviet guests about the decisions of the session of the Cambodian State's National Assembly which ended recently and about the basic directions of the activity of the country's supreme legislative body in conditions of the liberalization of economic life which is taking place and given the positive trends which have begun to take shape in the political settlement of the Cambodian problem.

The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation laid a wreath at the monument to fighters who died for the freedom and independence of Cambodia and visited the memorial museum for victims of Pol Pot's genocidal regime.

Usmanov Meets Cambodian Leaders

PM1502161990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Phnom Penh, 14 Feb—The USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy G.I. Usmanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has concluded its visit to the State of Cambodia.

The Soviet delegation had talks with a delegation of the Cambodian National Assembly headed by Mat Ly, member of the KPRP Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the Cambodian National Assembly. Questions of the further development and strengthening of relations between the two countries' top representative organs were discussed.

G.I. Usmanov had a meeting with Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the Cambodian Council of State, and with Chea Sim, member of the KPRP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Cambodian National Assembly.

During the talks the sides exchanged opinions on questions of further developing and strengthening relations between the CPSU and the KPRP and between the two countries' top representative organs. The Soviet delegation head briefed the Cambodian leaders on the main areas of the USSR's foreign and domestic policy, on the results of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, and on the tasks facing the CPSU in further improving internal party democracy, strengthening the prestige of party organs, and stepping up their influence on the process of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. Support was expressed for the State of Cambodia's stance on the question of a just settlement of the Cambodian problem.

The Cambodian leaders spoke about the development of the situation in the country, about measures aimed at

stabilizing the situation in the Cambodian regions bordering on Thailand, and about the KPRP's achievements in implementing the policy of national reconciliation. Heng Samrin and Chea Sim expressed profound gratitude to the USSR for the aid being given to the Cambodian people and came out in support of the Soviet policy of perestroyka, which is opening the way to realizing the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and serves the cause of the renewal of socialism on an international scale. The Cambodian leaders hailed the new political thinking, which is helping to establish peace throughout the world.

Heng Samrin and Chea Sim conveyed to M.S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leadership, and the entire people a wish for all-around successes in the cause of perestroyka.

Group Meets Laos' Kaysone Phomvihan

LD1702160990 Moscow TASS in English 1532 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Vientiane February 17 TASS—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Gumer Usmanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, met Laotian leader Kaysone Phomvihan today.

Usmanov conveyed to Phomvihan and the entire Laotian people greetings from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, his sincere wishes of great success in perestroyka and the country's renewal.

He informed Phomvihan of the results of the February (1990) plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the work of Soviet lawmakers, the content of important bills which are being debated by the current USSR Supreme Soviet session.

During the meeting, the sides noted the identity of Laotian and Soviet views on international problems and approaches to ways of developing the two countries.

The Soviet delegation which visited Laos at the invitation of the Laotian Supreme People's Assembly, departed for Moscow today.

Vietnamese Envoy on Economic Revival in SRV

90UI0358A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Nguyen Manh Kam, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the USSR, by M. Botyan: "The Sources of Strength Lie in the People"]

[Text] [Botyan] Dear Comrade Ambassador! What, in your view, are the most important landmarks in the history of the vanguard of the working people of Vietnam and by what does the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] live today?

[Nguyen Manh Kam] You see, the history of the CPV is inseparably linked with the contemporary history of our country. In the mid-19th century Vietnam was captured by French colonizers. The name of the country was stricken from the political map of the world. The people eked out a miserable existence, and human rights were trampled.

The many uprisings in which the Vietnamese people joined ended in failure. At the start of the 20th century the great Vietnamese patriot Ho Chi Minh arrived in the motherland of the October Revolution, on his way to see Lenin. Here he found the way to the salvation of his people and his country. This way was proletarian revolution. After several years of great organizing work, on 3 February 1930 Ho Chi Minh formed the CPV. This event put an end to the crisis in the route to the liberation of the homeland which Vietnamese patriots had been experiencing for almost 70 years. Only 15 years after its formation did our party, which numbered 5,000 members, call on the people of the whole country to rise to the struggle against the colonizers. Thus was the victory of the 1945 August revolution won. As a result the almost century-old colonial regime was ousted and freedom and independence gained. The first worker-peasant state in Southeast Asia was formed.

After it had won independence, our party had to command two lengthy wars of resistance against the most powerful imperialist forces. As a result of the total liberation of Vietnam the whole country embarked on the path of building socialism. Under Vietnam's conditions there were not then nor are there now any political forces and parties capable of winning independence and building socialism other than the CPV.

[Botyan] Does what you have said mean that your party's activity has been accompanied only by victories?

[Nguyen Manh Kam] Of course not. There have also been blunders, unfortunately. First, they apply to the start of the 1950's, when we carried out agrarian reform mechanically, applying the dogmatic experience of another party, another country. The peasants were separated, and faith in the party declined. Yet the peasantry in our country had always been a support for the struggle since Vietnam is predominantly an agrarian country. A blow was thus struck at the party's cohesion.

The second miscalculation occurred following the country's total liberation and unification. Following reunification, the whole country, under the party's leadership, took the path of socialism. The mistakes lay in the strategic line of economic and social development. In haste, subjectivism, and voluntarism they ignored the objective realities of development. We put the emphasis in the structure of the economy on heavy industry. Without regard for the development of agriculture and the production of consumer goods. In the sphere of management we persisted for a very long time with the bureaucratic tutelary method, ignoring the law of value and commodity-money relationships. Reliance was placed on eliminating as quickly as possible all previous forms of production relations and creating socialist

property belonging to all the people. We in fact failed to recognize the multi-structure nature of the economy, particularly at the first stage of the transition period.

[Botyan] The restructuring processes occurring in the Soviet Union and the East European countries could not have failed to affect your country also. What does perestroyka Vietnam-style mean? What are its specific features?

[Nguyen Manh Kam] Our party's Sixth Congress, which was held in December 1986, put forward the slogan "Look the Truth in the Eye, Tell the Truth, and Act According to the Truth".

The congress adopted a policy of renewing all spheres of the life of our society. However, for two years the situation in the country became increasingly difficult, bad, and complex with every passing day. Inflation developed rapidly. Prices of commodities and food were rising 16-20 percent a month. The value of the currency fell. As a result, the country's economy fell into disarray. The life of the population, which was difficult as it was, deteriorated even more.

And it was only at the start of 1989 that we scored our initial, but very important successes. We have succeeded in halting inflation. We have achieved significant results in agriculture with the aid of the application of a multi-structure economy. Last year we obtained more than 20 million tons of rice. The question of providing the population with food was thus solved. We have even managed to form a reserve, and we can export part of the product to pay off the loan. Further, we have managed to form a common market throughout the country. We have pursued a single price policy and created conditions for the introduction of financial autonomy. The prices on the market have become more stable. The value of our dong (Vietnam's unit of currency) is rising. We have also cut back monetary outflow. We have succeeded in reducing subsidies in all aspects of economic activity.

The results of foreign economic activity have improved. Last year exports increased by a factor of 1.5. The life of the people has become more stable. We have succeeded, finally, in strengthening public order and reducing the level of crime.

Our first successes have been achieved thanks to the application of a number of comprehensive measures. These have been renewal of the structure of the economy and improvement of its mechanism and the development of various structures: state, cooperative, private, private-capitalist, family, and mixed.

But, nonetheless, the results which have been obtained are only a start. They are not that stable as yet. We still have many difficulties because of the centuries-old backwardness and the consequences of the wars. It has to be said that the population's living standard is still very low. And our country has not yet emerged from its serious economic and social crisis. The economy is still inefficient. In foreign trade imports exceed exports. We lack raw material and intermediate products. Enterprises are working to only 50-60 percent of capacity. Our goods are not yet of a very high quality. However, the process of renewal continues.

The policy of renewal was advanced by the party. And it is guiding this process. But in order to ensure the victory of this policy it is necessary to renew the party itself also. In other words, it is necessary to accomplish a revolution in the sphere of party building. It is necessary to develop the capacities of each cell and each party member in order that the latter always be out in front and take the masses along with him.

[Botyan] How might you describe the development of relations between our countries and between the CPV and the CPSU?

[Nguyen Manh Kam] It needs to be said plainly that the Vietnamese revolution was closely linked with the idea of the Great October, with the cause of Lenin. The people of Vietnam are proud that both our parties and the peoples of both countries are bound by close ties of friendship and very good feelings.

Now, under the conditions of renewal in Vietnam and perestroyka in the Soviet Union, an urgent requirement is the increased efficiency of our cooperation in all spheres: policy, the economy, science, technology, culture, and ideology. Close friendly relations with the Soviet Union have always been the cornerstone of our party and our state.

Problems in USSR-SRV Economic Ties Viewed

90UI0344A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by B. Vinogradov, IZVESTIA correspondent, Hanoi: "An Old Track and a New Mechanism"]

[Text] The January meeting of experts of the intergovernmental Soviet-Vietnamese commission on economic and scientific cooperation was unusual. The last one in the current Five-Year Plan, it seemed to draw a line under and end a whole period in our business dealings. Moreover, it clearly took place under the influence of the recent CEMA session in Sofia. And in Hanoi the partners came to the conclusion that, under the new conditions that have arisen in connection with the economic reforms in our countries, the existing mechanism for cooperation, which is over-regulated and frequently not equivalent in commodity turnover, has become an impediment.

Along with improving the methods for providing assistance, it was decided to look for such forms of contacts that would promote the development of valuable and mutually beneficial relations. The sides agreed that during the next year they would prepare radical proposals to resolve pressing questions and to create a new mechanism. But this task is unthinkable without a careful account of the past.

Vietnam, which has taken the path of socialist development, carefully copied our experience. We helped it as far as we could and out of a desire to put others on the right path. The cooperation of the peasantry, the plans of industrialization, and the centralized system of management—all of this became a fanciful copy of our model transferred to Vietnamese soil.

It did not require very much time to be persuaded of the fundamental incompatibility of this system with the internal conditions in Vietnam. The question about the need to restructure the management of the economy and the repudiation of the administrative-bureaucratic methods of economic management came up in Vietnam as far back as the beginning of the 1980's, earlier than in our country. And at the Fifth Congress of the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] (1982), the announcement was made about the transition to economic accountability.

At that time crisis manifestations, a growing rate of inflation, and a drop in the living standard of the people required urgent reforms. "We lived better during the war," the workers said. And not without reason: Plans were not being fulfilled everywhere, prices for food and consumer goods were crawling upwards irrepressibly, and the newspapers observed that the population was losing faith in the former ideals and in the ability of the leadership to correct the situation. But even against this background, Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation looked serene in the press. More and more new, large, and at times enormous, projects were started which, in fact, were ruinous for Vietnam; new credits were allocated, and the turnover of the expenditure mechanism was accelerating. Together with this, the figures indicating the measure of assistance gave reason for great optimism and triumphal relations.

The foundation underlying our relations was established in 1978 in the form of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It is worth recalling that it was a year when tensions between Vietnam and China became as acute as could be. Economic and trade relations between the two neighboring countries were completely severed. But previously, China's assistance to Vietnam was almost equal to that of the Soviet Union. In the following year, using the introduction of Vietnamese troops into Cambodia as a pretext, even those capitalist countries who also supported the Vietnamese economy, but on smaller scales, essentially cut off or reduced their assistance. The situation that set in, which was reminiscent of the formulation "in one boat," forced us to set a course: Which way to go? But here also, propaganda concerns and our ideological proximity frequently prevailed over economic expediency and efficiency. That is, as is now commonly said, politics was running ahead of economics.

Here is a well-known fact: According to official data, more than 250 projects were built in Vietnam in the last 30 years with Soviet help. But the efficiency of their operation is very low. There are many examples of this. The diesel engine plant in Godama, the housing construction combine in Suanma, the cement plant "Bimshon," and a number of mechanical enterprises and electric power stations, the plant for the repair of mining extraction equipment in Kamfa...[names as published] Or let us take a number of compensating programs: vegetables and fruit, production of natural rubber, phosphate fertilizers, coconut oil, tea, etc. As was said in one of the reports, they serve as a graphic example of the commission of miscalculations and errors in planning and determining economic feasibility.

And now, when from the beginning of the year, in connection with the transition to economic accountability and financial self- dependence, a single price system has been established, and when there are free market prices, and subsidies to state enterprises have been eliminated, all of those projects that were built with Soviet help have decreased their profitability even more, and they are not utilizing even half their capacity. Until recently, for example, you could see in Haiphong Port, turned into a pile of trash and not claimed by anyone, once valuable equipment that was delivered by the Soviet Union to Vietnam.

When you try to find out where the idea arose for one or another enterprise that is bankrupt or going bankrupt, you are frequently drawn a picture of the arrival here of some kind of a highly placed official who, either from the number of impressions he acquired or the breadth of his nature, came forth with this "optimistic project." The idea was adopted, and it was authenticated with signatures. Figures in several digits demonstrated the seriousness of the intentions. This practice existed to our undying amazement, despite the scandalous inconsistency between concepts and results: At first, we sign an agreement, and then we think about how to fulfill it. What follows is a feverish rhythm of deliveries, unfulfilled obligations, and mutual reproaches.

A difficult fate also befell the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the sphere of shipbuilding and ship repairs. It seemed to have promise. Vessels of low and average tonnage—fishing seiners, barges, tugboats—are popular commodities on the world market. The economies of the Far East, the Vietnamese Navy, and practically all CEMA countries experience a need for them. Vietnam eagerly took to mastering the new branch. The Soviet side is allocating credit for the technical reequipping and reconstruction of plants here. A project is being readied which organizations of the USSR Minsudprom [Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry] promises to turn over in February 1990, that is, two years(!) after the signing of the agreement. The absence of a project and delays in deliveries have led to the fact that three of the first vessels, which were supposed to have come off the local building slips, were not laid.

However, during the regular coordination of planning, it was decided to raise the number of vessels being built from 292 to 390 for the period 1991-1995. But for whom

are these vessels intended, who will buy them and at what price, and over what periods will they cover the expenditures for the technical reequipping of the Vietnamese plants? The question about quality also remains open. Where are the calculations that show the effectiveness of these plans? For the time being, all of the deliveries of equipment and ship units are being conducted by the Minsudprom from within its own resources. But it is not entirely clear yet which of our plants, working under cost accounting conditions, will take on the fulfillment of agreements in the next five-year plan. Will a state order be in effect, or will a joint enterprise be created?

The politicization of economic relations which was conducted previously has so far cost both sides a lot. The first side, fulfilling the role of the leading socialist power, gave; and the second side, proceeding on the theory of a transition to a new structure and bypassing the capitalist stage, which can be done seemingly only with the help of friends, accepted, and thereby increased its indebtedness. And if sometimes during a regular meeting of the leaders a part of the debt was written off or deferred, then it changed almost nothing. The tendency toward and the growth of indebtedness was maintained and, it seems, will be maintained in the future, despite attempts to switch to new forms of cooperation.

Thus, starting in 1991, during the next five-year plan, Vietnam must start repaying the Soviet Union about R7 billion for credits granted earlier. It is already clear now that it is not in condition to do this. I am speaking about the indebtedness of Vietnam, not because I want to mention it once more—that is not the point. The problem is that it has become a mirror reflection of the ineffectiveness of our cooperation.

Neither side is receiving the expected return from the invested resources. In counting on the development of the export branches of Vietnam, the partners expected in this way to balance mutual trade and obtain a source for canceling debts. But, under the influence of reforms in their country and in our country, the economic mechanisms are changing.

The Vietnamese have succeeded in going farther than us in market relationships (see IZVESTIYA No 209 for 1989—"The Market Is Curbing Inflation"). Opportunities in the private sector have grown. And if you take into account that in a number of major programs of our cooperation the main producer on the Vietnam side is the private trader who is willing to search for a more lucrative market, including a hard currency market, then the noted disruptions in deliveries from Vietnam will increase.

To put it more succinctly, we note that there are difficulties in Vietnam that are characteristic generally of Soviet trade with socialist countries. Up to the present time, for example, about 70 pairs of Soviet and Vietnamese enterprises and organizations are registered for direct contacts. The "marriage of convenience" envisages mutual deliveries of commodities. But because of their own acute shortage of commodities, the capabilities of the Soviet partners are very limited.

With the introduction last March of licensing of commodities for export, Soviet enterprises were in direct dependence on the will of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], the sole manager in the issuance of licenses. But the plan of the ministry itself does not have the kind of indicator that would evaluate its work in the development of direct relations. And it is not interested in this in a financial sense. As previously, slogans and directives remain the driving force. The MVES has no commissions from mediation in the conclusion of such transactions. It turns out that it is more advantageous to develop its own trade and to apply the residual principle in direct relations.

Preliminary calculations show that, even in the creation of favorable conditions for organizations who enter into direct relations, their share in the total volume of commodity turnover between the USSR and the SRV in the future five-year plan will barely reach one percent. Objectively, neither one nor the other is rushing into partnerships. And the problem is not only that there is nowhere to go with the transferable rubles and dongs that are lying in their bank accounts. Although, of course, a system is needed that is based on a real rate of exchange of national currencies, but there is also a need for a single method of pricing, taxation, and calculations. At present, such a method does not exist, and either country can arbitrarily increase prices to its advantage.

The idea came up in Vietnam to create joint enterprises on the basis of tea factories built with Soviet assistance, and also factories for the production of frozen bananas. The idea was not implemented.

Soviet organizations that are responsible for special purpose programs in Vietnam, with all of their "independence," are limited in their operations, whose parameters are strictly outlined by the state. In fulfilling the role of mediator, they are deprived of any kind of initiative and opportunity to give dynamism to the reciprocal movement. Tied to our inflexible system of state order, they are compelled, while operating, to adapt to the changing conditions of economic management in the country they are in, when private producers at times simply refuse Soviet supplies as being of no use because of their low quality and high prices. And, as a result, our side does not acquire the necessary commodities. The allocation of special funds to these organizations is being proposed in order to create investments on the territory of the partner and to come out in a bigger way on third world markets.

The time has certainly arrived, weighing all of the pluses and minuses, to have a joint concept for future Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation as a basis for improving its mechanism.

TASS on U.S. Secretary Cheney's Manila Visit

LD1902074290 Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 19 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Bokhonko]

[Text] Manila February 19 TASS—U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney, currently touring the Asian-Pacific region, arrived in Manila today.

The Pentagon chief will have talks with National Defence Minister Fidel Ramos on the situaion in the region, U.S. military bases on the archipelago, military and economic aid to the Philippines. On Tuesday he will visit Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Field Airforce base, the biggest U.S. overseas military facilities. Then he will fly to Japan.

Cheney's visit is taking place at a time when Filipino-American relations have reached their lowest point since Corazon Aquino came to power, according to the Manila MALAYA newspaper. The Filipino President demonstratively refused to meet Cheney. In turn, the U.S. secretary of defence cut his stay in Manila by one day.

The cooling of relations between the two countries, which are linked by close military and strategic interests, resulted from sharp differences over Washington's committments to render Manila financial aid as compensation for the use of American military bases on Filipino territory. U.S. Congress recently cut the volume of military and economic aid envisaged by the 1988 joint memorandum by 96 million U.S. dollars.

Commentary Reviews Visit

HK2102044790 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Commentary by Anatoliy Aleksandrov]

[Text] The visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney to Manila has ended, after he held formal talks with General Fidel V. Ramos, Philippine defense secretary. Everyone knows that on the eve of his visit to the Philippines, President Corazon Aquino ruled out a meeting between her and Cheney. The reason given for this was that American newspapers recently falsely reported moves by the Aquino Government, as well as the fact that Washington has reneged on its financial obligations towards Manila.

The crux of the talks between Ramos and Cheney was payment by the United States for their use of the military bases in the Philippines. Recently military and economic aid to the Philippines for 1990 amounting to $360 million was reduced by $96 million by the Americans. In this regard, Cheney pledged to bring this matter up before the U.S. Congress for reconsideration of their decision.

In light of all this, various questions arise: Can Washington be trusted to abide by its agreements? Is the American military presence essential in the Philippines at this time of reduced military confrontation in the world? It will be recalled that the Soviet Union reduced the number of its warships in the Pacific Ocean, as well as its fighter planes in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Furthermore, the Soviets announced troop cuts amounting to 500,000-200,000 of which were based in Asia. According to Genadiy Gerasimov, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman presently in Manila, the Soviet Union does not look on any country in Asia as an adversary.

Meanwhile Cheney announced that there will be no big change in the United States' military policy in the Asia-Pacific region. During a press conference in Manila, he declared that the United States considers as important the retention of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. He added that 2,000 base workers will be laid off during the next two-year period because of the installation of new equipment. But the bases treaty ends in 1991.

When negotiations on the military bases between Manila and Washington take place, it is uncertain whether the U.S. will be able to continue renting the territory. While Cheney endeavored to strengthen the American stand on this prior to the negotiations, general feeling among various sectors of Philippine society indicate that Filipinos wish the country's true sovereignty to be upheld.

Editorial Scrutinizes Visit

HK1902040590 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Commentary by Viktor Vladimirov]

[Text] United States Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's tour of the Asia-Pacific region will cover the Philippines, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan. The crux of his trip is to look into the military bases in the region, where 190,000 American soldiers are deployed.

The most crucial point of Cheney's trip will be in Manila, where he will face the issue of the military bases, whose negotiations are due to take place six weeks from now. It is obvious that the United States is determined to strengthen its position before the talks get under way.

President Corazon Aquino has said that the first part of the talks will involve the issue of whether the bases will be retained after the agreement ends in 1991. However, latest reports say that the president has announced she will not meet Cheney, because she was displeased by the coverage of the American media of the recent visit by Robert Gates, President Bush's national security envoy, and Congressman [name indistinct] from Arizona. The president claims that American newspapers reported the opposite of what was discussed with the American envoys.

Because of this contretemps, it will be General [as heard] Fidel B. Ramos, the Philippine Defense Secretary, who will meet Cheney. At this meeting, the long-festering

issue of the bases will be highlighted. Certain moves made by the United States have affected the interests of the Philippines. One of these is Washington's refusal to grant the Philippine request for $390 million from the International Monetary Fund [IMF] for reconstruction and economic projects. While all the members of the IBRD [International Board of Rural Development] have supported Manila's request, it has only been the United States opposing the bid, according to Philippine Finance Secretary Jesus Estanislao. He says this action by the Americans is linked to the coming talks between Washington and Manila on the matter of the military bases. Estanislao says the IMF should not be the venue from which to send political signals.

On top of all this, the American Congress has slashed payments, for the use of the military bases, by $960 million. This act violates the 1988 Memorandum of Agreement. As a result of this, it is only natural that the latest American moves have made Filipinos angry. Filipinos are now saying that the United States need not engage in more maneuvers to keep their bases. Filipinos have also not been reassured by American Ambassador Nicholas Platt's comment that the aggression carried out by the United States in Panama is unlikely to occur in the Philippines, and that the military bases will be removed if the Filipinos so wish.

This new pose taken by Washington should not be taken at face value, particularly in view of information received by the Philippine Government that there is no plan by the Americans to reduce their military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in the Philippines. Hence Cheney's official message to General [as heard] Ramos, in which he said that if conditions in Europe continue to improve, the situation in the Asia-Pacific region will (?ease).

In this regard, moves by the Soviet Union to cut its forces in the region, thus reducing its military presence in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, (?have been ignored). Washington has highlighted only one thing: The plan to reduce its personnel at the San Miguel communications facility connected with Subic Naval Base.

In the wake of all this, groups and movements opposing the military bases continue to grow. One should take note of the statement by Primo Galvez, deputy chief of the groups demonstrating against the American military bases, that Filipino workers will refuse to work under unjust conditions. Galvez stressed that the military bases should be removed. Besides his group, there are (?36) other groups in the military bases, some of which favor the retention of the bases for reasons of employment opportunities.

All these point to the difficulties which face negotiators from Manila and Washington on the matter of retaining the military bases. The United States will have trouble explaining why it is necessary to keep the bases, especially since numerous senators and congressmen have expressed their opposition to the bases and are urging President Aquino to simply cut off further talks with Washington and order the military bases out by the end of the treaty in 1991.

Non-Soviet Reportage on Gerasimov's Visit to Manila

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For Philippine and other non-Soviet reportage on the visit to the Philippines by Soviet Government spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov, including reports on his participation in the One Asia Assembly media conference being held in Manila, see the Philippines section of the 20 February and subsequent issues of the East Asia DAILY REPORT.

Near East & South Asia

Commentary on Soviet-Iranian Relations

90UI0364A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 3

[Commentary by M. Nepesov: "Our Neighbor"]

[Text] "Our old neighbor". This definition of Iran was made during the top-level meeting in the Kremlin last summer, when that country's president, 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was on an official visit to the Soviet Union. Today the ancient Iranian people commemorate the 11th anniversary of embarkation on the path of revolutionary renewal and the elimination of the consequences of the multimillennial domination of monarchical dynasties and semicolonial dependency.

Recent years have not been easy for Iran. The war which erupted with Iraq took away many human lives and seriously undermined the country's economy. Eighteen months have now passed since the thunder of the guns died down, but, unfortunately, the process of peace negotiations is still not complete. For the purpose of accelerating the achievement of lasting peace the Islamic Republic of Iran has declared its readiness to conduct negotiations with Iraq on USSR territory.

Last month, Iran adopted the first five-year plan of the country's economic, social, and cultural development oriented primarily toward satisfaction of the people's needs. There is a substantial base for its successful fulfillment. It is sufficient to recall if only the fact that Iran is the world's biggest oil producer (sic), not to mention other sectors of the economy producing a whole range of modern products, from automobiles and television receivers through refrigerators and air conditioners.

The history of the mutual relations of our two countries has taken shape variously. Its current stage inspires hope. During last year's visit by the Iranian president, a program of trade and economic and science and technology cooperation between the two countries until the year 2000 was agreed. There will be vigorous interaction within the framework of this agreement in 15 sectors of

the economy, including finance, space, power engineering, transport, fishing, and the agroindustrial complex. As the Iranian leadership believes, one of the most propitious situations in the history of Iranian-Soviet relations has now emerged. Such an assessment is shared fully in our country also.

Baku Radio Cited on Iran Revolution Anniversary

LD1302104290 Tehran IRNA in English 0719 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Ardebil, East Azerbaijan 13 Feb. (IRNA)—The presence of millions of Iranians in the Sunday's rally marking the 11th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, once again proved that the Islamic revolution has arisen from the hearts of the people, Radio Baku said in a commentary Monday.

The radio, monitored here, said the most important achievement of the Islamic revolution of Iran was to put an end to hundreds of years of tyranny and oppression in Iran, and bringing freedom to the Iranian nation.

Referring to the expansion of Tehran-Moscow ties the radio said it was beneficial not only for the two neighbouring nations but also for the whole region, "since this cooperation would serve to establish peace and stability in the region."

"The increasing flourishment of the Islamic revolution of Iran delights Muslims of the world particularly the Muslim people of the Soviet Azerbaijan," said the radio.

Views on Soviet-Iranian Border Transit Agreements

NC1602230390 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today"]

[Text] A memorandum of understanding between the Soviet and Iranian Governments was signed on 15 February on the conditions for travel by citizens of both countries in order to visit relatives and for personal reasons. In addition, an agreement facilitating border crossings for people living in border regions was signed. Our analyst Yuriy Andreyev comments on this and writes:

Exactly 10 days ago, a delegation of experts from the Soviet Foreign Ministry headed by Boris Chaplin, Soviet deputy foreign minister, arrived in Tehran. This delegation brought the drafts of two agreements which facilitated the regulations for Soviet and Iranian citizens to visit each other. These documents were the outcome of a complicated diplomatic process which started in early January. It should be pointed out that at that time Mahmud Va'ezi, Iran's deputy foreign minister, studied this issue with Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow. At the same time, an Iranian delegation headed by (Tale' Mas'uli), director of the Iranian Visa and Passports Department, was working in Baku. The two sides reached an agreement in principle on visits between the citizens of both countries. Now in Tehran, agreement was reached on the last details concerning these documents.

Under these agreements, 11 transit points are to be created on the Soviet-Iranian border for use by citizens of both countries. The residents on border areas have the right, after showing their identity card and filling out the necessary questionnaire, to cross the border for a 15-day stay. The citizens of the Soviet Union and Iran can visit their neighboring country four times a year.

According to Boris Chaplin, Soviet deputy foreign minister, the implementation of these decisions will help to ensure stability on the Soviet-Iranian border. Boris Chaplin also stated that his activities in Iran were very valuable and that he is very satisfied with the outcome of the talks.

Mahmud Va'ezi also pointed out that the agreements that have been signed completely fulfill the desires of Muslim Azerbaijanis of both countries.

Dear listeners, as you know, serious unrest had broken out on the Soviet-Iranian border. During this unrest, a large number of border installations on the Soviet border were destroyed, and Soviet people could be seen crossing the border en masse. Meanwhile, Iranian citizens were also illegally entering Soviet Azerbaijan.

Naturally the tense situation on the Soviet-Iranian border and the constant violation of regulations on crossing this border did not conform with the interests of both countries.

Our commentator then writes: The new phase of relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, which started when a message was sent to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev by Imam Khomeyni, focuses on stabilizing the two countries' relations. The necessary mechanism to coordinate the Soviet and Iranian stands on various problems has now been created, and the incidents on the Soviet-Iranian border were tantamount to a serious test of the durability and reliability of this mechanism. Now one can say with great assurance that the mechanism created was able to pass this test successfully. The growth of relations between the Soviet Union and Iran has not slowed, and mutually beneficial political cooperation continues between the two countries.

Decree on Rushdie's Execution Discussed

NC1502223090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Ayatollah Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Islamic Republic's religious leader, confirmed that the decree on executing author Salman Rushdie is still in force. As clarified by the religious leader of Iran, Imam Khomeyni's decree regarding the author of the "Satanic Verses" should be carried out.

As you know, the decree on Rushdie's execution met with the West's aversion, but the majority of Muslims supported it. Meanwhile, it was clear that neither side focused on the strange values in Rushdie's book. This book became a means for intense ideological conflicts, so the Rushdie affair adopted a political hue from the very start.

Now that the level of tension in the confrontation has been overtly [word indistinct], we want to clarify our stand. What does this mean? We do not mean that we will accept one side's views. All the conditions should be taken into consideration. As far as our radio is concerned, we tried from the very beginning to weigh both sides' arguments realistically, and other mass media in the country also adopted this stand. With the exacerbation of the conflict, it became more and more clear that the Iranian side was moving toward a policy of confrontation with the West, and the West reciprocated. The two sides forgot everything about humanitarian ideas, and these humanitarian ideas are necessary today more than ever before.

We fervently wish for an end to all this violence, and we hope that the bloodshed in Afghanistan will stop. We hope that incidents such as Britain's aggression on the Falklands, U.S. soldiers bombing Libyan cities, U.S. soldiers downing the Iranian plane with its 300 passengers, and the recent aggression on Panama will stop. We sincerely wish that the consequences of the fratricide between Iran and Iraq be erased forever.

However, it seems that peace without force will not be attainable so soon. Conflicts and differences continue as a result of the contemporary world's crisis, which is actually a moral crisis. This special cruelty and lack of sentiments stem from industrial civilization combined with backwardness, fanaticism, and aggression.

We should free ourselves of these. British author Salman Rushdie should be shown compassion. After all, he did not intend to commit an (?improper) act and to weaken the foundations of Islam. Nevertheless, the author has been forced into hiding and is being guarded. Does he still believe in world justice and humanitarianism?

Plans for West Bank Emigre Settlements Protested

PM1402155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Frustrating the Extremists' Plans"]

[Text] The development of the situation in the Near East has given rise to hopes of the possibility of real progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its core—the Palestinian issue. However, the Israeli Government is creating additional obstacles by rejecting the idea of an international conference and opting to suppress Palestinian resistance. This is pointed out in a statement by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries. At the same time, the propaganda machine is being cranked up in the hope of stemming the wave of sympathy for the Arab people of Palestine on the part of the world community. The Israeli Government is trying to use emigration to Israel by Jews from the Soviet Union for the same purpose.

The Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries wants to draw attention to the main fact that the settlement of Palestinian territories is unlawful and criminal, irrespective of whether it is forcible or voluntary. The West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, has never belonged and does not belong to the Israeli state. It is appropriate to recall UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is recognized by everyone as the territorial basis of a Near East settlement.

Soviet citizens have the right to emigrate to any country, which is fully in line with the Vienna accords. But we resolutely protest against the violation of their rights in those countries. It is criminal from the viewpoint of international law and immoral from the viewpoint of basic human rights, including the right to life, to urge them to settle in someone else's land.

The Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries calls on the public in the United States, Britain, France, and the other participants in the Helsinki process to do all they can to frustrate the extremist Israeli circles' plans and prevent the settlement of occupied Palestinian territories by emigres from other countries. The Soviet public is on the side of the Arab people of Palestine.

Views on Continuation of Mideast Tensions

PM2102123990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[V. Vinogradov "Observer's Column": "Will There Be an End to the Violence?"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Lebanese problem is not the only one in the Near East that requires a resolution. Thus, the tension is not lessening in the Arab lands occupied by Israel, where the past few days became one of the most murderous periods since the beginning of the Palestinian uprising. According to eyewitnesses' accounts, the occupying troops, sent to crush Palestinian attacks, acted with particular cruelty, using arms against the civilian population without prior warning. There have been deaths and hundreds of injuries.

The events taking place in Lebanon and the occupied territories, during which peaceful inhabitants are perishing, literally demand that the world community triples its efforts to achieve peace in the Near East. And now it seems that the opportunity has come. The question of holding peace talks between Tel Aviv and the Palestinians is increasingly becoming part of the agenda.

But the extent to which everything in this dangerously explosive region is hanging by a thread was revealed by the incident on the Cairo-Ismailia highway, where a

bloody drama took place. Let me remind you that a group of unknown people machinegunned a bus full of Israeli tourists and showered it with hand grenades. Around 10 people were killed. The world community sharply condemned this crime. The PLO reacted in a similar way, stating that the crime only serves the interests of the enemies of lasting peace in the Near East.

The Egyptian authorities are carrying out a detailed investigation into the incident, in which they believe people abroad are involved. And here a natural question arises: To whose advantage was the incident on the Egyptian highway? In this connection, the fact stands out that this terrorist act was carried out on the day it became known that a meeting would be held in Geneva between the leaders of diplomatic departments of the United States, Egypt, and Israel. This meeting, which had been put off many times and whose aim was to initiate dialogue between Israel and a Palestinian delegation, had started to really take shape. And then the attack on the bus...

It is also definite that the tragedy that took place has also strengthened the position of the right wing of the Israeli "Likud" ruling bloc, which is against any talks with the Palestinians. Thus, the not unknown A. Sharon, advocate of a tough policy, stated straight away that this incident indubitably testifies to the futility of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, which is allegedly being imposed on Tel Aviv.

And lastly. The carnage on the Egyptian highway also demonstrates the need to regulate the Near East conflict as quickly as possible. Until the Near East achieves a just and lasting peace, the region will resemble a powder keg ready to explode at any minute.

Shevardnadze Holds Meeting With Pakistani Envoy

LD1902181190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb (TASS)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, today received Iqbal Akhund, special representative of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and adviser to the head of government on international affairs and national security.

I. Akhund handed over a message from Benazir Bhutto, addressed to Mikhail Gorbachev.

During a business-like and frank conversation, there was an exchange of views on certain international and regional problems and on the prospects for the development of Soviet-Pakistani relations.

I. Akhund brought up the matter of Pakistan's relations with India in connection with the tense situation in Kashmir. He set forth the Pakistani side's viewpoint on this matter. E.A. Shevardnadze expressed confidence that, through mutual efforts, the Pakistani and Indian leadership will find a way out of the situation that has developed, all the more so since they have the necessary legal treaty base for resolving disputes: the Simla agreement, signed in 1972, which provides a procedure for settling bilateral problems.

During a discussion of the world situation, the sides stated with satisfaction that the erosion of the policy of confrontation and the establishment of mutual understanding and constructive dialogue have become the main trend in international affairs. Referring to the Soviet-U.S. talks which were recently held in Moscow, E.A. Shevardnadze noted in particular that the sides confirmed their support for the all-embracing political settlement of regional conflicts on the principles of national reconciliation.

In this connection, emphasis was laid on the need for a most urgent settlement of the Afghan problem, which is in the interests of both the Soviet Union and Pakistan. The Soviet side drew the Pakistani representative's attention to the package of Soviet-Afghan initiatives put forward on the eve of the anniversary of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In particular, the conviction was expressed that establishment of an inter-Afghan dialogue with the participation of all political forces would be promoted if a consensus could be reached between the USSR, Pakistan, and Iran through conducting a conference with the UN secretary general or his representative taking part, and with both the republic of Afghanistan and the opposition being invited, and if a study were made of the question of ceasing military actions in any form and of ceasing supplies of weapons to the warring sides, wherever they originate from, alongside the recall of existing stockpiles. Stress was laid upon the important significance of proposals by President Najibullah, such as the readiness to send to Peshawar and Tehran representatives from Kabul on a nonparty basis, and to stop launching rockets against places where the opposition is stationed if the opposition stops missile attacks on towns.

E.A. Shevardnadze also raised the issue of the Pakistani government rendering assistance in liberating Soviet servicemen captured in Afghanistan. Their fate is giving rise to profound anxiety among all Soviet people. I. Akhund gave an assurance that the Pakistani side will do everything possible to resolve this issue in a humane and charitable spirit.

Kabul Correspondent Reports Continued Shelling

LD2102100690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Video report from correspondent A. Shkirando in Kabul; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The Afghan capital has again been subjected to rocket bombardment. Extremists fired four American-manufactured rockets at Kabul's residential districts. One man died, 13 were injured. The city's stock of housing has suffered damage.

[Correspondent A. Shkirando, identified by caption] We are now into the second year since Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Previously, the armed opposition linked the bloodshed on Afghan soil to the Soviet military presence. But unfortunately, even without the Soviets, Afghan blood has not ceased to flow. On the contrary, over the last year, the intensity of shelling of civilian towns and villages has increased almost threefold. And one more characteristic: The extremists have started using the most refined weapons for destroying faithful Muslims—cluster rockets. This area mine-laying weapon was used by the Americans in Vietnam. And now it is used for mining the streets and squares of Kabul, rather than the Vietnamese jungle.

The sky over the Afghan capital has also become far from safe, as shown by this recently burnt out transport aircraft of the Afghan air force. But regretfully, this wasn't the end of the Afghan extremsits' barbaric acts. [video shows parts of a downed plane; damaged buildings, fire engines]

[B.N. Pastukhov, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR to the Republic of Afghanistan, identified by caption] [Begin recording] Information available to our embassy, as well as recent events show that the armed opposition, instigated by its foreign patrons, is intensifying its activities aimed at disrupting the Soviet air bridge. This is confirmed by an attempt to shoot down a Soviet transport aircraft on 2 February, at 1251 Kabul time, with a Stinger missile. [video shows Pastukhov addressing pressmen]. [end recording]

[Shkirando] We would like to hope that the foreign correspondents from the leading Western news agencies, who attended the Soviet ambassador's press conference will contribute the truth about the kind of military facilities against which the so called fighters for the faith are using the most advanced weapons which come into Afghanistan in an uncontrolled manner and in unlimited quantities. As far as the 2 February event with the Soviet aircraft is concerned, we can tell you that a tragedy was only averted by the firing of a well-timed heat decoy. [video shows pressmen; woman with child boarding a plane; a Soviet aircraft in Aeroflot livery taking off, firing decoy flares.]

East Europe

Gorbachev Calls for Polish Border Guarantees

LD1702182490 Hamburg DPA in German 1731 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—The Soviet head of state and party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, according to WELT AM SONNTAG, has in return for his agreement to German unification demanded two guarantees of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) [Christian Democratic Union] and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP) [Free Democratic Party]: that the western Polish border be recognized and that the export commitments of the GDR to the Soviet Union be met.

DER SPIEGEL news magazine, too, has reported in its latest edition that Kohl and Genscher promised the Kremlin leader to take over the export commitments. This was, however, denied in Bonn on Saturday by a spokeswoman of the federal government: Kohl gave no such promises.

According to WELT AM SONNTAG, the chancellor and foreign minister had undertaken in Moscow last Saturday [10 February] to ensure that the Federal Republic, in an all-German government, will press for the immediate recognition of the western Polish border and will ensure this with a majority decision.

Gorbachev explained the asked-for recognition of the western Polish border with the remark that the government in Warsaw on its part has already threatened Moscow with claims to former Polish territories in the Soviet Union, WELT AM SONNTAG reported. [passage omitted]

New Polish Ambassador to USSR Interviewed

90UI0361A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 6, 10 Feb 90 pp 12-13

[Interview with Stanislaw Ciosek, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to the USSR, by Irina Pirogova: "We Have Breathed in 'the Wind of History'"; place and date not given—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KULTURA introduction]

[Text] We met the new ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Poland to the USSR, Stanislaw Ciosek, for the first time at a press conference in the Polish Embassy. He came here for several minutes immediately following his arrival in Moscow in his new capacity. He came so, as he put it, journalists would see him face to face. Our next meeting occurred recently at the Polish Center of Information and Culture where he discussed the current issues of Poland. The skill of having the audience in his hand, the ability to respond to complicated questions briefly, clearly, and unconventionally—all of this is very attractive, and it is definitely characteristic of the personality of Stanislaw Ciosek.

[Pirogova] I remember you talking at a recent meeting with members of the Moscow Polish community about socialism having played an important role in the history of Soviet-Polish relations at a certain stage (the routing of fascism, participation by the USSR in the rebirth of Poland, and so on). It is particularly important to be aware of this currently, when there is a tendency to throw stones at our common past. In the Caucasus, they say: "If you shoot at your past with a gun the future will shoot you with a cannon."

[Ciosek] This was not just a role in the history of our relations but in the history of society as a whole. Socialism was a response to the cruelty of the systems

which exploited the people mercilessly. The people needed socialism! This was one of its most important functions. Another of its functions was to point the way for the poorest and oppressed peoples and states to get ahead. At the time, the belief was accepted that capitalism would disappear, perish, and a universal paradise would come to the world. However, it turns out that capitalism has changed and assumed a different countenance. The third point which I am absolutely certain about is: Had there been no socialism capitalism would not have changed its attitude toward the toilers so abruptly and taken care of comprehensive welfare and increases in the standard of living... I was told about a countryman of yours (it could have been a Pole just as well) visiting his relative in Canada. The relative ended up in Canada after World War II, has been a working man all his life, and by our standards is quite affluent now. This old man told his guest: "It is too late for me to return to my motherland; I have settled in here, and have given all of my energy to this land. However, I will be always grateful to the communists for making our capitalists reckon with us and not letting them drive us into the ground..."

Every person and every state in the world has a right to choose. However, alternative variants are only possible if pluralism exists. If there is no freedom to choose both the person and the system degenerate.

Our mistake was in the fact that, having become an alternative to the other system and having promoted its improvement, we killed ourselves as a competitor, became complacent, and turned a blind eye to the real situation; as a result, we developed a serious illness. This is the "ideal" example which Stalinism set for us. If the truth and nothing but the truth was on our side why then be afraid of competition, other opinions and ways to achieve the beneficial objective? We overestimated greatly the "second function"—how the poorest can escape woes and poverty. During the first stage, this was necessary in both the Soviet Union and Poland. However, subsequently we needed to seek new paths of development rather than just apply the method of pressuring the people and the structures. When evaluating the socialist system objectively now, we should see both its advantages and weak spots. The significance and necessity of socialism follow from this very sober-minded interpretation of it. Now we have to become an alternative to right-wing forces. If someone who is driven by hatred is aware only of the degeneration of socialism he is just blind. However, in the course of it we should never forget the innocent people who suffered due to the manifestations of this very degeneration. We should also understand them. This is where my answer is to the Caucasian proverb which you have quoted. If genuine socialism as a system alternative to the right-wing forces is going to be destroyed we will arrive at a totalitarian system which will shoot at the future with a cannon.

[Pirogova] Currently, when your party is going through a period of crisis, many people are somehow trying to forget its indisputable services to Poland, especially in the recent years of Polish renewal and Soviet perestroyka. As I see it, it is unfair. After all, along with their bitter mistakes and misconceptions, the Polish Communists have come to recognize them and to aspire to a new path.

[Ciosek] The second question logically follows from the first. We grasped the historic moment we were facing: the crisis and the most acute issues raised by the current state of affairs. The old stage based only on the past accomplishments of socialism which had actually outlived itself was dragged out for too long in an artificial manner. So, the Communists of Poland opted for a revolution—I am not afraid to use this word. I believe that my party has earned its "ticket" to history by seeing its crisis itself and embarking on a new stage of social development in the country. Some almost call us masochists—indeed, has it ever occurred that a party went against itself? Jacek Kuron, a minister in the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government, wrote as early as a year ago referring to the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]: They are the ones making a revolution, and we are joining them. We jumped into deep water though we were aware that we had forgotten how to swim due to our monopoly on power. However, an old Polish proverb says: If you want to learn how to swim don't be afraid of deep spots. We had no time to learn because procrastination was as bad as death for the people and the state.

Hence the decision on the elections which we could not win. Yes, we were aware of this. This is why at the "roundtable" we agreed with its other participants that the PZPR would retain 38 percent of the seats—more than one-third. This means that currently our party, obviously in its new capacity, has a right to control possible changes in the Constitution because this is possible only with more than two-thirds of the vote. We agreed that our party would safeguard the constitutional system. Judge for yourselves whether we would have taken this step had we recklessly believed in our election victory! There are people who accuse us of having surrendered power voluntarily, without firing a single shot. However, this is not a political or even zoological but rather, as I would put it, zoolitical point of view which does not merit any comment.

We have opted for the path of "contractual," agreed-upon democracy. What is the sense of it? Under pluralism which is the foundation and basis of democracy, a free rivalry of political forces is necessary. Due to the protracted existence of monopolized power (given some anarchist movement), some people have not grown up to this system. However, we should give credit to the left-wing forces for being the ones to create conditions for the maturing of their opponents. After all, political pluralism in Poland became a fact almost 10 years ago because new parties and unions had already evolved by then. However, it is only now that in our striving for an equilibrium we are working on rules for the action of these political forces depending on coalitions. During the current historical stage, only this "contractual" system

will protect the country from monopolized power on the one hand and a rampage of elements and universal chaos on the other hand.

[Pirogova] Do you believe that radical changes which are occurring in a highly concentrated manner in East Europe amount to yet another struggle for leadership or a historical pattern?

[Ciosek] I am certain that this is an absolute historic necessity. If a leader opposes a historic need the result is what we are seeing in Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria. In our country, in Poland, there are people who say (I am returning to what I previously said) that the Polish Communists have made a mistake by losing the elections. Supposedly, we could win them under an old, undemocratic law contrary to reality. It may be that I am going to use an expression which is too pathetic, but there is "a wind of history," and it is absurd to oppose it. Historically needed conditions for changing the social system were present.

This cannot be considered an utter defeat of socialism. We are now trailing behind in terms of economic efficiency. How and when did the PZPR sense it, how and when did we breathe in "the wind of history?" We lived through the years 1980, 1970, and 1956. At all of these stages, we made good decisions. To be sure, the problem was that they turned out to be half-measures. However, the lessons of history were not lost on us. Our time demanded general decisions. The rules of the contemporary world are harsh: If we do not want to be the slaves of others we must increase labor productivity which is impermissibly low in Poland. To this end, efficient methods for giving the people incentives are necessary. Currently, this is the most significant point, the foundation of foundations. Currently, genuine self-sacrifice is required of the Poles first of all. For the first time, our party, the [Catholic] Church, and Solidarity are saying this together—Jaruzelski, Glemp, and Walesa, all those who have the interests of Poland at heart. When only the PZPR talked about this we were not heard because we had lost the credit of confidence. Finding a common language within the framework of political pluralism for benefiting the nation presents a common opportunity for us.

Please note what the effect is: Our society is suffering tangible financial losses, the real standard of living is declining (which, unfortunately, is necessary temporarily), but the popularity of the government is not declining. The people value the truth, even if bitter, more than beautiful hollow promises.

However, let us go back to the issues of East Europe. Economies where efficiency is low are also a reason for all of these radical changes. Perhaps, we would not be discussing these problems today if the socialist camp were the leader in the world economic race or, more precisely, had not fallen behind so hopelessly. The beautiful ideals of the fair distribution of assets become dull when there is nothing to distribute. They should be made realistic. However, in all fairness, these are the shortcomings of the practice of socialism rather than its truth and its ideals.

I am a man of the left-wing forces, and I profoundly believe in these ideals. I hope that we will travel this difficult path toward economic stability without killing off the faith in the beautiful features to which socialism aspires. This is how I interpret the mission of the left-wing forces. They who are taking a firm course are right, I am in favor of it; however, how are the people going to respond? When will their patience run out?

[Pirogova] As a rule, the notion of a certain course is associated with a particular statesman. As you see it, what should be the traits of a contemporary leader under these conditions? Let us look at President Jaruzelski... What is the "secret" of the political success of Walesa—after all, it is not due just to the fact that he comes from a working-class background, is a good family man, and a practicing Catholic, despite all of these traits being very worthy in their own right?

[Ciosek] I believe that in grasping the past and the future a real leader should see further than the others. To my mind, this is the main condition. Of course, it is very good that he is kind, that he likes children, and so on. However, I repeat that the main point is to see further than the others. I hope that President Jaruzelski will not be offended if I say that, despite various attacks, he sees further through his dark glasses than quite a few people, as experience has shown.

As far as Walesa is concerned... I have never wanted to evaluate him though I have known him for a long time and have met him in different situations. There is one thing which I may say from my point of view: Not one of the images of Walesa reflects the truth—neither the one where Western propaganda paints him as a Saint George slaying the Red dragon nor the one which was painted in our country in black alone. One thing is correct: He would not have "jumped over" the fence of the Gdansk Shipyard if he were a small, common person.

[Pirogova] We have become convinced that the ideological dogmas which provided the foundation for our mutual relations have largely outlived themselves. A new concept is necessary. I think that the basis for this concept is found in our common history, in the inviolability of our borders, in economic and cultural cooperation free of old stereotypes. What do you think about this?

[Ciosek] Let us begin with the word "friendship." Specific people have to be friends in order for peoples to be friends. Friendship is an utterly personal thing which hardly depends on the toasts which state leaders make about it. The beautiful notion of friendship should acquire its true meaning and become natural.

There are both beautiful and bitter chapters in our common history, as is the case between neighbors who have lived in the same house since time immemorial.

This is natural, and we should understand this. This needs to be explained to the people not for the sake of "rubbing salt into the wound" but rather in order to turn these bitter pages in the book of our common fate and close them. To this end, some new words need to be sought. The language of our communication in the past was often bombastic and untruthful. Let us put phraseology aside. We should discuss history, the efficiency of trade relations, and cultural ties between our peoples in a regular manner.

The main point is for the people to be able to learn about each other. I am convinced that ultimately we will open the border between our countries; this is natural. Certainly, it is difficult from the point of view of economics. However, West Europe is creating what virtually is a common state after all! Pronouncements about fraternity and unity cannot be translated into reality by using border guards, customs inspectors, and the OVIR [Department of Visa Issuance and Registration] service.

[Pirogova] Finally, with what feeling did you embark on your work in Moscow?

[Ciosek] I know that one of the legs of the table at which the future of Poland is being decided is here, almost 1,500 km from Warsaw. Another leg is in the West; however, the two remaining legs are ours. I understand the significance of my mission and the significance of the processes of perestroyka, of everything new that is happening in the USSR for the future of my people.

We are not detached from this world, and we follow with great attention events in Moscow and Berlin, Bonn and Washington, Prague and Budapest—in a word, on this globe. Very significant events are taking place. I feel that I am small compared to these great deeds.

Brovikov Briefs Mazowiecki on Germany Talks

LD1602150190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Feb (TASS)—Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, today received Vladimir Brovikov, USSR ambassador in the Republic of Poland, who informed him of the results of the recent talks held in Moscow by FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and also by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki presented Poland's position on the prospects for the unification of Germany, stressing the necessity for guaranteeing the country's participation in the international talks on this problem in accordance with the formula agreed in Ottawa.

Briefs Jaruzelski on Moscow Talks

LD1602150690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2246 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw, 16 Feb (TASS)—On Thursday, Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of the Republic of Poland, received Vladimir Brovikov, USSR ambassador in the Republic of Poland, who on instructions from the Soviet leadership, informed Jaruzelski about the position and actions of the USSR on very important international problems in connection with the talks in Moscow held by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

W. Jaruzelski received the information conveyed to him with satisfaction and expressed gratitude for to the USSR's position on vital problems of Poland's security. He expressed the conviction that the USSR would consistently come out in favor of a treaty settlement of the German problem, including confirmation of the inviolability of borders in Europe. The president noted the necessity for Poland to participate in the proposed talks on the question of German unification.

Moscow Comments on Polish-GDR Consultations

LD1702225190 Moscow International Service in Polish 1500 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Vasiliy Lisouik commentary; read by announcer]

[Text] The German issue has never just been a national issue for the Germans; it has always been in the focus of attention of European countries, including Poland. That is why, in accordance with predictions, the main topic of the talks of Hans Modrow and Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Warsaw was connected with problems of the unification of Germany, European security, and the inviolability of borders.

The Polish side has received answers to the above questions. The GDR's attitude to the main problem worrying Poland was confirmed yet again in Warsaw by Hans Modrow who was in favor of the justified and special interests of Poland, i.e. assurance that the inviolability of its borders and their security were fully guaranteed.

The sides stressed that while doing this, the agreements of 1950 between Poland and the GDR should be taken into consideration, as worked out in Zgorzelec, as well as the Warsaw agreements of 1970 between Poland and the FRG.

However, in the future unified Germany, continues the Moscow radio commentator, the responsibility for stability and inviolability of the borders will also belong to the other German side, that is why Poland and the GDR have every right to expect the confirmation of such a stance from Bonn.

In connection with this, it is worrying that Helmut Kohl, the FRG chancellor, is avoiding concrete statements on this issue. It is enough to recall his statement during the recent meeting in Paris with the French President Francois Mitterrand, when he said that the issue of borders will be decided by the joint parliament and government of the unified Germany.

The future of Germany will be shaped by the two nations of the two current German states. Nobody questions their right to do so, but at the same time this does not lift the responsibility from the allies of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in resolving the current German question.

Their responsibility results from the agreements made in Potsdam. The unification processes should not disrupt the aura of confidence and detente existing in Europe and should not cause fear among other nations and states about their own security and permanence of borders.

This is how one can justify the stance presented by the Polish side on the solution of the German problem. The Polish side is of the opinion that the guarantees of European security and the inviolability of borders on the Oder and Neisse could be given by an agreement initialled before the unification of the two German states and signed after their unification.

One can also understand the Polish wish to have a place at the negotiating table of the future six, which in accordance with the concept by Hans-Dietrich Genscher ought to work out the principles for German unification and define the place of this state in the European structure, writes the Moscow radio commentator.

This is dictated by the above-mentioned anxiety of Poland about the fate of its Western borders, from the Baltic to the Sudeten, as it will be a border with a neighbor who will be economically and militarily strong.

This is what Hans Modrow, the GDR premier, said on this issue in Waraw. Those who are going to be talked about have the right for their voice to be heard. How this issue will be resolved specifically, time will show.

However, the Moscow Radio commentator writes in conclusion, one ought to think that the formula two plus four does not exlude and takes into consideration constant consultations with all the interested sides.

With regard to the Soviet stance on the issue of unification of the two German states, it is based on the interests of security of neighboring countries, including Poland.

'Dissatisfaction' With Polish Reforms Emerging

PM1502103990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Disagreements Within 'Solidarity'"]

[Text] The quite clear political horizon which opened up before the Polish public movement formed around the "Solidarity" trade union after last year's parliamentary elections has begun to be obscured by storm clouds.

The fact that the trade union association which initiated the mass civilian movement is no longer a monolith and that serious centrifugal trends exist within it is borne out by the decision of the Western Pomeranian "Solidarity-80" trade union, with its headquarters in Szczecin, to break away as an independent organization.

The split was prompted by disagreement with the policies of "Solidarity" leader L. Walesa and the civil parliamentary club, which, in the opinion of Western Pomerania's "Solidarity-80," deviate from "Solidarity's" ideals of 1980-1981.

The first comparatively distinct symptoms of public dissatisfaction occasioned by the grave social consequences of the radical economic reforms, which have been a burden on working people and on indigent sections of the population above all, have been manifest not only in the recent wave of miners' strikes and the numerous protest actions by individual peasant farmers but also in the population's growing apathy and political indifference.

Prohibited, Restricted Goods Seized From Poles

LD1602120190 Moscow TASS in English 2105 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 15 TASS—On Wednesday, February 14 sizable shipments of industrial products and foodstuffs were seized at the Mostiska customs office in western Ukraine. The shipments, which Polish tourists tried to take out of the Soviet Union, included 480 television sets, 686,000 electrical appliances, 875 kilograms of sugar, 1,100 kilograms of butter, 1,200 liters of vodka, etc.

Part of these shipments were confiscated as containing things prohibited for export by the USSR Council of Ministers' resolution of August 30, 1989 on measures to regulate export of consumer goods from the USSR, other goods were seized as being in excess of established norms for export, a spokesman for the Chief Custom Controls Administration at the USSR Council of Ministers told TASS today.

On Thursday morning, a group of Polish tourists expressed their dissatisfaction with the seizure and, in contradiction with the established rules, picketed the crossing point, obstructing entry into and exit from the Soviet Union, Soviet Customs officials told TASS. Police had to be called in. Representatives of the Polish consular agency in Lvov and the chief of the Lvov regional customs office arrived at Mostiska.

The officials helped calm down the enraged tourists and settle the dispute.

Polish Social Democracy Amends Property Bill

LD2002094890 Moscow TASS in English 0858 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Warsaw, February 20 TASS—A meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic held on Monday made radical

amendments to a bill on property that will help determine Poland's future economic structure.

The Central Executive Committee believes that the bill, designed to privatise state property, does not ensure the working people's active participation in this process. It is necessary to establish the Sejm's control over those bodies that will carry out denationalisation and their decisions.

The committee also suggests that guarantees against the rapacious selling of national property or its exploitation, contradicting the interests of the population and the state, should be ensured.

Work collectives should have the right to co-own enterprises, the Central Executive Committee said. The denationalisation of the economy should not lead to the establishment of capitalist private property. It should create conditions for the existence of competing pluralistic forms of property.

The meeting also discussed preparations for the forthcoming elections to the bodies of territorial self-government.

PRAVDA Text of Gorbachev Message to Iliescu

PM2002151390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[M.S. Gorbachev greetings message to Romania's Ion Iliescu on election; undated]

[Text] To Ion Iliescu, chairman of Romania's Provisional Council of National Accord:

Accept congratulations on your election as chairman of Romania's Provisional Council of National Accord.

I wish you success in your activity for the benefit of the Romanian people and in the interests of solving the socioeconomic problems facing the country, democratizing social life, developing fruitful cooperation between our countries, and strengthening stability, peace, and security in Europe.

M. Gorbachev

Romania's Iliescu Cited on Army's Role, Tasks

PM2002111190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under general headline: "Regarding Romanian Army's Tasks"]

[Text] Bucharest, 19 Feb—The army forms part of our society, the state of which also affects the military, I. Iliescu, chairman of the Provisional Council of National Accord, stated at a meeting with the command personnel of the Romanian Army.

There exist many grounds for discontent in our society, he said. Despite the measures taken to improve people's living standards and remove negative phenomena, a difficult road in terms of economic, social, and political transformations still has to be traveled.

There are circles which have an interest in maintaining a tense situation in society, the Romanian leader went on. The dismantling of the security system, which was a destructive force in our society, has made us realize that there is no one to defend state interests at this stage. Meanwhile the appearance of various foreign services in our country, which are operating at every level and in every sphere of society, is clear. From this standpoint we are completely unarmed in the face of these services, which are directing the discontent built up in society against the authorities and individual representatives of power.

Regarding the demands put to the country's leadership by the military, Iliescu observed that there are rational elements in them which should be carefully examined. Some of the problems have already been resolved and some will have to be resolved in the near future, he said. The military has been frustrated by the lack of trust in the army and some of its cadres whose behavior during the revolution has still not been clarified. The law-enforcement agencies, together with the army itself, have to solve these problems in order to restore calm and faith to people.

The Romanian leader touched on a number of problems concerning the securing of order and discipline in the army. The army proved a reliable shield during the revolution, he said, and it must remain a force that ensures stability in society during this difficult period.

Romanian Military Demonstrates, Lists Demands

PM1602135590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by own correspondent V. Volodin: "Romania: New Trial of Strength"]

[Text] Bucharest—It was decided at a sitting of the Provisional Council of National Accord that Ion Iliescu will remain head of the Romanian state. The participants in the "little parliament" unanimously expressed themselves in favor of granting him the post of chairman of the provisional council without being elected. Radu Cimpeanu, leader of the national-liberal party, was elected as one of the deputy chairmen by a majority of votes. I think this was no accident. Representing one of Romania's historical parties, R. Cimpeanu also figured on the list as the candidate of another historical party—the national peasant party—and for the National Salvation Front as well. I believe that the Front's decision to support Cimpeanu attests to the historical parties' growing popularity and to a certain weakness in the positions of the Front itself.

For the umpteenth time since the December events Victory Square, despite the government prohibition,

became the arena for large demonstrations. Now it is the military who are setting the tone in the demonstrators' ranks.

The demonstrations began 12 February when a delegation of air force officers and representatives of the units of the Timisoara garrison arrived at the government residence. They demanded an investigation into the army's actions in the period of the December events, the dismissal of all officers and generals who have compromised themselves, the resignation of National Defense Minister General Militaru (who, as is well known, switched to the side of the rebels) and of Minister of Internal Affairs General Chitac. The military decided not to leave the square in front of the government residence until their demands are met in full. I visited Victory Square when civilians were demonstrating in support of the military and the total number of demonstrators reached several thousand.

The senior lieutenant to whom I spoke, without giving his name, explained to me that the army must rid itself of those leaders who are compromising it.

"It is known that the troops fired on the demonstrators. We have a video cassette recording the present minister of the interior taking a direct part in actions against the unarmed people in Timisoara," he said. "The defense minister must also resign because he is commanding the troops with the aid of Stalinist methods..."

In the opinion of the air force officer, virtually all Romanian military units are in solidarity with the demonstrators' demands, but their delegates cannot come to their assistance.

"In the military townships a roll call is organized every three hours," he explained. "And those who are not in line are declared deserters. Someone is now spreading rumors about the possibility of a military coup, but I do not think things will get that far..."

Indeed, while I was talking with the senior lieutenant delegates from various military units—in addition to the airmen there were border troops, communications troops, and motorized riflemen on the square—were received by Romanian Prime Minister P. Roman. Having heard their demands, he assured the delegates that a competent commission would study the evidence they have submitted regarding the December events in Timisoara and Bucharest. As for the resignation of the national defense minister, a reply to this question will be given in two weeks. The prime minister pointed out that going absent without leave from a military unit is a very grave violation of discipline, but he undertakes that the demonstrators' return to their place of service will have no adverse consequences for them.

To judge by the reaction of the crowd, which had somewhat thinned out by night time, this reply disappointed the demonstrators, who had decided not to leave the square until their demands had been met in full. Yesterday, Thursday, the military's demonstration continued in front of the government residence.

Romanian Assembly's Debate on Structure Reported

PM1402124790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Volodin report: "Parliamentary Battles on Patriarch Hill"]

[Text] Bucharest—The first session of the Provisional Council of National Unity [PCNU], which was organizational in character, has ended in Bucharest in the old Romanian parliament building on Patriarch Hill.

Questions about strengthening the PCNU's structure were included on its agenda: discussion of the draft statutes and the council's activity; and a Romanian government information report about the economic situation in the country. It should be noted that the session was conducted in accordance with the decision taken 1 February during the "roundtable" talks between the leadership of the National Salvation Front council and representatives of 30 political parties.

So, the "lesser parliament" held its first session. It can be said without exaggeration that the ancient parliamentary palace has not known such heated discussions. Instead of unanimous approval and applause followed by a standing ovation, fierce debates, interrupted by sharp responses from different parts of the hall, shook the vaults of Romania's former Grand National Assembly. For the first time in recent decades people spoke without notes and even without time limits. But the line at the microphone prevented any single speaker from remaining at it for too long.

"The discussion really is unprecedentedly keen," Tache Viorel Piryulescu, deputy chairman of the Ecology Party, said during a recess. "But I think that, when the the PCNU chairman and executive bureau members are being elected, the polemics will become even more heated..."

But this session did not get as far as those questions—nor, by the way, as far as discussing the other points on the agenda. After the recess the debate on the "lesser parliament's" numbers flared up with renewed intensity.

"Order! We are still a small parliament!" I. Iliescu, chairman of the session, jokingly tried to restore order in the hall.

But, probably precisely because the parliamentary system is taking its first steps, in almost eight hours of debate the session participants succeeded in reaching agreement on only the first question on the agenda, concerning the formation of the PCNU.

Heated verbal battles flared up over the size of "lesser parliament's" chambers, which under the accord reached 1 February must be absolutely equivalent to one another. In other words, 50 percent of the places in the

PCNU must belong to members of the National Salvation Front Council. Seven political parties formed since the "roundtable" session are also embarked on the road of resolving this question. The participants in the PCNU session also took a long time to decide in what chamber to incorporate the nine national minority organizations.

"Not all the minorities are with the front! Leave us alone! We ourselves know whom to vote for!" people could be heard saying from the hall.

Often during the debates a stalemate seemed to threaten to trap the novice parliamentarians. Many journalists who followed the progress of the discussions got the impression that representatives of both chambers were afraid to upset the parity of forces discussed in advance. It seems that in this connection a fierce debate flared up over the status of the political parties and public organizations formed since 1 February. So, the "additional parties" were at the epicenter of the polemics.

For several more hours the parliamentarians fought verbal skirmishes over the question: Can the new political formations become full members of the PCNU or participate in its work in the capacity of observers? As night approached they managed to find a solution which was acceptable to everyone. That is, to approve all the present session participants as full members of the "lesser parliament."

At the end of the debates, answering journalists' questions, I. Iliescu explained that by consensus 37 political parties and nine national minority organizations became part of the Provisional Council. For this the composition of the PCNU had to be extended from an intended 241 to 253 members. But from now on, until the elections, all newly formed parties and organizations will have to be satisfied with the role of observers there. Discussion of the agenda questions remaining outside the framework of the first sitting will continue on Tuesday.

Popular Support Demonstrated for Romanian Front

PM3001135590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 90 Morning Edition p4

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch under the rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Workers Support the Front"]

[Text] Bucharest—So many times now Victory Square in Bucharest has been the scene of large demonstrations. True, the demonstration staged last Sunday and which has continued since Monday morning has involved thousands upon thousands of people who are not just inhabitants of the capital but also workers who have come to the assistance of the National Salvation Front from various regions of the country. The subject of the discussions which lasted throughout Sunday and shook the square till dawn was the decision of the National Salvation Front Council to run in the free elections planned for 20 May.

Immediately after this, on 24 January, tanks were heard rumbling along the road in the square, thereby impeding access to the main entrance to the Romanian Government residence, and the square shook with the cries of demonstrators: "Elections without the Front!" and "Iliescu is the Romanian Communist Party!" The rumor that the National Salvation Front led by President I. Iliescu intended if not to revive the Romanian Communist Party on the basis of the National Salvation Front then at the very least to use the same administrative measures as those employed by the dictatorial regime spread quickly through the excited crowd.

However, the demonstrations which continued in the days that followed were only a modest prelude to the serious opposition of all Romanian political forces, which drew as many people into the streets of the capital as these same streets had perhaps seen only during the days of the hated regime's overthrow. The official reason given was a television appearance by representatives of the three "historical" parties—the National Peasants' Party, National Liberal Party, and Social Democratic Party—who not only declared their opposition to the National Salvation Front but also their intention to secure its resignation by staging a demonstration, planned for 1200 hours last Sunday.

Victory Square appeared to be split between two polar forces. On one side of the invisible barricade were people holding placards saying things like: "Someone who has been with the Russians for 65 years cannot think like Bush"—a reference to the fact that I. Iliescu once studied in the Soviet Union. On the other side of the barricade were the people supporting the National Salvation Front as the only force enjoying the trust of the majority of the Romanian people and capable of saving the country from chaos and anarchy.

I cannot say that at first there were more people supporting the National Salvation Front. Workers began to gather only when representatives of the so-called historical parties had broken through the cordon of soldiers and were moving past the tanks in the direction of the entrance to the government residence. This appeal, made by one of the participants in the demonstration on free Romanian television—"Rush to their aid!"—roused not only Bucharest. Half an hour later, signalling desperately to the square packed with thousands of people, trucks began to arrive from various cities and districts.

It would be possible to give an even lengthier description of the events of that turbulent Sunday and of the slogans and appeals of the demonstrators, which included this one: "Do not allow representatives of the so-called historical parties to stand in the elections—as emigres, they have not shared the people's pain and sorrow!" However, we will try to sum up the results of the demonstration, which has forced the country to forget about the resignation of D. Mazilu, first deputy chairman of the National Salvation Front Council, and even about the court trial of the dictator's stooges which has now begun.

In my view, one of the main results is that, without wishing it, the National Salvation Front has demonstrated its strength and popularity among the people.

Soviet-Romanian Commission Discusses Cooperation

LD1402023790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1938 GMT 13 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest, 13 February (TASS)—A meeting took place here today between P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet section of the combined Soviet-Romanian Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, and V. Stanculescu, Romania's minister of national economy and chairman of the Romanian Section of the commission.

Prospects were examined for extending bilateral economic ties, deepening scientific-technical cooperation in sectors where there is mutual interest, and improving the exchange of goods between the two countries.

Ye.M. Tyazhelnikov, the USSR's ambassador to Romania, took part in the talks, which will be continued.

Soviet-Romanian Trade Turnover To Increase

LD1902210290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 19 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; report by correspondent S. Zhelenznyak—identified by caption]

[Text] It is planned to raise the trade turnover between the USSR and Romania to 6 billion rubles [R] in 1990. This was stated at a press conference in Bucharest by Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. [Video shows Mostovoy addressing and being questioned by audience]

The situation in Romania is unstable. It is unlikely that anyone would today be prepared to predict the outcome of the elections set for 20 May. Under these conditions, the absence of anxiety in signing major economic drafts can only be based on the countries' profound mutual interest.

Suffering from a mania for the gigantic, Ceausescu built many of Romania's enterprises without taking the economy's real potential into account. Fitted out with western equipment and advanced technologies, for years they did not work to full capacity due to a lack of raw materials, electric power, and gas. Agreement has been reached to place Soviet orders for these cathedral-like capacities. It is planned to produce—from our raw materials and using our electric power—rolled metal, stainless steel, sheet aluminium, caustic sode, cement, and other products, the lack of which is acutely felt in Soviet industry.

In accordance with a decree from Romania, the export of foodstuffs is prohibited; the Soviet Union used to receive some of these in exchange for petroleum oil. Instead of foodstuffs, Romania has now offered goods which used to be supplied from here to shops in France, the FRG, and Italy: furniture, clothing, and footwear, as well as dry wines, vegetables, and fruit. [video shows street scenes; the exterior of a factory showing large tanks; factory interiors with welding taking place; clothing in shop window]

PRAVDA Views Romanian Political Situation

PM0202113590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Special correspondents V. Vedrashko, Ye. Spekhov, and A. Sharyy dispatch: "'We, the People...' Romania After the Revolutionary Events"]

[Text] Bucharest, January—Carefully enunciating the unmanageable vowels, the presenter articulated some Russian words and their meanings, which, seeming slightly naive to us, made her eyes light up with a warm joy. "Faith... Hope... Love... Please remember..." The first Russian language lesson was under way on Romanian television and the words pronounced on the screen were greeted as if they were something significant, because the country really is living in faith and hope. Faith that the difficult past will not be repeated. Hope for a better future. Love and respect for the memory of those who died in the struggle for freedom.

"Faith... Hope... Love..." the presenter said.

Please remember this.

"The interests and positions of various categories of people are becoming differentiated in political life," Ion Iliescu, chairman of the National Salvation Front Council, said in a recent speech. "But the idea of preserving unity as regards the main problems is more topical than ever today." Historical practice has shown that, in the name of achieving common aims, yesterday's opponents can become temporary fellow travelers, although they do not, as a rule, follow parallel paths for long. Romania is no exception—after the victorious revolution, the stormy process of the crystallization of political organizations began in the country. Now, a month later, around 20 parties have been registered: It is not just the quite natural desire to fill the political vacuum that formed during the years of dictatorship that is asserting itself, but the old traditions of pluralism as well.

Time, like a chess player, will place figures on the political board, but for the present, programs, slogans, and statements are being published and posters, pamphlets, and notices are appearing in the streets. It is extremely difficult to find one's bearings in this labyrinth. "After all, no one knows yet in what way the democrats differ from the national liberals," an elderly passerby said, having read an announcement stuck to a lamppost.

The weekly CONTEMPORANUL published a list of questions for the newly created parties in order to help readers work out their political sympathies: What, in the opinion of representatives of various social forces, are the priority tasks in the development of industry and agriculture, how should the pricing system be reformed without causing inflation, what will the country's political system look like?

But it is much easier to ask questions than to obtain answers in Romania today.

The country's interim leadership—the National Salvation Front Council—has declared its intention to present its candidates at the elections, which will take place 20 May. What is the orientation of the front itself? According to National Salvation Front leaders, it is a left-wing organization "in the broadest sense of the word," in the sense that the front has a progressive, left-wing view of democracy. "Doesn't the National Salvation Front have a color?" journalists ask ironically. "The front has no ideological schemes," Silviu Brucan, member of the National Salvation Front Council, counters. "The Romanian revolution was not dictated by some kind of '-ism'—capitalism or socialism—but by man and his needs, concerns, and worries." "We want to create a country free of dogma in which equality and man's free development are asserted." These statements, which brought together virtually the whole nation under the front's banner at the first stage of revolutionary events, guarantee support for the new leadership even now.

It should, however, be noted that the front has been subjected to criticism both from the left and the right from the very first moment of its existence. The new leadership's difficulties are obvious and anyway no one is hiding them—in the few weeks it has been in power, the front has already often found itself on the brink of a crisis.

The first time this happened was 12 January, when, giving in to pressure from the crowd that had gathered outside the government residence, the Council adopted antidemocratic decisions on banning the communist party and holding a referendum on the question of restoring the death penalty, which were subsequently recognized as a political mistake. "The rally left a feeling of shame and a mountain of empty bottles," ROMANIA LIBERA wrote with bitter sarcasm.

The Front's decision to present its candidates at the elections provoked a negative reaction too. Three political parties spoke out against this intention, believing that the country's interim government was contradicting the original program it had declared. Again demonstrators came out onto the squares. Some to demand that the current leadership's resignation, others to support its decisions. Thousands of workers from the all over the country came to Bucharest, expressing their disagreement with attacks on the front, believing that its destabilization could bring chaos to the whole country.

The front stood its ground. There was a meeting between National Salvation Front Council leaders and representatives of the "historical" parties. It is being assessed as a constructive beginning for the creation of a climate of mutual understanding and further cooperation.

Romania is moving along the path of creating a multiparty political system. However, I. Iliescu believes, "a multiparty system is a historically outdated model of democracy. There is no ideal form of genuine democracy and genuine pluralism. We must construct a Romanian democracy for the late 20th and early 21st centuries."

The outlines of such a "democratic model" have still barely started to be formed. In theory, the communist party too has its place in it. A party that is now virtually nonexistent.

Party membership cards being burnt on the streets of Romanian cities, anticommunist slogans, the hammer and sickle likened to the fascist swastika. This is retribution for the betrayal of an idea and for the party's transformation into an apparatus of personal power. It is distressing to realize that communism in Romania is now an object of hatred and contempt primarily because no distinction is made between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the methods of "putting it into practice" that Ceausescu chose. "Faith in communism has been undermined at its very foundations," the journalist F. Merculescu writes in ROMANIA LIBERA. "No one, unless their memory fails them, will succumb the temptation of communist humanism."

Merculescu is unfortunately not far wrong, although time will tell what will happen in the future. Of course, there many people in Romania who have been able to assess the situation calmly. But what can you say to mothers whose sons were killed in Bucharest under the slogans of socialism? What can you say to families who are still mourning those who went missing? Or to the people driven to despair by the lack of food and heating and humiliated by the system of total espionage?

And yet almost 4 million people—this was the number of members in the Romanian Communist Party—cannot be traitors to their own people.

"It must be taken into consideration," Flore Curcan, a steel worker, says, "that party members who were communists by conviction did not seek any kind of advantages for themselves. Of course there was no lack of careerists and scoundrels in the party ranks, but not everyone was like that! The main difficulty is to draw a line between those who stayed honest and those who were Ceausescu's accomplices."

Where is this limit? No one will refuse former Romanian Communist Party members who are innocent before the people the right to take part in political life. As for the possibility of organizing a renewed party, cleansed of filth, it is too early to talk about this. The December shock has proved too strong and the weight of the communists' guilt before the people is too heavy.

Bucharest at night is populated by soldiers. Silent army pickets stand at freezing crossroads and the main entrances of foreign embassies, hotels, and stores in the center. The blue berets of paratroopers greet guests arriving at the airport, while dirty green barrels of tanks greet them in Victory Square. A chain of submachine-gunners, sullen from exhaustion, stands rigid at the television center.

It is more than a month since the birth of the Romanian revolution. Wrecked social and administrative structures have been inherited from the dictatorship. The country is essentially creating itself again and arming itself with new laws. "Everything that is being done is based on a single concept"—these are the words of Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac. "We are not feeling our way, we are following a single precise working program." In the gigantic social mechanism, just like in a complex electronic instrument, there are thousands and thousands of elements, whose manufacte and tuning demand a great deal of effort. Because it is easier to break something than to create it."

...A new passport system has been introduced whereby all Romanian citizens over the age of 14 now enjoy the right of free travel abroad. Romanian entry and exit visas have been abolished. A new information agency, ROMPRESS, has been created. A decision was adopted by the Police Inspectorate with respect to those citizens who are asking to change their names because they are similar to the dictator's name. A draft decree cum law on the election of parliament has been published.

This is only a small part of what has been done. And only a little has been done so far of what still has to be done.

The Romanian capital is returning to normal, although the walls of buildings still bear the scars of the recent urban warfare. A few things have already been restored, the spindly tops of cranes tower here and there, but the burnt-out, disfigured buildings still have gaping holes where windows were smashed. Snowmen, grey from car fumes, wearing scarves made of national flags around their necks and the letter "V"—a symbol of victory—on their chests, smile to passers-by.

The biologist Dan Predescu has become the new mayor of Bucharest. The main task, he believes, is to form a competent "team" to manage the city's economy. The new municipal council has to seriously analyze the capital's housing problem and inspect gas and water supplies. There is a complex situation in public transport. There are not enough parks and gardens in Bucharest where children can play. Many of the city's inhabitants who have suffered from lack of food and heating in their apartments, are demanding that their demands be quickly met.

Romania has changed, it has become different, people are no longer afraid to look each other in the eye. "The most serious of your crimes is that you fettered the soul of this country," one of the prosecutors told the dictator during the case. The fetters have now been cast away. But the process of finding oneself, and realizing creative, and not destructive potential, is still continuing and is evidently far from being concluded.

The Romanian revolution is 41 days old, and the first, most difficult month is past nor, probably, could a more difficult month have been invented: a month full of victories and losses, joys and defeats, a month of intoxicating freedom and the opportunity to say what you think. The country took a step from one era to another and the people finally obtained the right not just to think for themselves, but to say at the tops of their voices: "We, the people..."

Shishlin Views Developments in Eastern Europe

PM0702130090 London MORNING STAR in English 6 Feb 90 p 5

[CPSU Central Committee member Nikolay Shishlin article: "A Choice of Paths Toward a New Socialism"]

[Text] Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania have entered a period of radical reforms.

It has been noted in all circles that the Soviet Union not only welcomed and supported the revolutionary changes in the Warsaw Pact countries, but also encouraged them by its policy of perestroika and its unconditional denunciation of the totalitarian Stalinist model of Socialism.

It is more or less clear what the Eastern European countries want to break with.

They have said "no" to the administrative-command system and the one-party monopoly of power.

They have said "no" to ideological dogmatism and the system of power which ignored the fundamental laws of economic and political development.

They have said "no" to dishonesty, corruption and the immorality of the leaders who usurped the right to declare what was right and what was wrong on behalf of the party and the people.

There are other questions that are far more difficult to answer, such as where the Eastern European countries will go in the future.

How will their social systems develop? What factors will dominate the development of what was recently referred to as the "socialist community" and the "nucleus of the world socialist system."

Answers to these questions are coming from those who are directly involved in the stormy process of renewal as well as by those who are watching the swift changes in the political scene.

In short the answers put forward are these.

First. Socialism has suffered a defeat. Communist ideology is dead. The only possible future is a return to the bourgeois-democratic system. In other words, back to the past.

The second answer is more elastic.

In the international dispute between the Communists and the Social-Democrats, who were so zealously and ardently condemned at the time of Stalin and in later years, the Social Democrats have actually won.

That is why Social-Democratic methods should be used in curing the ills of the Eastern European countries.

Third. The revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe will cleanse the Socialist ideal, ridding it of the tragic follies of barrack- room Socialism.

Newly-found freedom will enable Eastern European societies to make a quick recovery, throw away false values and embrace the true values of Socialism.

All these points of view have a right to exist, but one should not try to map out a single course for all the Socialist countries that are breaking away from their past.

It is futile to draw up a single reform programme for all these countries, which have different histories, conditions and traditions.

Each socialist country has its own solutions to its problems.

At the same time, such principles as democracy, assertion of human rights and liberties, the overcoming of people's alienation from property, the establishment of a self-regulating economy and respect for the moral and cultural values of each people will dominate the activities of the public forces which have a key role to play in the present situation in the Soviet union and the other socialist countries.

I don't think that the socialist ideal, born of the entire development of humanity, has lost its appeal.

I know that the socialist countries today are in a state of turmoil. The same is true of the Soviet Union.

I know that alongside the honest people who want life in their countries to change for the better there are dishonest and ambitious politicians. Such people also exist in the Soviet Union.

I know that intolerance justified by the desire to solve all problems at once can lead to new bitter disappointments. The political struggle in my own country bears this out.

A break with the past is always dramatic and sometimes tragic. People who have committed crimes must be punished.

Public anger against those who solemnly presided over all sorts of meetings for years is justified. But it is dangerous for society to waste people's energy, revived by freedom, on revenge alone.

The loss of their past monopoly on power by the Communist and workers' parties in Eastern Europe should not prevent them from actively participating in the radical restructuring of social relations in their countries.

There were members of the ruling parties among those courageous and honest people in the Eastern European countries who awakened the public by their ideas and actions, and it is unfair to tar them with the same brush as the bankrupt political leaders form the upper echelons of power.

Only a society in which the constructive element prevails, and in which common sense and justice govern public actions, is capable of making progress.

I am convinced that 1990 will be a tumultuous year for the Soviet Union and our friends and allies in the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. We are in for many surprises, including unpleasnt ones.

Yet I am sure that further movement toward democracy and progress based on human rights and dignity will be easier if our countries succeed in establishing more balanced, diverse and meaningful relations between them.

They have already begun to restructure their relations in keeping with the new realities, on the basis of full respect for the right of every people to decide their own destiny.

Free choice is best, while cooperation is the most constructive way to implement this choice.

West Europe

W. European Socialists Consulted on Economy

PM1302130190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Exchange of Experience"]

[Text] In accordance with agreement between the CPSU Central Committee and the Socialist International leadership, an international seminar to exchange experience in using different forms of ownership and the market was held in Moscow 8-10 February. The seminar was attended by parliamentarians, public figures, and eminent economists representing 11 socialist and social democratic parties from West Europe.

There was a frank and useful discussion of questions concerning the best possible combination of different forms of ownership and mechanisms for their functioning, of problems associated with the transition from a centralized administrative to a plan-market economy.

Commentator on Creation of European Bank

LD1402231290 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—By TASS observer on economic issues Yuriy Stepanov:

Today is the last day to submit to the organising committee for the creation of a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development of remarks and corrections to its rules. The Soviet side has a number of comments to make, the Soviet Foreign Ministry told TASS.

At the first round of talks held in Paris last month, the Soviet delegation put forward a number of serious observations. Later additional comments were made by the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, the USSR State Planning Committee and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The secretariat of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is taking part in working out the final version of the document.

A proposal to create the European Bank for reconstruction and Development was put forward by President Francois Mitterand of France at the summit meeting of the European Community in Paris on November 18, 1989. According to Mitterand, the purpose of the bank will be to help East European countries transfer to market-oriented economies. The USSR accepted the invitation to take part in the preparatory work on the creation of the bank and expressed its positive attitude, in principle, to the idea. During his meeting with the French president in Kiev last December, President Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that the new bank could become one of the instruments used to unify Europe and create the all-European home.

The first international meeting to discuss this issue was held in mid-January. The Soviet delegation set forth its stand there: constituent documents of the European bank should not contain any discriminatory restrictions in relation to the Soviet Union and equal rights for all members of the bank should be recorded there. This demand was put forward in response to some Western countries' insistance that the USSR not take advantage of credits and other services of the bank.

The USSR insists that the goals and functions of the bank, as recorded in its constituent documents, should be of a balanced character and that the granting of credits should not be specified by any political considerations. If the USSR joins the bank, its share of the capital should be large enough to ensure direct participation in policy-making.

Most West European countries favour the bank's orientation towards the creation of market structures of economic management, including the financing of national programmes for the decentralisation and demonopolisation of economies in East Europe. Many of them support the CMEA proposal to include in the crediting sphere the state sector, which is gradually being transferred to a market economy.

In contrast, the U.S. and Japan would like to confine the activities of the bank to promoting the development of private enterprise in East Europe by granting credits for financing specific projects.

All these problems and proposals will be discussed at a plenary meeting in March, and, according to the intention of France—the initiator of the plan—the European Bank for Reconstruction and development will start functioning on July 1.

More on Belgian Defense Minister's USSR Visit

Disarmament Discussed

LD1602065290 Moscow International Service in French 1800 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Mr. Guy Coeme [Belgian defense minister] made public the Soviet-Belgian communique before Soviet and foreign journalists during a news conference in Moscow [on 10 February]. You have already heard the first installment of his speech. Guy Coeme spoke on the themes of negotiations and talks with the Soviet party. He particularly spoke about the question of German reunification. Then he dealt with disarmament:

[Begin Coeme recording] The second topic—disarmament. We have talked a great deal about Vienna-1 and about the preparation of Vienna-2. Concerning Vienna-1 and particularly my talk with Mr. Karpov, I feel that one is trying to reach an agreement as soon as possible. My interlocutors argued several times in favor of rapid preparation of the second phase of negotiations in Vienna with a summit which could be held before the end of this year and which would prepare the negotiation of Vienna-2. To talk about disarmament is one thing, to talk about the consequences of disarmament is another. One of the preoccupations I expressed was to know how one converts companies which have up until now been devoted to arms production. The Soviet interlocutors stressed political will to provide the maximum of means for the production of consumer goods. Everyone realizes however that this will require a lot of money; that there is the problem of the reconversion of the personnel, at the level of officers, at the level of experts which are well paid in the arms industry and whose fate could be different tomorrow.

The second topic [as heard] is that of nationalities. Our interlocutors think that this year will be decisive in the prospect of a solution that has to be found for the nationalities issue. In general they express the need to create structures that are truly federal—and not only on paper. The Constitution allowed the republics to leave the union, but the conditions for such secession are not provided. It would be convenient thus to set up a mechanism which would allow possible secession from the union but everyone stresses the need to take into consideration the interests of the union and of course,

before that, the search for a solution within the structures of the Soviet Union. We have also had the impression that the situation in the Caucasus is at a stalemate we did not have the impression that a solution is near.

Another topic—the Supreme Soviet. Our interlocutors—and we certainly share the point of view—are happy that the rule of law will prevail in the future and that the Supreme Soviet is acquiring an increased importance compared to what it was in the past. This influence is evidently increasing in defense and foreign policy. In this context, Mr. Krivakov [name as heard] stressed that in the future a declaration of war would have to be initiated in the Supreme Soviet. Referring to the example of Afghanistan, our interlocutors said things will never happen like they did in the past. Our interlocutors in the Supreme Soviet told us that the control over the defense budget of the Soviet Union is very important to the Supreme Soviet. We finally discussed, in general terms, especially initially, nuclear issues; the issue of the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency was examined without being exhausted. Some of the interlocutors want total destruction of nuclear weapons; but as I said, we did not go to the deepest heart of this matter. I believe we agreed to say that it is important, that it is essentil that Vienna-1 end rapidly with an agreement in order to head to an agreement at Vienna-2 which will in any way be ruled by the problem of short-range nuclear weapons where negotiations should be started too, following the first implementation of Vienna-1 agreement on the field. [end recording]

Departs Moscow for Leningrad

PM1502115390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Touring the Country"]

[Text] On 10 February Belgian National Defense Minister Coeme, who is paying an official visit to the Soviet Union, left on a tour of the country.

He was seen off at the airport by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; Army General I.M. Tretyak, USSR deputy defense minister; Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, USSR deputy defense minister; and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At the airport the Belgian and Soviet state flags were hoisted, an honor guard was drawn up on the airfield, and the two countries' national anthems were played.

On the same day the Belgian guest arrived in Leningrad.

He was greeted at the airport by Colonel General V.F. Yermakov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, and other officials.

G. Coeme visited the monument to the Heroic Defenders of Leningrad on Victory Square and laid flowers in front of the central sculpture group.

The guest paid a call on the Leningrad Military District commander.

Departs Leningrad for Home

PM1602093790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 4

[TASS "Official Report"]

[Text] Leningrad, 12 Feb—While on an official visit to the Soviet Union, Belgian National Defense Minister Guy Coeme spent three days in Leningrad. At Piskarevskoye Memorial Cemetery, he paid tribute to the memory of more than half-a-million Leningraders and soldiers who died defending the city during the blockade and laid a wreath.

This evening Guy Coeme left for home. He was seen off at the airport by USSR Deputy Defense Minister Army General M.I. Sorokin and other officials.

Belgian Ambassador to the USSR L. Putman was also there to see him off.

Austria's Vranitzky Cited on Economy, Soviet Ties

WA1502201790 Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Austrian Chancellor F. Vranitzky, by special correspondents E. Alekseyev and I. Belov; place and date not given: "Beneath the Sign of the Eagle and the Hammer and Sickle"]

[Text] Vienna-Moscow, February—It is over 70 years now, although not everyone notices this, that Austria has been living under this sign—that of the eagle and the hammer and sickle. Back in 1919 the two-headed eagle on the country's coat of arms lost one of its heads and in place of the sword and orb acquired the symbols of the alliance of workers and peasants. Having suddenly noticed this fact, perhaps, some of our compatriots have linked together the 70-year-old symbol of worker-peasant alliance on the coat of arms and Austria's undoubted postwar successes and determined that the principles of socialism are being implemented in the country in practice.

Two TRUD journalists had an opportunity to visit Austria at the invitation of the editorial board of the country's most popular newspaper NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG. We gratefully accepted the invitation in order to try to familiarize our readers somewhat more closely with today's Austria. And, we believe, it is very important that we are able to begin this familiarization with an interview with Franz Vranitzky, federal chancellor of the Austrian Republic and leader of the Austrian Socialist Party.

[Correspondents] Can Austria be considered, as some people in your country maintain, a socialist country?

[Vranitzky] After World War I, our country, under the leadership of the two big parties—the Austrian Socialist Party and the Austrian People's Party—adopted the decision to build a parliamentary democracy. This implies a system of a market economy, a system of competition, and a system of the federalism of each federal land in relation to the central government. The Austrian Socialist Party has pursued, primarily, an economic policy which we define as a "vari-structural economic system." It incorporates on the one hand free private enterprise and, on the other, certain enterprises belonging to the whole of society—the railroads, telecommunication facilities, power stations, and a number of important industrial facilities, which were until recently even under 100-percent republic ownership.

In the postwar period the nationalized enterprises did an important job since they mined and produced, in the main, raw material and intermediate products. Their nationalization after 1945 is explained by the fact that there were in the country at that time no private entrepreneurs who might have ventured to revive destroyed factories.

We no longer adhere to the principle of 100-percent state ownership of industrial enterprises. In the course of further development and the internationalization of production, large-scale production will be a sector of the economy that will, to a growing extent, be open to the interests of private businessmen.

I would like to briefly illustrate also a second set of questions—there is a very positive attitude here, in Austria, toward the social protection of our citizens. We have always attached importance to all forms of social insurance, particularly hospital and pension insurance. Nonetheless, this system needs to be improved constantly. Not least because the Austrians' life expectancy is gradually increasingly. Our developed system of health care and ramified network of recreation and rehabilitation centers is contributing to this. But nor are we losing sight of the social question at the other end of the generational chain, so to speak. I refer to children and the youth. We have created a system of schooling and education which is free and accessible to all. However, even in this case we must constantly perfect it since it cannot be ideally good once for all.

These, in the main, are the economic and social components of our policy. Its future, from the viewpoint of social democracy, consists of ensuring that the worker and any other person not be exploited. The main thing now is to display concern to ensure that the environment not be exploited either. Living conditions and the environment must remain in a good condition. Really big tasks of the future now, therefore, are, in my opinion, protection of the environment and also, and not least, transport policy, housing construction policy, and a policy of development of the family. All of these are most important principles for the further functioning of a modern economy.

[Correspondents] Could you, as leader of the Socialist Party, briefly formulate your concept of socialism?

[Vranitzky] We do not have an expression thereof in the form of slogans. But we rely in our policy chiefly on fundamental principles. These include man's absolutely free development in society, payment by the job, social protection, and healthy surroundings. We also declare ourselves supporters of internationalization and openness to the world. The basic values enshrined in our party program—freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance—remain invariable for us also.

[Correspondents] What achievements by the government which you have headed for almost four years now have been the most notable?

[Vranitzky] Of the specific political measures, the most important is undoubtedly the decision in principle on the desirability of the country's joining the EEC. In second place I would put the fundamental reform of Austria's economic and financial system. This reform is made up of several components—tax reform, liberalization of the movement of capital, improvement of the federal budget, and a broadening of the opportunities for private enterprise. And third and finally: We have a whole number of very important intentions for the coming years affecting many aspects of the infrastructure: transportation, road construction, capital investments for improvement of the railroads, and so forth.

I would like further, returning to our achievements, to recall that we have in recent years scored very significant successes in the sphere of science, research, and culture.

[Correspondents] What principal tasks does the Austrian Government plan tackling in the future?

[Vranitzky] The biggest task within our country and within the framework of international cooperation is without any doubt work on improving the environment. I have instructed a group of scientists to analyze the most modern principles of policy in this sphere. A contribution to the creation of an internationally recognized charter of states' ecological rights and duties like the charter of states' economic rights and duties formerly adopted by the UN General Assembly could be a most important goal of the research that is being performed. What a good thing it would be were each state on our planet to undertake to comply unswervingly with the principles of such a charter.

As far as other tasks are concerned, we should in the coming years seek success in the business of European integration. We are also embarking on the next stage of tax reform. The bulk of tax receipts now is shifting from income tax to turnover tax. It is essential, in addition, that we improve work in the field of scientific research. The vast sphere of health care, where it is essential not to

lag behind others in the course of the rapid development of medical-engineering progress, is directly connected with this.

[Correspondents] Do you not see in matters of the economy dark clouds on the European or national horizon?

[Vranitzky] On the national horizon, no. We believe that during the current year good economic conditions will continue. An "abatement of the market" cannot be ruled out in 1991, which could be expressed in a slowing of economic growth. This assessment coincides, as a whole, with OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] forecasts.

[Correspondents] How do you evaluate the state of Austro-Soviet relations? What are the prospects of these relations?

[Vranitzky] They are good enough, I believe. In recent years I have established very good relations, personal relations included, with Herr Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers. This has undoubtedly made it possible to overcome and compensate for certain shortcomings in relations between our two countries.

We have, in addition, developed new methods of cooperation. Earlier these were mainly trade relations, that is, Austria would supply the Soviet Union with various finished industrial products, and your country would export to us oil, gas, and coal. We are doing this now also, it is true, but there are other additional important projects. Technical specialists of our countries have organized cooperation on the joint modernization of various machines and equipment. Many projects are being realized within the framework of joint ventures. The joint work to modernize Soviet paper-making machinery may serve as a most important example. Or we could mention the joint construction of hotels and other tourist centers. Both architects and construction workers are working together now. They are restoring architectural monuments, in Novgorod, for example. Medical personnel of our two countries have also established close contacts for the purpose of furnishing hospitals with the latest equipment, in the sphere of microsurgery particularly. Thus there are many new channels along which cooperation is expanding. And I believe that we must build up our efforts in all these directions together.

[Correspondents] How do you evaluate the processes which have been occurring in the East European countries in recent months?

[Vranitzky] In brief, I am greatly sympathetic toward the Soviet leaders—M. Gorbachev, N. Ryzhkov and E. Shevardnadze—and toward perestroyka and glasnost. I very much sympathize also with the processes which are occurring in other East European countries. I believe that by way of economic and political cooperation our country also could contribute to the advancement of these processes. I am fully aware that these processes are as yet only at the beginning of the road. The tasks confronting different countries may vary, but all peoples will still to this extent or the other have to display a capacity for persevering labor, solve problems of structural change, and rethink reality. The most difficult periods of adaptation to these circumstances could arise in the process of the accomplishment of these tasks. We are seeing this now in the example of a number of countries, in which the political authorities are not yet organized such that we may in the next few years be confident of their permanency.

It is essential that these countries replace the obsolete economic and organizational structures. To which, in my view, special attention needs to be paid since there is always a close interdependence, kinship, I would say even, between economic progress and political progress. Some people do not notice this.

[Correspondents] And, finally, a personal question. Not putting politics among your amusements, do you have a favorite pastime to which you devote your spare time?

[Vranitzky] The problem is that I would like in my little spare time to do too much. I am a "book person" and read much and like to listen to music. I am an amateurish, but willing tennis player and in my youth even played for the national basketball team. In the summer I try to take several long walks in the mountains. In addition, I have a very close family, which is very dear to me and to which I try to devote as much as possible of the spare time of which I have so little.

Future Role of French Defense Examined

PM2102111790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Yu. Kovalenko under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment": "France: Revision of Military Doctrines"]

[Text] Paris—What should France's defense be like in the new international situation, when there is no longer a "Soviet threat?" Should military expenditure be cut back? Is it necessary to modernize the nuclear forces? Will there be an increase in the role of France—the world's third nuclear power—in the NATO system? How will the forthcoming reduction of conventional armed forces and arms influence the country's combat capability? Is it ready for reconversion? Should it not create a professional army?

Today all these questions are being debated in a lively fashion in the Paris press with the participation of statesmen, top military men, political scientists, and journalists. Various scenarios are being examined connected with the possible revision of military doctrines. As a whole the view prevails that the concept of nuclear deterrence should remain the cornerstone of national

defense, but its individual components should be modernized. As for the reduction of conventional armaments, the general opinion is that it is inevitable and France should take this into consideration.

So far all these debates are being conducted mainly at an unofficial level and there is an exchange of opinions. That is why the French Government and parliament must launch a broad discussion as soon as possible on the strategic consequences of the "1989 revolution" (that is the changes in East Europe), Francois Heisbourg, the eminent French specialist on defense issues and at present head of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, stated recently.

Paris should not adapt to the new conditions but fully review its military doctrine, F. Heisbourg stressed, speaking at the French Institute of International Relations. Above all, he noted, France cannot remain the only major European power which is continuing to increase its military budget (so far it has merely reduced the pace of its growth). In his opinion, the country should be ready for this. To this end it is necessary to completely repeal or to defer the implementation of some military programs and to emphasize scientific research, not the production of sophisticated types of weapons.

F. Heisbourg believes that the strategic nuclear forces should be kept at the level of minimal sufficiency and in particular that the development of the new S-4 missile should be abandoned and that the concept of the use of tactical nuclear weapons should be completely reviewed. If the present course of events in Europe is confirmed, he says, we must abandon the production of the planned "Hades" missile with a range of up to 480 km. It is also essential to curb the pace of the production of "Leclerc" tanks and to prepare to withdraw the 50,000 French soldiers now in the FRG.

The proposals of the director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies reflect to some degree or other the viewpoint of a section of official circles and the broad public. Observers note that today many politicians belonging to different parties who not so long ago unconditionally advocated building up defense expenditure are now suggested that it be reduced. According to recent polls, an increasing number of French people advocates reducing France's military budget. One more example. Whereas formerly France was against the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from Europe, they have now supported U.S. President G. Bush's proposal to reduce the Soviet and U.S. troops on the old continent to 195,000 on each side.

So far—which is entirely natural—it is the military who are displaying the greatest caution on questions of disarmament. The army, and primarily the ground forces, is not concealing its concern at the forthcoming reductions of armed forces (by approximately 15 percent) at the conclusion of the military talks. For his part, Army General Maurice Shmitt [surname as transliterated] warns that "no detente is permanent" and is in favor of France's other Western allies using the nuclear deterrent concept.

The unprecedented changes in the socialist countries are entailing a revision of some seemingly indestructible dogmas, including those concerning the role of NATO and the United States in Europe's defense and the nuclear deterrent doctrine. The voices of the supporters of building a "European defense" have fallen silent. Observers note that the Paris-Bonn military axis, which was supposed to serve as the basis for military integration, is being "eroded."

In brief, the political changes taking place before our eyes are radically influencing the military-strategic aspects of the situation in Europe and obliging the political leaders of France and other countries to take them into account.

Swedish Foreign Minister Greets Delegation

PM1502162390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Guests of Sweden"]

[Text] Stockholm, 13 Feb—People in Sweden welcome the perestroyka in Soviet society, without which many of today's positive changes in the world would have been impossible. This was declared by the country's foreign minister, Sten Andersson, during a meeting with a group of Soviet parliamentarians. A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by N.N. Gritsenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy Questions, was here on a working visit.

During a discussion of the contemporary stage of European cooperation the participants in the conversation gave special attention to the strengthening of contacts in the business, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. It was noted in this context that a new form of ties—bilateral exchange of experience in socioeconomic development—has become an organic part of Soviet-Swedish relations over the last few years. This goal was certainly promoted also by the Soviet parliamentarians' working visit to Stockholm. USSR Ambassador to Sweden B.D. Pankin took part in the conversation.

Consultations With Swiss on Economic Relations

LD2002184990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1319 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Berne, 20 Feb (TASS)—Soviet-Swiss consultations took place in Bern on 19-20 February this year, during which topical problems of international economic relations, as well as questions of mutual interest on preparations for the Bonn economic forum of the CSCE, were discussed.

From the Soviet side, the consultations were conducted by E.Ye. Obminskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign

affairs, and from the Swiss side by R. Felber, head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and J.-P. Delamuraz, head of the Federal Department of Public Economy.

Narcotics Fight Discussed

LD2002185390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1350 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Berne, 20 Feb (TASS)—The first Soviet-Swiss working meeting took place in Berne on 19-20 February this year, attended by representatives of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee and the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police. During the course of the talks, the delegations exchanged information on the organization of the work of the corresponding units on halting the illegal trade in narcotics, on laws regulating the struggle against drug abuse, and on the state of affairs in this sphere in the two countries. Questions of ways and methods of cooperation were also discussed, and mutual interest in its broadening and deepening was expressed.

Swedish Left Party Seeks Marxism-Based 'Renewal'

PM1402170190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent Yu. Kuznetsov: "Renewal Rather Than Disbandment"]

[Text] Helsinki, 9 Feb—The largest of Sweden's communist parties—the Swedish Left Party-Communists [VPK]—is clearly making major changes, including alterations to its own program. At a recent session of the party board, Chairman Lars Werner pointed out that the restructuring of the party is backed by the majority of its members and that practical work in that direction should be intensified. The VKP will hold its congress this May. It is necessary to carry out a socialist renewal of the party on the basis of Marxism, the VKP chairman said. It should also be a revolutionary party in the future. The socialism for which we are fighting, the draft new program points out, should provide for both central planning and market mechanisms.

We want a renewed party, Werner said, rather than disbandment and the creation of another. The party may need to change its name and seek an alliance with other left groups in society which are also striving for socialism.

Comparison of Medvedev Interview

PM1402113390

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 14 February 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 5 a TASS report of an interview given by V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, in London 13 February. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, entitled "Trip Ends," with the item headlined "Gives Interview, Departs 13 Feb" published in the 14 February issue of the Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 28-29, reveals the following variations:

Page 28, column two, first paragraph, only sentence PRAVDA reads: ...fully and organically.

Question: What is...(deleting words);

Page 28, column two, third paragraph, fifth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...showing a very lively interest in these...(rewording);

Page 29, column one, fifth paragraph, last sentence PRAVDA reads: ...market, banking and insurance, and investment activity. Of course, not everything here can be...(adding words);

PRAVDA ends: ...can be derived. (deleting paragraph).

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Airs Supreme Soviet Coverage 20 Feb

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD2002181890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1600 GMT on 20 February begins carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is chaired by Anatoliy Lukyanov.

At 1602 GMT Lukyanov asks deputies to register their presence. Four hundred and two registered. Lukyanov then proposes the agenda:

At 1604 Lukyanov opens the session after the deputies have registered.

"We've consulted the chairmen of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet Presidium about how we should now arrange the work in the most effective way. We must, all the same, complete the discussion of the draft fundamentals of land legislation to adopt that vital act as quickly as possible. The following proposal is submitted. Today, in the first half of the day, we should complete the discussion of the draft fundamentals of land legislation, if you have no objection, so that, after two o'clock, the committees and commissions, which all have sittings planned for these days, can start work.

"Then, after that, if a decision on yesterday is not ready shortly, we could hold the next sitting as a separate sitting of the chambers on Monday, and the commissions could now work and complete their drafts. On Tuesday, we could hold a joint sitting of the chambers. Moreover, it should be said that the packages of draft laws for each chamber are already prepared. There is something to discuss. That's the schedule roughly. I think that, by two o'clock, we'll have made it clearer."

At 1606 GMT Deputy Kasyanov criticizes the bad practices of the past. Those who live in the countryside are regarded as some sort of cattle, to be done with as the authorities see fit. He criticizes the fact that supplies of, for instance, spare parts for Zhiguli cars, are erratic. Production should be increased, but the pace of change must be measured. He criticises Article 25 of Draft Fundamentals of Land Legislation: It will not be good if land is divided up into tiny plots so that everyone can have one. The draft must work out a program for setting up peasant farms.

At 1616 GMT Deputy (Stepa) begins to speak. He is afraid that land, once it can be bought and sold, will be the subject of speculation. There are 24 million people employed in agriculture, about half of them do manual work. There is already a problem with mechanization and it will be exacerbated if holdings become smaller and smaller. He criticizes the state of agricultural science: out of R35 billion rubles allocated to science, agriculture only got R11.2 billion. This is inadequate, especially because agricultural output accounts for about a third of our GNP.

At 1622 GMT Deputy Savostyuk begins to speak. He wants cultural establishments to be exempt from payments for land, in the context of criticizing the provisions of Article 12.

At 1624 GMT Deputy Batorov begins to speak. What type of federation do we want to build, he asks. Autonomous republics, oblasts, and okrugs have recently gained importance, but their involvement in land dealings is not deemed necessary, according to Articles 13 and 16. Collective and state farms can set up cooperatives and it is not something we should be afraid of.

At 1628 GMT Deputy Kozyrev is asked to speak but does not turn up. Belov takes his place. He praises the way in which agriculture is organized in Finland, where the state pays peasants not to produce more. The world laughs at us when we import potatoes from Cuba. This serfdom, based on Marxism, must, at long last, disappear. Peasants must be unshackled. The might and power of every state depends on the peasants. But peasantry without land is a fiction. He praises the draft and says that farm chairmen should not fear it. Each collective farmer must have a right to leave his farm, otherwise he is nothing more than a serf. Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich thought up these collective farms in order to make it easier for them to plunder the peasants. The decision-making process affecting land should be based on collective principles. Articles 20 and 21 have ambiguous provisions: What does "other purposes" mean? As for plans to create free economic zones, this would be tantamount to parcelling Russia off, as one professor, whose surname I will not state, in order not to excite the anti-Semitic press, wanted to do.

Peasants Use of Land Discussed

LD2002190790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1638 GMT Deputy Safin criticized various provisions of articles as being insufficiently precise. On the whole, the draft is a good document, he says. He criticizes Academician Tikhonov's assertion that farm chairmen are exploiting people. We do the same work as our collective farm members. Safin supports Motornyy's suggestion that ministries and departments ought to react fast to what deputies have to say.

At 1643 GMT Deputy Denisov rejects assertions that professors should not pronounce views on things they know nothing about. He was brought up on the land and still remembers what it was like. What the justice minister said—that this draft corresponds fully to Lenin's land decree—is not true. He praises the draft and

Medvedev's PRAVDA article on Sunday—but it does ignore the human dimension.

In effect, we propose that peasants can use the land, but they cannot really freely dispose of it as they see fit and this situation did exist in our country before 1861. He would like each Soviet family to have a right to get land in order to be able to build a home on it. He quotes Marx' views on private ownership and the human dimension.

At 1650 GMT Deputy Yermolayev starts his speech by saying that the land law is the most important law for land users. He thinks that just because peasants will buy land—not all of them and not in a rush—we should not fear that collective and state farms will thereby disintegrate. The draft could do with being more flexible. How will losses sustained by peasants be compensated for after natural disasters? There should be a system of proper incentives for scientists.

At 1654 GMT Deputy Prokushev discusses Article 3 and praises it. Articles 4, 8, and 25 are ambiguous with regard to the soviets and their role. As for Article 4, peasants' rights to own, use, and dispose of land should be enshrined therein.

At 1659 GMT Lukyanov announces a 15-minute interval.

At 1715 GMT reportage on the morning session continues.

Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic State Agro-Industrial Committee, begins his speech. He criticizes the state of the land. Almost two out of every three hectares are in very poor condition. Machinery is bad, supplies are poor, and land improvement measures are ill thought out. Over the past 20 years the country has lost 65 million ha of agricultural land. Private ownership of land is not a must. Many developed countries operate their agriculture on a leasehold principle and results thus obtained are just as good. Pricing and taxation, mechanization and provision of supplies play a very important part here, more important than ownership. Nikitin proposes amending Article 2, adding yet another land classification, that of sparsely populated areas.

At 1721 GMT Deputy Komarov speaks. He criticized the concept of nationwide discussion. It should more properly be called nationwide familiarization with the content of the draft laws. There is little in the way of proper two-way traffic. We should adopt a provision here on this concept of nationwide discussion. Autonomous formations should have their rights broadened. The role of soviets should be more precisely defined. The hereditary ownership provision is in need of fine tuning. But he is, on the whole, for adopting the draft.

At 1727 GMT Lukyanov quotes a SELSKAYA ZHIZN poll on the draft law. Almost 8,000 people responded, of which 2,100 live in towns. Some 80 percent approved the draft. Seven percent are against. So, there is a consensus in society on the draft.

At 1728 GMT Deputy Tikhonov praises the draft. We never thought such a document would come into being within the walls of the Supreme Soviet. Out of 227 million ha now owned by the population, 225 million ha are owned by collective and state farms. But once peasants begin to own and use the land, they must have proper guarantees. Also, there should be equality of access to land. So let us amend Article 5 accordingly. Let us restore the status of collective farm peasants as it once was. Theirs is a voluntary association. They can join or leave the farm. The peasant must feel he is a free agent here.

At 1738 GMT Deputy Mokanu begins to speak on ownership. The draft says nothing about who owns the land. Article 3 is devoid of legal content in my view. This is impersonal property, hence nobody's property. In Moldavia, between 2,000 and 3,000 ha of land are lost annually to agricultural use. This is because land is now worthless. Let us therefore amend relevant articles to institute proper incentives to protect land. Article 12 fee exemptions should be expanded. Article 46 should introduce responsibility for the pollution of land by pesticides and insecticides. Guarantees for land owners and provisions for compensation must be improved and broadened. The draft should make provisions for dealing with unemployment in the countryside. Mokanu favors the draft and its adoption.

Deputies Debate Land Use

LD2002200490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1816 GMT the afternoon session begins. Lukyanov says that there is a large measure of agreement on this draft law. Deputies should, therefore, keep their comments brief.

At 1818 GMT Deputy (?Semyanikhin) quotes Lenin in support of his view that the land should not be sold: To whom? He goes on to state that he approves of the draft law. It should be passed. Then he surveys the ecological state of some areas of land and makes a few criticisms of the wording of individual articles.

At 1822 GMT Deputy Oleynik asks what would happen if there were to be a strike in agriculture. Miners are one thing, farmers are another. He surveys the possible consequences of such an unimaginable action. The law on land must, he says, be passed as a means of buttressing country life for the benefit of those who spend their lives working on the land. He favors the right to inherit land, but opposes the right to sell it. The countryside must be in a position to look after itself, since no

one else will, as experience shows. He surveys the horrors of the past that afflicted the countryside—starvation, the dispossession of the kulaks, etc.

At 1829 GMT Deputy Kirgizbayev points to the historic nature of the draft under discussion and then announces that she has comments to make on 16 articles. She then makes a number of detailed points, which tend to call for greater differentiation, depending on local conditions.

At 1834 GMT Deputy (?Mirenkov) points to the poor state of affairs in the countryside and says that it is hardly surprising that the farmers are debtors when compared with urban workers. He opposes the transformation of the land into private property. This would lead to class differentiation. Private plots on farms should be given material assistance, he says, since they are making a great contribution toward resolving the food problem.

At 1840 GMT Deputy (?Zhigunova) makes detailed points about the wording of several articles, particularly concerning health matters, such as the effects of pesticides on food.

At 1843 GMT Deputy Kutuzov puts forward an amendment to Article 9 land ownership by foreigners who may be largely indifferent to the state of Soviet agriculture. Private property is a crucial issue for the future of the country. It will probably lead to speculation and all kinds of shady deals which will only harm the position of the hard-working peasant. Some deputies have lauded the capitalist past of Russian agriculture and have exaggerated the virtues of that system. In reality, the introduction of capitalism would lead to harsh exploitation that would only benefit the speculators. A new means of organizing labor is needed, not a return to the past.

At 1849 GMT Deputy Yefimov acknowledges that there are different ways of farming. The hidden costs of any change must be taken into account. Currently, industry is geared toward supplying the needs of large-scale farming, not small holders. The market economy and private ownership are seen by some as a panacea for all ills, but they have their negative aspects too. Private ownership leads to exploitation. That is its essence. What is needed in Soviet society is social justice.

At 1954 GMT Deputy Yemelyanov says he is concerned with land use. He says that the idea of ownership is missing from the draft law on land. He goes on to criticize Article 12, adding that laws must not be defied. There are many good laws in existence that are not implemented. The debate must be based on reality, not on extreme views put forward either by farm managers or by scientists. The interests of collective farmers who have suffered much in the past must be looked after. Really good farmers must be encouraged.

Protection of Peasants Urged

LD2002193190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1745 GMT Deputy Gutskalov says that peasants must have proper guarantees. Otherwise, once leaders have changed, bad things of the past may happen again, such as the de-kulakization campaign. Soviet policies have resulted in people fearing to work on the land. We now import agricultural produce. We can only feed ourselves if we have full guarantees that excesses of the past will never occur again. No less important are the anti-pollution measures. But we have huge regions that are dead to agriculture and that is why we have to import bread.

At 1749 GMT Deputy Krivorotov praises the draft in general terms. He makes the point that academics are too removed from the practical everyday life of farms. Three academics he invited to his farms declined his invitation. We have shortages of fuel and construction materials now and if land is divided up into smaller aand smaller plots we will also have distribution problems. I do not defend collective farms, but I do support those that yield profits. It is hard to discern priorities within the draft in its present form. He proposes various changes and amendments to protect farms, peasants, and the land. Provisions must also be made to ensure that state orders are retained, otherwise who will feed kindergartens, hospitals, etc? After all, they will hardly be able to purchase agricultural output by paying market prices.

At 1800 GMT Deputy Pashaly says he supports the draft in its entirety. It reflects the majority view, on the whole. I speak on behalf of southern Moldavia where collective farms do not set themselves the task of developing. The issue of the state of land in the regions must be give more attention. Another issue is: Have collective farms really made full use of their potential? Let us not blame collective farms for poor productivity, if they lack proper back-up. Let us, therefore, not be overhasty in eliminating collective farms.

At 1807 GMT Deputy Adamovich recalls a writer's suggestion made in pre-perestroyka times to the effect that perhaps in one republic capitalism should be introduced, so that it can feed all the other ones. [muffled laughter] Well, maybe it is high time to see to it that proper provisions are made for land use in each republic, taking account of local conditions. People will not join collective farms, no matter what roads you build for them. One can understand collective farm chairmen speaking with pride of their farms but the very word kolkhoz is regarded with revulsion as far as our people are concerned. So, let us stop playing games. Let us go whole hog and give land to peasants for real so that they have all the rights. Even city dwellers might be tempted to go back to the land. Let us not take their apartments

away from them. Let us allow them to rent them and invest money thus obtained in the land.

At 1815 GMT Lukyanov declares an interval.

Land Law Debate Ends, To Be Continued

LD2002223190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1901 GMT Deputy (?Tarsigov) makes a quick point about the constitution of the rural population.

At 1903 GMT Deputy Orekhov criticizes the present state of agriculture: "We do all, and we do nothing." There is no point in doling out the land if nothing is done about the infrastructure. He quotes Swedish experience to show that farmers can look after themselves very well without the support of any committed parties. He calls for no unjustified interference with current arrangements that are working well. Redistribution should only affect those who are unproductive.

At 1910 GMT Deputy Ryzhikov talks about the social and moral aspects of the draft law. The rural poor must be cared for. The issue of exactly why farmers are called debtors needs examination.

At 1916 GMT Deputy Pokhodnya comments on the current elections to local soviets. Very often, there is only one candidate because no one else wants the job. The same may soon apply to farmers. Sixty percent of farmers in Belgorod and Kharkov Oblast do not believe in rural perestroyka and want nothing to do with ownership or leasing. Most farm administrators are concerned only with the freedom of the farm, not with the freedom of the man who works there. He supports the draft law.

At 1921 GMT Deputy Karpochev warns against private ownership of land. He says it will lead to unearned income and exploitation. The draft law will not feed us all by itself. Such things as good equipment and good education are also important, nor must the past be idealized. There was poverty on the land in tsarist times. He calls for the draft to be passed.

At 1925 GMT Deputy Rogatin calls for another look at Article 12 about land fees. Who pays for social facilities in rural areas? In the West there are special subsidies.

At 1929 GMT Deputy Veprev says the draft is incomplete and there is need for the draft to be made law as soon as possible. He proposes an amendment to Article 25 regarding the size of the plot of land which can be allocated to a peasant farm. He thinks there should be greater competition for farms and that the future lies with cooperatives. There is a need for change he says and account should be taken of local circumstances in determining the form of ownership. He proposes that the draft should be published by 1 March at the latest and that the proposals and amendments made today should be discussed in commissions and introduced tomorrow.

At 1938 GMT Lukyanov says that 54 have spoken and he puts to the vote as to whether the discussion should end. 347 are for, 14 against, and 2 abstain. There is a two-thirds majority so the debate ends. He proposes that discussion on the draft law on land be continued next week, and that it be presented to the Supreme Soviet within a week. 349 are for, 6 against, and 10 abstentions, so the proposal is adopted.

At 1942 GMT Deputy Pivovarov reads out a note on holding a mass rally on 25 February which voices people's concerns about what these may unleash and he calls for perestroyka to be defended by legal measures. He says he has received many letters from constituents voicing concern over mass rallies.

At 1944 GMT a deputy also voices constituents concerns over mass rallies and he notes that most rallies have an antigovernment thrust. He says the authorities are too liberal toward rallies and demonstrations.

At 1946 GMT an unidentified deputy says the following:

"In connection with Deputy Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's appearance on Leningrad television on 17 February 1990 and with his statement to the effect that investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov are honest and decent people, I submit a proposal. First...."

Lukyanov says: "One moment. I'm sorry, but perhaps we should discuss this."

Deputy: "No, it is also...."

Lukyanov: "Is it on this question?"

Deputy: "No."

Lukyanov: "Because it was Pivovarov who proposed it."

Deputy: "No. I'll now express.... (some shouting from the floor) Right. I submit the proposal. First, to require Comrade Sukharev, the procurator general, to open an investigation into the testimony of induvidual leaders in Uzbekistan to the effect that, while he was in Tashkent as a CPSU Central Committee secretary, Yeltsin took bribes from them. This testimony was beaten out of them by honest investigators—in quotes—Gdlyan and Ivanov. (noise from the floor) One moment, comrades.

"Second, to instruct Deputy Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to go to Uzbekistan to personally study the criminal, anti-legal—illegal—deeds of Gdlyan and Ivanov, and then to listen to his information in the Supreme Soviet.

"Third, to ask the voters of Moscow and Leningrad to send their delegations to Uzbekistan so that they can get to know on the spot the lawlessness that was created by their deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov in our republic."

Lukyanov: "I think, comrades.... Let's, all the same, differentiate. Wait a bit, comrade Kirillov. Sit down. Give us an opportunity. Not on this issue. I think that, so far, the Procuracy has not come to us with its statement, about which we've been speaking. Let's keep calm. We've got a commission. Let's consider these questions thoroughly and calmly. If there are any statements or wishes that someone should go somewhere, go ahead. A deputy's not forbidden to say so. Perhaps we'll discuss this, Deputy Pivovarov's proposal that was just conveyed. What? Comrade Velikhov, go ahead."

Lukyanov Gives Agenda for Next Week

LD2002231490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues carrying a recording of the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1948 GMT Deputy Velikhov says that rallies should be held within the law.

At 1949 GMT Lukyanov reads out the note which voices the concern of people that extremists may join in the demonstrations called for 25 February and calling for the government ot take appropriate measures, for the defense of perestroyka by means of the law. Lukyanov puts the appeal to vote. 274 are for, 30 are against, and 39 abstained. He asks deputies to register again to determine whether there is a quorom. There is a quorom—373, Lukyanov says. Some call for voting by name.

At 1953 GMT Deputy Igityan asks who decides what the theme of rallies is.

At 1954 GMT Deputy Kirillov says that in Voronezh the rally is because the elections are being held on a non-alternative basis. He calls for them to be broadcast. Lukyanov says if a rally has been given official approval then he is in favor of it.

At 1956 GMT Lukyanov gives the agenda in the Soviet of Union for next week.

"Comrades, let's...first of all, I have received questions. The first question: We earnestly ask you to inform us on what package of laws has been prepared for discussion next week in the Soviet of nationalities and in the Soviet of the Union. Deputy Kuznetsov and Deputy Tikhonenkov and others are asking this. I can say, that on the proposal of the chairmen of the chambers, in the Soviet of the Union, a sitting will take place on the 26 February at 1000 in this hall. It is proposed to discuss three draft laws which have been given out to you. On the draft, the draft law on the legal regime of the state of emergency, the draft law on the obligations [corrects himself] duties and rights of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) internal troops and the draft law on strengthening liability for encroaching upon the national equality of citizens and the violent violation of the unity of the territory of the union. This is what deputies have proposed. However, I do not think that you will discuss everything immediately, but that is the question.

"As for the Soviet of nationalities, you, today, have received finally that draft on the general principles of managing the economy in the social sphere of the union and autonomous republics. At last, that draft has been signed by all six chairman and co-chairman of the commission. Therefore, comrade Nishanov wants to present that draft at the sitting of Soviet of Nationalities. Moreover, that sitting will take place not in this hall, so that we save the chambers time, but in the Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin. The Sverdlovsk Hall of the Kremlin is nearby, nearby. You will be told. Well, that is first. Second, (deputies heard shouting indistinctly and the word "when" is audible) Also on the 26 February at 1000, on Monday.

"While on Tuesday comrades, we want to hold a joint sitting at which, in the first place, we have to adopt a decision on which they have been working today already the whole night long, and obviously tomorrow we will work on it, too, on the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. This has to be worked through fittingly, comrades, with the participation of all delegations. Everyone must take part.

"Second, it is also possible that questions will arise since I am asked about the progress of...can't you inform us of the time limit for the completion of the work of the commission on elaborating the proposal on the introduction of the post of president. The commission convened yesterday. They have prepared the initial draft and at three o'clock tomorrow (Moscow time) that draft is being presented for examination to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Before the Supreme Soviet examines it, it must be given out to all deputies so that you have the opportunity to acquaint yourself with it. That is why as soon as the Presidium examines it and settles it we will give everything to the deputies so that we knowingly embark upon that action."

At 2000 GMT the Supreme Soviet recording of the 20 February session ends.

Supreme Soviet Approves Land Bill in Principle

LD2002132990 Moscow World Service in English 1300 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Excerpt] The Supreme Soviet has approved in principle the draft bill on land. As the draft bill on ownership, it is a fundamental act of radical economic reform, which will be subjected to article-by-article voting in a week's time. The overwhelming majority of members of parliaments supported the idea of returning independence to farmers and diversifying methods of farming. [passage omitted]

Supreme Soviet Adopts Resolution on 25 Feb Rallies

LD2002131990 Moscow TASS in English 1307 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 20 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Soviet Parliament today adopted a resolution concerning rallies planned for February 25 in Moscow, Leningrad and other Soviet cities.

The rallies have been organised by public associations of various political persuasions to express their attitude to changes taking place in the country.

As far as newspaper reports indicate, forces interested in destabilising the situation also intend to join the demonstrators.

In order to prevent actions by militants and, possibly, criminal forces, the Supreme Soviet has asked the government and local authorities to adopt all necessary measures to protect law and order.

Unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations will be curbed. Authorised meetings must be held in specially assigned places.

"Perestroyka and democracy should be safely protected by law," says the parliamentary resolution.

Republics Can Call Referendum on Independence

AU2002192090 Paris AFP in English 1851 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 20 (AFP)—Soviet republics will be able to call a referendum on secession from the union, according to a draft bill submitted to the Supreme Soviet here. The referendum can be held under a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the republic or at the call of a third of the republic's residents aged over 18, according to INTERFAX, a Radio Moscow news digest. The referendum has to be held at least six months after the decision to call it is taken, and three quarters of the republic's voters must take part for it to be valid.

However, according to Yuriy Boyars, a Latvian deputy, the draft bill also says it is up to the Congress of Deputies, the 2,250-strong parliament, to approve any bid for independence. Any seceding republic would have to pay Moscow for industry built on its territory, along with the cost of resettling people who did not wish to remain in the republic, he said.

The Estonian delegation has asked parliament to set up a commission to discuss how republics could achieve independence. The right for a republic to secede from the union is enshrined in the constitution, though the way to go about it is not spelled out.

During his visit to Lithuania early last month, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said he would put before parliament a bill laying out the procedure under which any of the 15 republics could achieve independence.

Adamovich Speaks on Collective Farms

LD2102001490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1807 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Speech by Deputy Adamovich, at the USSR Supreme Soviet session 20 February at the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed people's deputies:

Some five years prior to the start of perestroyka a writer suddenly expressed—either in earnest or in jest—the following idea: What if capitalism were to be introduced in turn in each of our 15 republics, capitalism in order that this republic should feed the remaining 14 republics while they build the shining future of communism. And I thought, shouldn't we experiment in a more narrow sense—and touching on Article 5—shouldn't this article be added to as follows: The question of private property of land is decided by the republics themselves, each in accordance with its own conditions and traditions. That is to say, inasmuch as we are so afraid of the words private property of land, it is to be left to the republics themselves to determine this. Perhaps bold ones will be found—well, the Balts, in my view, are indeed bold. Something was planned in Kirghizia—and perhaps a republic will indeed emerge which will feed the other ones, until the others will make so bold as to do the same.

During the whole of my life I haven't heard so many cheering and enthusiastic words about collective farms as I have heard here. Well, collective farm chairmen are entitled to speak in such an enamored way of their farms. These were good farms, probably. But it is hardly worth speaking on behalf of collective farmers. Enough of us are children of peasants or grandchildren of peasants, and it is not the first year that we are associating with the countryside. [passage omitted]

Well, speaking for myself, I am afraid of the savage violence, the savage, immense suffering, bloodshed and destruction of millions of people, which are at the basis of the collective farms: They have not been forgotten by the people. And people were perhaps prepared to join your collective farms. But now the problem is for the people to join, settle, till and apply for this nonprivate land to feed us in places where collective farms are flat on their backs, as they say—and that is the main bulk of collective farms. People will not join these, whatever roads you build, whatever houses you build. They will not join, because of the primordial revulsion among the people for this word—collective farm.

One can understand the chairmen of collective farms and their logic and they are right in many respects. We are not China.

In China, when they allowed the peasants to leave the communes, these peasants fled the country and started

selling abroad in a matter of three years. Why? Because the peasantry had remained and survived there. It was preserved. They did not succeed in destroying it. The situation in our country is different indeed. In our country the peasantry and workers who are really still worth their salt, so to speak, assemble round these thousands of collective farms which are still strong. [passage omitted]

How can we invite people in? I think that it is now in the hands of the deputies to invite people in. But for this purpose it is necessary to stop playing these games which we continue to play: we are sort of giving you the land but we are not giving it to you. You will work on it but tomorrow we'll give it some more thought. If you don't have any heirs or if your children leave for town and do not wish to work, all the work you have invested in this land will be lost because you don't have the right to sell this land.

Yes, there is such a problem today of course: if today, one starts selling land, money-bags can indeed buy up this land and then resell it. But Belov expressed an excellent idea here as to which priorities should prevail here: that is to say, people, families, etc. who worked here. Moreover, one can forbid the sale of land for five years or for however long. You have to wait, you have taken the land, you must cultivate it, dig a pond, plant an orchard, and so forth and only then, when you have invested labor, are you indeed a peasant and you have the right afterwards to dispose of this land.

I think that if we act this way, then after the priority categories of people outlined by Belov, even townsfolk will join and they will be enthusiastic if of course we provide them with back-up—if a town-dweller is told, you have the right to buy five, 10, 15 hectares of land, but you keep your apartment. Without this he will not join, he no longer believes us and will not believe us. But if he rents this apartment, receives R100 and invests it in the land, this will be the very same thing: The town will compensate the countryside for what it took. Or if you took away his apartment, then you must build him a house in the village. I think that the farmer we are so afraid of will be a buttress of our perestroyka in the countryside. Stolypin was no fool. He understood who could be the foundation so to speak of the state. Well, I have a few more words to say. [loud booing]

It was said here that a start should not be made in March, that it should be further and further delayed. I think that a start should be made precisely in March, precisely now. And if people set off for the countryside from the queues, from the mass-meetings, then perestroyka will get moving, then perestroyka and cooperatives will really get moving. [loud shouting]

Another question raised was: What guarantee will there be for the de-kulakization of the future? This guarantee does not exist and you and I will not give it. Only a multi-party system, and perhaps, the creation of a very powerful peasants' party will give this guarantee. Thank you.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Discusses German Unification

LD2002221390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Interview with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev by unidentified PRAVDA correspondent; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is introduction; read by announcer—recorded]

[Text] We are broadcasting the replies by Mikhail Gorbachev to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent. The following will be published in PRAVDA on 21 February.

[PRAVDA] Letters continue to arrive at the editorial office in which readers ask for clarification on the matter of the unification of Germany. It is well-known that in the West, too, not a few diverse ideas are being expressed on this score, including with respect to the results of your meeting with Chancellor Kohl. What could you say in this regard?

[Gorbachev] The issue really is very important, one of the main ones in contemporary international politics. I would single out two aspects here.

The first is the right of the Germans to unity. We have never denied this right. I want to remind you that even immediately after the war, which brought our people both the rightful pride of victory and immeasurable grief, and a natural hatred toward those who were guilty of it, the Soviet Union was against the partition of Germany. This idea does not belong to us, and it is not we who bear the responsibility for how, later, under the conditions of the "Cold War," events began to unfold.

To this I shall add that even after the two German states appeared, the Soviet Government, jointly with the GDR, continued to defend the principle of the unity of Germany. In 1950 the USSR supported the proposal of the GDR on the restoration of common German statehood. On 10 March 1952 the Soviet Government put forward a plan for the unification of Germany in a single, democratic, and neutral state. The West rejected this proposal, too. We again proposed the setting up of a united, demilitarized Germany at the conference of foreign ministers in Berlin in 1954. Once again we received a rejection. A year later, on 15 January 1955, the Soviet government put forward a proposal for the creation of a united Germany with a government elected in free elections with which a peace treaty would be signed. This proposal, too, went unanswered. In 1957-1958 a proposal for the creation of a German confederation, which was put forward by the GDR and actively supported by us, was not even examined. In 1959 a new Soviet proposal followed at a conference of the foreign ministers of the four powers that a peace treaty be concluded with a single, united Germany, which would not belong to military and political groupings, but which would possess a certain military potential. The result was

the same. With the conclusion of the Moscow treaty, the USSR did not rule out in the long term that the division of Germany would be overcome. Evidence of this is the acceptance by our government of the letter on German unity with which Brandt and Scheel accompanied the signing by them of this treaty. Such are the facts.

As you see, this question is not a new one for us. We proceed from the fact that—and I have had occasion to talk about this on more than one occasion, both publicly and in contacts with German political figures—we proceed from the fact that history has decided that two German states should come into being and it is up to history to decide what, ultimately, the state form of the German nation will be. Now history has started working in an unexpectedly rapid way. Under these conditions we have confirmed once again that the Germans themselves must determine how, within what timescale, and in what forms their unification will take place. This has been discussed in conversations with H. Modrow and shortly afterwards with H. Kohl. But this is only one side of the problem, and this is not the only thing that was spoken of in these conversations.

[PRAVDA] What do you have in mind?

[Gorbachev] First of all, the fact that the unification of Germany concerns not only the Germans. Notwithstanding all the respect one has for this their national right, the situation is such that it is impossible to imagine the Germans reaching agreement among themselves and afterwards asking everyone else merely to approve decisions that they have already made. There are fundamental things which the international community has a right to know and upon which there must be no room for ambiguity. Further, it must be clear from the very beginning that neither the process itself of the drawing together of the FRG and the GDR, nor a united Germany must present a threat or be to the detriment of the national interests of its neighbors and anyone whatsoever outside it. Of course, any encroachment upon the borders of other states is excluded.

Besides the unshakable nature of the borders that came into being as a result of the Second World War, which is the most essential thing, there are also other consequences of it. No one has revoked the responsibility of the Four Powers. They alone are capable of removing it from themselves. There is still no peace treaty with Germany. In terms of international law, that alone is capable of finally determining the status of Germany within the European structure.

Over a long period of time security, be that as it may, has been maintained by the presence of two military and political alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The prerequisites for the formation of a system of security in Europe that is new in principle are still only taking shape. The role of these alliances remains, therefore, too, although it is being modified substantially as military confrontation is lowered, as the military component of security is reduced, and as the political aspects of their activity are intensified. Consequently, the reunification of Germany, too, must take place with due consideration for these circumstances, namely the fact that violation of the military-strategic balance of these two international organizations is impermissible. Here there must be complete clarity.

The last thing. From what has been said, it follows that the process of the unification of Germany is organically linked with and must be synchronized with the all-European process and its pivotal line, the formation of a structure of European security that is new in principle and that will replace that which is based upon blocs.

[PRAVDA] It is well-known that in Ottawa the ministers of foreign affairs reached agreement on the mechanism for discussing the German question with the involvement of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, and the GDR. Could you explain how the role of this mechanism is being envisaged?

[Gorbachev] Indeed, what is involved is the precise form for discussion of the German question among the six states mentioned. Incidentally, the idea for such a procedure was conceived in Moscow and in Western capitals at the same time and independently of one another. We spoke about it with H. Modrow and then with H. Kohl. Any references to "priorities" are hardly appropriate.

Its legal basis is linked to the results of the war and the responsibility of the Four Powers for the future role of Germany in the world. At the same time, it also takes account of the enormous changes which have taken place in Europe and the world, and within the two German states themselves since that time, and therefore includes them in the formula of this mechanism, which has been given the conventional name of "two plus four."

The task consists in discussing, in an all-around and phased manner, all the external aspects of German reunification, and in preparing the matter for inclusion in the all-European process and for an examination of the foundations of a future peace treaty with Germany. The effectiveness of such consultations, and their authority depends on the degree of trust and openness between all the participants. It goes without saying that sovereign states can effect contacts of any kind, including with respect to the German question, on a bilateral and any other basis.

But, we rule out such an approach whereby three or four first come to an arrangement between themselves and then set out their already agreed position before the other participants. This is unacceptable.

[PRAVDA] But is there not in this procedure an element of discrimination with regard to the other countries that also took part in the war?

[Gorbachev] That's a fair question. That is precisely why—without belittling the right of the four powers, which has been brought about by history—we link the

"two plus four" mechanism with the general European process, and at the same time we understand the special interest of other countries which have not been indicated in this formula, and, consequently, their legitimate right to defend their own national interests. First and foremost, I have Poland in mind. The stability of its postwar borders, like the borders of other states, must be guaranteed. Only an act of international law can serve as such a guarantee.

[PRAVDA] How do you assess the certain alarm among Soviet people, and also on the part of other European peoples, concerning the prospect of the emergence of a single German state in the center of Europe?

[Gorbachev] Such anxiety is understandable both historically and psychologically, although one cannot deny that the German people have drawn lessons from the experience of Hitlerite domination and the Second World War. In both German states new generations have grown up who see Germany's role in the world in a different way than, say, over the last 100 plus years, and especially during the period of Nazism.

Of course, it is important that not only on the part of the public of the FRG and the GDR, but also at the official, state level, it has been stated more than once before the whole world that war must never emanate from German soil. In a conversation with me, H. Kohl gave an even more binding interpretation of this formula: Only peace must emanate from German soil.

All that is so, but no one has the right to ignore the negative potential which developed in Germany's past. It is all the more impossible not to take into account peoples' memories of the war, of its horrors and losses. That is why it is very important that the Germans, in tackling the question of unification, remember their responsibility and the fact that it is necessary to respect not only the interests, but also the feelings of other peoples.

In particular, this concerns our country and the Soviet people. They have an inalienable right to count upon, and the possibility of achieving, a situation whereby our country suffers neither moral, nor political, nor economic damage from German unification, and whereby at the end of the day the old "scheme" of history is realized, history which determined that we live together, which extended threads of communication and deep mutual interest between our peoples, which caused our destinies to cross—sometimes in tragic clashes—and which, in conditions of a new epoch, gives us the chance to trust one another and work together fruitfully.

[PRAVDA] How can we assess the accord achieved the other day in Ottawa on reducing the number of troops of the USSR and the United States in central Europe to a level of 195,000?

[Gorbachev] I consider it important and positive. The initiative was shown by U.S. President George Bush. But this initiative itself became possible in the atmosphere of an improvement in Soviet-American relations, which received new and strong stimulus as a result of the meeting in Malta. G. Bush's proposal is in line with the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. For this reason, having carefully analyzed it, we replied positively, and even proposed a more radical variant: 195,000, not for central Europe, but for the whole of Europe outside the borders of the USSR. But, we immediately said the President's variant was also suitable.

Our keynote proposals to return all troops to within the boundaries of their national borders by 1995-1996, and also to eliminate all foreign military bases by the year 2000, are well- known. Talks are already under way on the withdrawal of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia with those two governments.

In a word, the accord on reducing the military presence of the United States and the USSR in central Europe fully accords with the main tendency of international development, and serves the cause of peace.

[PRAVDA] To implement the accord the Soviet Union will have to reduce more troops than the United States. Besides that, the United States is leaving another approximately 30,000 men in Europe, outside the central part. Could this not affect the balance of forces and our security?

[Gorbachev] I can reply briefly: No. But the question probably requires a more developed answer.

Of course, even now we are calculating the correlation of the military potentials. However, the traditional notions of ensuring security by predominantly increasing military strength are disappearing into the past. The new character of interstate dialogue and the stability of the negotiating process have made political factors much weightier in this sphere, too. Such powerful forces have been brought into world and European politics that the real military danger has been reduced considerably and the process of shaping a fundamentally new system of international security is in progress.

I believe the Soviet-American accord makes it considerably easier to elaborate an agreement in Vienna, which could be signed at the all-European meeting at the end of this year.

As for the strictly military aspect of the matter, which has been examined thoroughly by us, the reduction of armed forces beyond our country's borders, taking into account the military-political situation developing today, will not weaken our defense capability—It is being maintained at the necessary level.

PRAVDA Carries Statement on 25 Feb Rallies

PM2102093790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

["USSR Supreme Soviet Statement"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A number of public organizations and movements, including ones which operate from different and sometimes even opposite positions, are calling for demonstrations and rallies to be held in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities of the Soviet Union on 25 February. Many Soviet people express alarm at the fact that extremists and even criminal elements pursuing ends that have nothing in common with creation and democracy may join in the mass rallies and marches.

The USSR Supreme Soviet charges the USSR Government and the soviets of people's deputies locally with taking all necessary measures to protect law and order. Rallies and demonstrations may only be held if they have been sanctioned and their venue specifically determined. All violations must be resolutely suppressed.

Perestroyka and democracy must be reliably defended with the help of the law.
USSR Supreme Soviet

Yakovlev Meets Moscow Party School Students

LD2002232690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Remarks by Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at a meeting with students of the Moscow Higher Party School on 20 February; from the Vremya newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] A meeting between Comrade Yakovlev and students of the Moscow Higher Party School which took place there today was devoted to a discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th party congress and the prospects for improving socialism. Beginning his speech Aleksandr Nikolayevich said that the present time is characterized by a certain confusion at the unaccustomed and complicated nature of the situation in the new society. It is, most of all, the central task of perestroyka, itself, to which we are unaccustomed. It is a task which for the first time in world practice is being posed precisely as the universal renewal of social relations.

But, we, nonetheless, have not yet overcome the psychology of what we are accustomed to.

[Yakovlev] This gap between the revolutionary and unaccustomed nature of the new and our psychology's attraction to what we are accustomed to, an attraction which is, in general, natural for people explains much in our current life. It has also been clearly manifested in the reaction of communists and the public as a whole to the February Central Committee plenum and the pre-congress party program which was adopted at it.

Anticipating possible questions, I will say straight away and quite frankly: Is the CPSU platform ideal precisely as an action program? Of course not. Not only because in general nothing ideal exists. The platform is one of the results of perestroyka. Herein lies its strength but herein lies the first causes of its shortcomings, or of what are regarded by some communists as shortcomings. The problem today is to preserve what has been achieved, the standard of living, the social achievements, and guarantees—people's social security. We will be able to do this only if we radically rearrange the whole organization of life, itself. Only when we reconstruct, when we create the economic and political foundation of a new quality of social relations, only then will we be able once again to move forward. That is the reality.

There will be no miracles. Only competent and painstaking work is capable of moving us forward. Belief in miracles and making one's stake on miracles can result in only one thing—in violence from the desire to impose this miracle which in no way wishes to appear or in violence from anger that it is not arriving. In these conditions the political value of the platform, in my view, lies not in giving a theory of the current and imminent processes; nor does the value of the platform lie in setting out specific actions point by point, which, it seems, rather a lot of people were expecting from it. Let us not forget that the course of separating the powers and functions of the party in local soviet, state, economic, and social bodies and organizations is something we have undertaken seriously. The task of the party in these conditions is to propose and defend the main directions of policy and its main aims.

In present conditions the political value of the platform is to facilitate the unification of everything that is healthy, sober, responsible, industrious, and conscientious.

Is not the appeal which I am now making naive? Does it not smack of a certain degree of vague complacency? No, comrades, I am convinced that this is not naivete. It reflects the most acute need of society and of the party, itself—the need for unification on the basis of variety. We must learn to live, work, and cooperate with each other, learn to respect others' opinions, to seek civilized forms of conducting and resolving our quarrels and our disagreements. In this sense, the party's pre-congress program gives the basis for the broadest possible social coalition.

For me, personally, it was obvious to me before the Central Committee plenum that the draft platform would be subjected to criticism from both flanks. But in this case such a political balance is more of a plus and I spoke about this at the plenum. It indicates the possibility of broad social consolidation.

As far as concerns the specific contents of the document, naturally it is open for constructive finalizaiton. The main demand on it is to learn how to cooperate with the whole society, to interact with all of its parts.

[Announcer] Then comrade Yakovlev replied to questions from students at the party school.

Answers Questions

LD2002192190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] [Presenter] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, met students today at the Moscow Higher Party School. The theme of the meeting was put like this: The CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress, and the prospects for improving socialism. Describing the party platform adopted at the February plenum, Comrade Yakovlev said that this document had grown out of the experience of perestroyka. Herein lay its strength, and herein lay the first causes of its shortcomings. A major conversation took place at the Higher Party School on the broadest range of matters relating to the life of our homeland. We have for you Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev's replies to certain notes addressed to him.

[Begin Yakovlev recording] What measures does the Central Committee plan to take in order to localize the violent democracy of rallies? Well, if it's violent, then it can't be democracy. What sort of democracy is it if it's violent? Just yesterday we had a conversation on this subject. We have to awaken a law, comrades, that lies dormant in our country. It does exist—all the laws against violence, against the possession of weapons. Yesterday, at the Supreme Soviet this matter was discussed. A draft resolution has been submitted to the Supreme Soviet on banning any organizations advocating violence, racial intolerance or interethnic strife, that is, to oppose extremism. Well, we'll have to see what attitude the Supreme Soviet takes to this.

I think, comrades, that if the law doesn't find its feet in our country, then nothing will come of our democracy, and we'll return to the bad old times. Ony the law, and our responsibility, can preserve democracy and, ok, so it's still, you know, timid, of a tender age, but still this is the first time in our life, in our thousand-year-long history. I have already, somehow, spoken of this, and I would like to repeat once again: Our misfortune lies in the fact that for the last thousand years we have been ruled by people, and not by laws. This is the first time in history that we are trying to create a law-governed state, so that laws, and not people, might rule, and that people might carry them out. Even now I think, and will continue to think, that until we—I was, for some reason, talking about this element of cannibalism of ours, so to speak, this also stems from the same place—we need the law to hold sway, the triumph of the law, and then democracy will look different, and our attitude to it will be different, and then the people won't suffer from disorder and lawlessness.

[Yakovlev reads next question] The meaning of the Yugoslav concept is socialism—not the world system, but the world process. All the world progresses toward socialism, the socialist forces and, accordingly, the separate socialist achievements are present in different socialist countries. What is your opinion about this concept, what is your opinion about the necessity of including into the platform a special chapter—"Socialism as a World Phenomenon" in the spirit of the theses of the said concept?

It is, of course, a complicated question, comrades. We need, of course, to sort out what we have built and how we shall continue building, and how we shall formulate the theoretical platform of our building activity. I think that so far we are not ripe enough for this. We need to live through the stage of perestroyka, the social renovation, the new approaches to building before formulating a precise system of the socialist views and plans for the socialist building. That is why this matter has been put very cautiously in the platform. In the past 70 years we have been developing the socialist idea after Lenin in, so to speak, its purified form—as if it develops outside the social movements surrounding this idea; existing by itself. And as if the rest does not exist. We still need, nevertheless, to study all the arsenal of socialist ideas very carefully, and not just their theoretical theses but also in practical interpretations.

[Yakovlev reads next question] In the party leadership a Yakovlev-Primakov-Frolov group has formed in which the Interregional Group finds its support. What is your program and aims?

I think the second question will be redundant when I answer the first. There is simply no group of this nature in the party leadership, these are simply current rumors. I could spend half a day telling you about such rumors.

[Yakovlev reads next question] Have socialist ideals and aims been implemented in Sweden?

Do not know. Have never been to Sweden and did not study it. Would like to ask you myself about it. [end recording]

[Presenter] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev answered some other questions from students at the Moscow Higher Party School. A report of this meeting will be published.

Yakovlev Discusses CPSU Role, Presidential Rule

LD2002233590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1858 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, today urged communists to unify the party on a new foundation for the sake of perestroyka. The fate of perestroyka, he said in an address to students at the Moscow Higher Party School, depends on "the extent to which it is trusted not by individuals or by thousands, but by tens of millions of people—competent, enterprising and professional, from the very center of life." A basis for broad consolidation could be provided by the CPSU Central Committee platform, adopted by the

February plenum and intended to "promote the unification of all that is healthy, sober, and responsible existing within the party and the country."

Noting the importance of the CPSU's rejection of a constitutionally guaranteed monopoly of power, Aleksandr Yakovlev said he considered it essential that new parties, if they appear, "are responsible, stand on the ground of socialist ideas, and champion the interests of the country and the people."

Going on to talk about the USSR's political structure, the CPSU Central Committee secretary noted the importance of introducing a presidential form of rule. In the past, he said, "when in the USSR there was rule by a single person, the question did not arise. But democratization has brought to light very many new forces, not always constructive, and it turned out that we have an absence of power." Within the country, the speaker said, "there is no guarantor of legality or of a constitutional system. The head of state today is, essentially, the parliamentary speaker, who has no right of veto over the decisions of the legislative and other authorities." Only the law is capable of defending democracy, said the speaker.

As for the post of CPSU chairman proposed in the platform, he must be, in the opinion of Aleksandr Yakovlev, a leader who is free of organizational party work. Replying to a question from the hall, Aleksandr Yakovlev said that "reserves for Mikhail Gorbachev as party leader have not been considered."

Yakovlev Discusses 'Enemy Syndrome'

90UN0955A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 90 p 10

[Interview with A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo member, by Igor Gamayunov: "The 'Enemy Syndrome': Anatomy of a Social Disease"; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are LITERATURNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Why is the "enemy image" so tenacious in our social consciousness and how does one get rid of it? The discussion on this subject, which LITERATURNAYA GAZETA began last November, is still of acute interest to our readers. We have already called on many of them to speak. The thoughts of writers, lawyers, economists, and psychologists have been published also.

Today the questions of Igor Gamayunov, editor of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Morality and Law Department, are answered by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

[Gamayunov] Whence, in your view, among a considerable number of our compatriots so ineradicable a need for the creation of an "enemy image"?

[Yakovlev] There are most likely several causes. But these include also the long centuries of the life of the state and the peoples incorporated therein under conditions of authoritarian rule.

Both the poverty of the individual and the poverty of the state, which compel the gathering into an "attack force" of the little that there is in order to survive and accomplish what is desired, seek salvation in authoritarian rule. The lack of learning and information and confusion in the face of the nature and scale of problems requiring rapid, vigorous solution push in its direction also. And, of course, the outside threat, real or potential, and the need to be ready to repulse an attack.

Let us return to this same Russia.

It was always either beleaguered, when it was being torn to shreds. Or was itself stubbornly opening up the expanses, doggedly straining toward the seas and oceans, from Moscow to the Baltic and the Black Sea and to the Pacific and Arctic shores. The country almost repeatedly disintegrated into fragments, rent sometimes by internecine, sometimes by social feuds, but would then get back on its feet again. And with whom has it not waged war?! And all this in living memory. All this shapes the consciousness and remains in the genetic stock. Both when one was being warred against and when one was the conqueror—in any event one was fighting an enemy.

There has always been an abundance of all this in Russian history— psychologically a burdensome legacy. And, of course, the decades of the Stalin business, when millions were dragged into the search for and destruction of "enemies". How many people perished in this abominably nasty hunt for dissidents and how many were stricken by spiritual corruption through hatred, informing and the vile thirst for power! And how many people lost their faith in life and become completely confused, eaten up with fear, and who lost courage, dignity, and decency!

Such was the price of the "head hunt," which still gives those who hope to turn life back and restore power, honor, and privileges to themselves no rest. They are unscrupulous and immoral. They are sniping like flies of autumn, biting as painfully as possible before escaping beneath the snow. But the reactionary wave, which is now in a hurry to remove the obstacles to a turn to the right, is ultimately condemned to buffoonery and hysterics.

Time is cruel and pitiless—toward all, unfortunately. But it is philanthropic also for the human memory stores both time itself and people's behavior and their exploits and treachery, brilliance, and ignorance. It remembers also the petty vanity of nonentities persecuting—from envy or obsequiousness—their contemporaries. This was what it was like last century. And in the last 70 years also we have been constantly struggling—if there has been no real enemy, we have invented one.

Subjective factors cling to the historical inheritance. Someone's malice, inordinate ambitions, vanity. And, further, stupidity, thoughtlessness, conceit. Mixed together here is not only that which is universally historical and universally social but also that which is maximally specific—the actual relations of people, various people—vile and malicious, kind and decent—emotional and indifferent.

Such is existence, and it fashions the consciousness. A destructive consciousness at times in that it creates social groups and forces to whom the "enemy image"—of what kind is immaterial—is profitable. And in that it maims the soul of new generations, which also in certain circumstances begin to experience a need for such an "image".

Who needs all this and why? All who are malicious, indolent, and envious and who are prepared to trample anyone for the sake of their career and mercenary gain. It is convenient for a production outfit which is operating badly to blame allied subcontractors. For a person who is incapable of or reluctant to organize work, to look for "conspirators" and "intriguers". For the individual, to blame for his failures and gaucheness on whoever he will, only not himself.

Of course, there is intent of all kinds. To trip up a person, condemning him to life's squabbles and spiritual torment, to persecute to no purpose and to taunt with rumors. But there is this need for an "enemy" within Homo sapiens also. Domestic literature, particularly Dostoyevskiy, Tolstoy, Gogol, Chekhov—and only they?—saw this foul aspect and mocked it.

The authoritarian way of life kills in man that which is original, independent, his own. Beginning in kindergarten and school, where the personality is leveled down for the first time, about which the public has been speaking with concern for a long time now. It continues in the institute and the vocational-technical school, in the Army and at work. And all this under conditions where there has been an acute lack of democracy. It is lacking today also. Let us not fool ourselves on this score.

As a result a person does not discover much from what he may learn: in his profession, in everyday life, in social intercourse. A lack of breeding means scarcity of know-how. It has to be compensated by a surfeit of arrogance, self-importance, and conceit and a search for shortcomings and defects in others, a search for "objective reasons" and every conceivable kind of "enemy". Whence largely also the attraction for some people of lies, labels, and the trampling of those they do not like and other "exploits"?

Is this situation rectifiable? Yes, undoubtedly. If we turn, of course, in the direction of culture—the general and personal culture of human relations. Otherwise, bad times await us since there are too many people running around with matches who are infected with pyromania.

[Gamayunov] Why is it precisely now that, according to many indications, this social disease is progressing?

[Yakovlev] Because perestroyka is truly a revolution introducing to society tremendous amounts of things that are new, at times incomprehensible, frequently unexpected and, for many people, unacceptable. All this is making people edgy, exciting them, and pushing them either toward comprehension or rejection. But what is particularly important is that perestroyka demands creative action, of which far from all are capable for they have for too long been learning the opposite.

As soon as the groundlessness of the former approaches and methods were demonstrated, strata of people, in all social groups, what is more, the intelligentsia included, who had an interest for this reason or other in compromising that which was new took shape.

As soon as a policy of limitation of the omnipotence of the economic bureaucracy and the development of amateur, including cooperative, forms was adopted, look how everything turned out. Initially the rayon soviet executive committee official gave the go-ahead to the profiteering cooperatives—they were more moneyed and "tractable". Dozens, hundreds of cases of such cooperatives being officially registered in a day or two, while production cooperatives had for months to overcome the rapids of official agreement, practicing patience. But after public anger against the profiteering cooperatives had mounted, all, but the production cooperatives primarily, came to be smoked out. This is an example of the sabotage of perestroyka on the part of officials and the latest search for an "enemy".

As soon as, albeit gently, the squeeze was put on the intriguers, corrupt elements and the shadow economy and policy, every conceivable kind of social provocation appeared. And all these people and groupings needed to justify their egotistical and sometimes criminal interests and actions. And here also some kind of "enemy" was needed, and under conditions of danger, a more serious one than before.

But the regular, honest, industrious individual, who is encountering empty store shelves, is standing in line and is burdened with the many concerns and troubles of day-to-day life and the pressure of bureaucracy, indifference, crime—it is essential that he be given at least some explanation or semblance of plausible explanation. The difficulty here is that the real person with criminal intent is wily and shrewd and is doing everything to deflect anger from himself and channel it against perestroyka, democracy, and glasnost, and creating edginess in every way and sometimes engaging in outright incitement, taking advantage of people's credulousness.

And, finally, the problem of the unskilled, people who are inadequately prepared for independent life. We say: Perestroyka has brought freedom. But freedom is a gift only to those who know how to use it for the creative realization of themselves. But if not, freedom may prove to be for a person a punishment and may destabilize his

inner world. In addition, for the indolent and weak-willed, this is the way toward lumpenization, anarchic behavior, and crime.

The same with glasnost. For the thinking, searching, independent individual glasnost is a great blessing. But if a person is used to singing with another's voice and trusting in popular stereotypes, for him glasnost with its torrent of hitherto unaccustomed truth is also a source of edginess and malaise. This is why there is a great stream of letters which speak about "loss of faith" and "loss of ideals" and inquire: "what kind of life to lead now?" The simple idea of living by the age-old categories of goodness, decency, and justice and working conscientiously does not always occur to people. And once again society is encountering the destructive magic of dogmatic assertions which have duped man repeatedly.

In other words, while we are still breaking with the old ways and the new ways are only just becoming established, disarray in the economy and confusion in people's minds are stimulating this disease, as it were, at all levels: both social and individual. And I believe that we have yet to cross the crisis point. The temptation to resort to social demagogy, attempts to track down the "witches" of perestroyka—all this could increase, at least while the socioeconomic situation remains inauspicious, until the law has become law.

With the development of prosperity, culture and democratic forms of life the authoritarian features of the national and individual mentality will obviously be effaced. Although, going by certain articles and speeches, there are people condemned to be cave dwellers, as it were, and to go after others with clubs.

We need to be realists and to understand that it is a question of inertial, slow processes which develop through the mechanisms of generational change. In fact, the formation of a democratic society means the formation of a new way of life, the cultivation of a democratic mentality and the education of people open to innovation, emancipated people not overburdened with complexes.

[Gamayunov] How dangerous is this disease for the progress of perestroyka?

[Yakovlev] Extremely. I would say that the main and most concealed danger to perestroyka emanates precisely thence, being a method of stirring up dissatisfaction and the ideological base for a social explosion of this scale or the other. The main danger because we can at least see the other dangers. But what lurks in one's own heart we very often fail to understand and evaluate far from dispassionately.

First, in the social respect the need for an "enemy image" pushes people onto the path of wrong and at times simply tragic decisions. Empty stores, freight cars which have not been unloaded, unshipped produce at the plants, rotting goods and food at depots—what is this if not sabotage? Interethnic conflicts. The decline in discipline and responsibility. Scandalous mismanagement. All this builds up to the simple response: a "firm hand" is needed. There is logic to such reasoning. Because there are both deliberate saboteurs and people who are specifically to blame for disgraceful happenings. And a firm hand is needed, but the hand of the law, not the hand of arbitrary action.

But were we under the pressure of objective circumstances and conscious pressure to return to "turning the screws," we would miss and fail to see the main, deep-lying processes and causes. We would be gliding along the surface, without having touched the essence. We would be driving the disease inward and preparing the ground for a crisis, severe and, it could be, catastrophic. All this has happened before. Perestroyka needs realism, clarity of thought, calmness of mind, and balanced evaluations and measures. This was the tenor of the discussion at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum also.

Second, the historical aspect. We are now at a forking of the ways. One way is to return to the old and the deadlocked. The second is the decisive surmounting of fettering, limiting, and soul-destroying authoritarian rule. It is the radical nature of the changes which rejects the temptation to resort to tested, familiar, but tragedy-causing prescriptions.

How often we say today: Change approaches and thinking and overcome stereotypes in consciousness and behavior. But how difficult this is in practice! Resistance is offered by the mentality, the possibilities, problems, and difficulties of which we know inadequately as yet. As also the dangers lurking therein.

Of course, there is a deeper cross section of the problems here also. And the central one is: What in reality dictated our aspiration to escape from authoritarianism to democracy? Where is the proof that history is moving in precisely this direction?

Well, there is, in my view, convincing proof: primarily the continuous development, despite the orgy of violence, of the democratic and humanitarian trend—at all times, among all peoples, in all socioeconomic systems. The ideas of humanism and democracy have been bloodied many times over, but have never died. More, civilization and social progress mean the buildup of the democratic and humanitarian potential of the individual and society, the state and culture, and the political system and its specific institutions and laws.

Self-regulation and self-management and a high measure of democracy are needed also by the modern economy, science, and creativity. It is impossible to control intricate and super-intricate systems according to rigid outlines and rules. Principles of the system's self-tuning are essential.

Given a certain tolerance of the analogies, it may, possibly, be said that if the relationship of the mind to

nature is the highest question of all philosophy, the relationship of democracy to authoritarianism is the fundamental question of politics and the social development of mankind and man.

Were we to imagine some ideal, hypothetical society, the optimum would most likely be a combination of different patterns and types of control in the various sectors thereof for the accomplishment of tasks of a varying nature under various conditions. Democracy, administrative control, and an ability to combine them one with the other and to coordinate their application in related sectors at one and the same time would be required. This is evidently how it should be theoretically. And modern life also requires flexibility and an ability to maneuver.

But it should not be forgotten that, granted all its staggering achievements, mankind has lived the bulk of its history in an atmosphere of poverty, ignorance, inequality, and the extremely limited nature of the opportunities for self-realization. And for this reason in an atmosphere of violence and wars also and their inevitable concomitant—authoritarianism. The task today is to learn democracy and feel deeply and recognize in practice the entire distinctiveness and self-worth of each human life, each personality. That is, to become a truly humane society—in being and consciousness and basis and superstructure, without the feverish, paranoid thirst for the blood of one's neighbors.

Such a time is coming, it is coming! Throughout the world, as in our country also, dictators, like their ideologues, are collapsing, although the turbid trace in the consciousness and in practice remains. But I believe that we will master democracy and that it will become a part of our consciousness and habits—we will then certainly be reasoning differently in some respects and will see problems in a different sociohistorical and philosophical perspective from today.

Democracy for us is not only a means but also an end in itself of unparalleled significance. And the obstacles in its way are diminishing only slowly. But the most serious impediments are those which are concealed in the depths of culture and consciousness, which are not even recognized currently as obstacles.

We will all have to tread the early-morning dewy path.

[Gamayunov] What explains the division of the intelligentsia, men of letters particularly, into opposite groups? May an analogy be made here with the argument which occurred last century between the Slavophiles and Westerners?

[Yakovlev] There is some point to such an analogy. Generally, arguments on pressing issues of social life and problems of creativity and its forms, styles, and methods are normal and natural. Without them, science, art, and literature would simply die out. But where there are arguments, there is division into some groups and associations. Each has its own predilection, its own prophets and antichrists, banners and slogans. All this is, I repeat, natural, such is life, so has it been at all times.

This is evidently not what we are talking about. It is a question of a very regrettable phenomenon, when artistic, procedural, and substantive disagreements descend to pernicious cliquism, informing and a readiness to destroy one's opponent, pin on him any label and to lie. All this is truly vile. This demeans the most creative individuals and their labor, evokes the hostility of the public, impedes the spread of genuine breeding in all strata of society, and sets a negative moral example.

Of course, far from all creative persons—scientific or artistic—participate in such squabbles. This is not characteristic, as a rule, of people who really have a "divine spark" and are endowed with talent and dignity. But that the phenomenon of cliquism around creativity exists and that it has recently been assuming abominably nasty forms and nurturing reactionary forces and shady instincts is a fact. Against the background of perestroyka all this is both more pronounced and also more intolerable than before. Pronounced because the changes in the spiritual life of society have highlighted the whole absurdity and moral inferiority of what was in fact the "norm" for decades. Intolerable since this whole row objectively serves the anti-perestroyka, is impeding renewal, and is pulling us backward.

Spiritual quest and disagreements are secondary here. It is not a question of Westerners and Slavophiles. It is a question, in my view, of the combination and mutual reinforcement over many decades of serious distortions and abnormalities of life itself: historical, economic, political. They do not, however, remove the question of the artist's personal responsibility for his position and moral and civic character. But since we are speaking of a phenomenon with a social resonance, everyone needs to look into the reasons from the substantive angle.

One group of reasons is historical. I have spoken partly about this. For a long time the leadership of the party and its machinery of officialdom cultivated precisely confrontation among the intelligentsia. Many honest, incorruptible people were in one way or another shoved aside as awkward and recalcitrant. They were repeatedly savagely punished, and in the more recent past unacceptable conditions for work were created, and they were then listed as dissidents. It is understandable that the attempts to control creativity, by manifestly unclean hands all the more, were socially and spiritually devastating. But many people grew accustomed to such practices, they liked them and for honors and benefits they hounded their own dissident colleagues even.

Worse even: Certain artistic people recognized back in Proletkult times that the party's position could be manipulated via cliquism, personal relations and demagogic speculation on acute issues of social life. Far from everyone understands yet, unfortunately, what damage this did to society. All this is still being supported by certain apparatus manipulators.

I could understand this in the past, but now, in the era of glasnost and democracy, how do we explain the fact that certain scholars and men of letters, as soon as they disagree with someone, there are immediate prolix ideological denunciations in the Central Committee and the KGB! And, I know from experience, there are many such people. One would have thought that speaking candidly and cogently, expounding a different viewpoint, and proving and substantiating it—this is, after all, possible! But no, denunciation is preferred. And the articles also are sometimes more akin to denunciations than an attempt to arrive at the truth. And some intellectualizing lackeys of stagnation, how they would like to forget about what and how they themselves wrote at that time and instead rummage around in the archives of others! Loss of a sense of humor and, together with it, shame always leads to discomfiture.

There are, I believe, political reasons. For many centuries the country was deprived of a normal domestic political process. But life goes on, it, like thought, cannot be stopped. The vernal water always makes its way through: if not directly, then circuitously, if not on top, then beneath the ice, if not into the river, then into a subterranean channel. So in society also: a thought which has not had an open, direct road has sought byways.

The load factor in science, literature, and the arts in our country of social and political problems is immense. In some instances this is good, in some, evidently, not so, but a fact. If people are unwilling to express themselves directly, a context and concealed meaning, associations and allegories, and allusions and historical parallels are born. And some naive or very subtle people sometimes accept them in good faith and begin a new line of argument, debate, and confrontation.

But whereas political life was for decades adapted to distorted forms, it frequently lived parasitically on the artistic process also. Is it therefore to be wondered at that this very process acquired all the characteristic signs of political squabbles and petty intrigues? With the ideological demarcations, acute clashes of ambitions, and contrived squabbles, and with all the mores and particular features which are still inherent in our political culture as a whole. Nor did people shun recourse to political annihilation—this was the case in the past with M. Bulgakov and A. Platonov, with A. Tvardovskiy, V. Vernadskiy and A. Sakharov, V. Nekrasov and B. Pasternak, N.I. Vavilov and A. Tarkovskiy, and many others too.

Of course, perestroyka is making its adjustments, but it is not in a position to straighten out everything all at once. As democracy, normal political life, and public democratic movements develop in the country, the situation, I believe, will begin to progress toward common sense. Abnormal super-politicization will disappear from artistic, creative, and literary life. The habits of greater tolerance and a readiness for respectful debate will appear. The thirst for blood will no longer be predominant. True artists will go about their business, but the camp followers will continue their intrigues—they having simply no other occupation.

I would also evaluate through this prism the most acute arguments which are under way currently in the artistic environment around perestroyka. Inasmuch as perestroyka is a revolution which leaves no one indifferent, it has here also—particularly here—caused an explosion of passions. I am for the emotional character of life and the confrontation of ideas, evaluations, and approaches. Perestroyka can only benefit from this. It needs an intelligent and keen opponent: on the left, on the right, and in the center—among conservatives and neoconservatives and radicals and super-radicals. But on one condition—given a general rejection of hatred leading to violence. A normal democratic process presupposes a competitive aspect in all things and creative competition, not a vanity fair or a literary version of the Vyshinskiy's.

What I categorically find unacceptable in this debate, from whichever side it comes, is disparagement of the opponent's human dignity. It is possible to argue from any standpoint, any viewpoint. But a person may not be hounded merely for the fact that he does not share one's views and convictions and, even less, have others set on him by an underhand quotation, labels and inventions. This is a sign of the moral degradation of the personality. Such methods engender a "special meetings" spirit.

Certain mass meetings have too often of late been seeking rather victims, than ways and means of solving our common problems. What everyone should be doing today even to ensure that we all really progress toward a better future is being lost behind the rhetoric. I would like to think it were time it were understood that not only hatred and estrangement but also indifference, unscrupulousness, and an absence generally of any convictions and moral principles whatever are fostered in society in this way. It is time to stop.

Yes, the arguments are bitter, although this is nothing new, if not to say, as old as the hills. Subsequently art and literary historians will ennoble the arguments and squabbles and eject from them that which is vain, demeaning, and arrogant, leaving merely that which is substantive and artistic. We would recall what a high degree of intolerance at times marked the debate in Russian literature of the 19th century. Now, 150 years later, the wheat has been sifted from the chaff, and in the popular consciousness and memory there remain only true giants of literature, thought, harmony, and the brush. In their quest for the truth we find such insights of the spirit that it is becoming excruciatingly hard to take today's row at literature's entrance ways according to the principle: "If you don't sting, you won't die," "If you don't yap, people will not notice you". All this can only be regretted. This row is evidence of a decline in morality and breeding.

And the people hanging about here are of various kinds, and they are malicious from various motives. Some,

from innate bitterness, others, on account of lost command honors, yet others, owing to an inferiority complex, and others still, on account of inordinate ambitions to greatness.

But at times the group skirmishes are joined also by dignified, truly gifted people who by their work support goodness and charity. They have neither personal cupidity nor a thirst for power. But they are oppressed and consumed by some pain, justified, pressing, and interminable, caused, for example, by ecological disasters. They become dismayed because they cannot find a cure and ease this pain. And they gradually become worn out with it and also tempted to look for an enemy. It might seem paradoxical, perhaps, but this comes from sincerity and gullibility also.

The search for an "enemy" is a social ailment. It is particularly dangerous today, at a time when we so greatly need nationwide concord. All this is intolerable and immoral for the roots of the phenomenon are being fed by the mentality of 1937. But it is particularly sickening when such a search is being organized on national soil, when nations are measuring off their boundaries and when genealogical grave digging is being indulged, the names of fathers and mothers being tracked down with sadistic intensity. The truly Russian intelligentsia has always been conscientious, of high moral fiber, tolerant, sensitive to others' troubles, and internationalist in spirit. And we are now rediscovering this for ourselves, immersing ourselves in the depths of the thought of the Russian philosophers of the turn of the century, those who, to our great misfortune, were found no place in the development of Soviet society.

As far as the dispute between Slavophiles and Westerners is concerned, I consider it in the current form artificial and simplistic and infected with ideological speculativeness and an atmosphere of hostility.

This dispute has a big and distinctive place not only in literature but throughout the culture, social life, and history of Russian self-awareness. Its emergence and content were predetermined by Russia's very position. I would note, incidentally, that this fundamental argument was conducted at the highest moral and ethical level, which, unfortunately, has been lost today.

The essence of the argument turned on whether Russia should develop in accordance with its own particular path or, on the other hand, borrow certain aims, reference points, and forms of development from the West. I believe that this primordially sincere and natural question was answered by life itself. Answered dialectically: Go your own way, live by your own brain and determine the modes of progress yourself. But do not here shun all that has proven its worth in the experience of other countries and peoples. Do not mechanically snatch that which glitters more brightly but take intelligently what might really be useful and necessary, adapting it to our conditions and requirements. What, it might seem, was there to argue about? And why, precisely, Slavophiles and Westerners, and not, say, Slavophiles and Easterners? Was there nothing for us to take from Japan, India, China, and other ancient oriental cultures?

Not only the revolutionary democrats but also such well-known philosophers as N. Berdyayev and V. Solovyev argued against Slavophilism and made a scholarly characterization of it. It sought the truth, not people to be asphyxiated.

In my opinion, the current arguments on this topic are a speculative pretext by means of which people wish to lend a semblance of profundity and respectability to base instincts. The Slavophiles were upright people and patriots of Russia and they were seeking some special path of its development—yes, seeing a threat to such a path from the West, although objectively they themselves had experienced Western influence to a large extent. They struggled sincerely against the pollution of the Russian language and believed that "prilepa" sounded better than "karniz" [cornice], and "mokrostupy" better than "galoshi" [overshoes]. We will not dispute this.

They idealized the pre-Petrine past—but not, for all that, the special elite of Ivan the Terrible. They understood Russian and Slav distinctiveness in their own way,—but did not for the sake thereof incite people to pogroms and a search for "enemies". Their thinking may be evaluated variously politically, ideologically, practically. But they cannot be charged with the amoral content of their appeals. They were honest thinkers, chroniclers and collectors, and researchers into the culture of their country. Unfortunately, our knowledge of them is very inadequate: whether it be the Slavophilism of A.S. Khomyakov and Yu.F. Samarin or, later, of N.Ya. Danilevskiy, K.N. Leontyev, N.N. Strakhov, and of others also. Their ideas have not lost their instructiveness and relevance in some respects even today. And, of course, it is blasphemous to even think that the ideology of Slavophilism—love of the Slavs and their culture—could serve as a political base for the bazaar elements and anti-Semitism, about which even Stalin wrote: "Anti-Semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is a most dangerous vestige of cannibalism."

It is most greatly to be regretted that adventurers frightening away by their hysterics those who really in practice by all their thoughts and deeds are for the flourishing of Russia are today frequently latching on to the very serious idea of Russian revival. There is no recovery for Russia in division and rebellion. It needs unity and a new understanding of its unifying, consolidating power rooted in the depths of the ages, not a reawakening of hatred; the fostering of the dignity of the nation and charity are needed, not the spurring of suspicion; what is needed is free labor on free land.

[Gamayunov] What needs to be done to ensure that any polemic—both political and literary critical—turn into constructive dialogue?

[Yakovlev] The need for this is becoming increasingly acute. But without a desire for dialogue, without a general aspiration thereto, and without condemnation of the strengthening "cannibalism" nothing can be done under the conditions of democracy.

We need to work on the restructuring of social conditions also. It is they which determine both the degree of alienation and the moral atmosphere. We need to revive the high standards of communication. Essentially there has been no demand with us for constructive dialogue and a truly moral product. For decades. There has been a different demand: for controllability, for a stooping posture, for a readiness to attend. For an imitation of the effervescence of life and an artificial monolithic character. For the intensification of any struggle. It is this which we need to change, and this may only be done via general social conditions, via culture, not otherwise.

Take only such a question as relations between social and professional groups and nationalities. It has become profitable to some people to embroil nations and spur discord. Some people cannot wait to dig a ditch between the authorities and the masses. Some people are starting to rebuke the peasants for being unable to feed the country. Although it is clear that it is nothing to do with the peasants here. Any peasant understands that, given our expanses and the potholed roads, it is necessary to store grain and potatoes mainly with the producer, not organize annual "battles for the harvest" and bungling competitions. The threshing barn, threshing floor, and granary have always been a subject of the peasant's primary concern and provided him with work from fall to spring. But since the times of Stalin through today we have been shaking the kolkhoz [collective farm] member and sovkhoz [state farm] worker and shouting around the clock: "come on, come on, hand it over," as if the peasant is essentially a villain and that all he has in mind is using up all the grain before the first snows.

Some people continue to see the intelligentsia as the whole evil, which is doing nothing right and which can come up with nothing sensible—in science, literature, or art. And it needs to be "ousted". There are also those who are simply convinced that were it not for glasnost, the shelves would be full of goods and everyone would be working better.

As you can see, a search for evil spirits once again.

A constructive dialogue is inconceivable without genuine professionalism, otherwise where is the constructiveness to come from. But does everyone want this? After all, a constructive approach would kill off some people—both morally and materially. Reading the newspapers, I cannot yet rid myself of the impression that inability and an unwillingness to work are being attributed to whomsoever one pleases, only not oneself.

We need to work on the climate of our relations in matters large and small—everything is of equal importance. The intelligentsia, the artistic, specially literary intelligentsia particularly, is morally obliged here to give a lead and set an example for society. I am not saying that it is necessary to like those who are profoundly antipathetic and whose views and behavior are subjectively unacceptable. But human standards of intercourse must be observed! We cannot go on like this, comrades!

Constructive dialogue is not some individual argument or discussion in specially allocated premises at an appointed time. It should be the daily state of society and its mentality and practice. Only then will we perceive the benefits in people's deeds, hearts, and character and in the way of life. It is to this that perestroyka is geared. But what kind of constructive dialogue can there be without real freedom! What kind of constructive dialogue without glasnost, when the public is on starvation information rations! What kind of constructive dialogue can we have without democratic procedures and a democratic outlook!

Yakovlev Addresses Yaroslavl Party Aktiv

LD1802163690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2050 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] Yaroslavl, 17 Feb (TASS)—A serious conversation on the destiny of perestroyka, how to enhance party's prestige, and ways out of the crisis situation took place today at a meeting of the aktiv of the oblast party organization which discussed the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress. Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, addressed the communists. In five years, perestroyka has reached a boundary beyond which the phenomena and the processes brought to life by perestroyka will become decisive and will begin to shape all aspects of our existence, underlined Aleksandr Yakovlvev. That is why the resistance to it is becoming increasingly stubborn and why the question has arisen of whether to go further, whether to make the next step? Or should we slow down the transformation, and maybe even retreat to a certain extent?

The idea of the pre-congress platform of the CPSU Central Committee is that the party will take the next step—a most important one in the history of the country, in the transformation of society, in the perestroyka of the CPSU itself—in a new awareness of its function in society.

Man should indeed be at the center of social development, and of party policy, the CPSU Central Committee secretary underlined. If today there is a shortage of food and housing, of goods and services, if the social sphere is weak and the countryside is lagging behind, then the entire economy—its organization and management—as well as the political sphere should be oriented toward meeting these requirements in a realistic way and as rapidly as possible. If strengthening the market principle, a multiplicity of forms of ownership, competition between producers, joint stock formations and concerns, and so forth will help this, then we should make use of all of them, without hesitation.

The speaker drew attention to another feature of the precongress platform and of the policy of perestroyka as a whole, namely its call for constructive and creative work, and for unity, which presupposes not only pluralism—that is, a multiplicity of opinions, views, and approaches—but also tolerance, democracy, and glasnost, on the basis of legality and discipline. Unity should not be a mechanical movement, but the conscious choice of every citizen, a choice dictated by the understanding that any other path will not lead to a solution of the problem.

Aleksandr Yakovlev replied to numerous questions.

Ligachev Attacked in MOSCOW NEWS

PM0602142090 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 5, 4 Feb 90 pp 8-9

[Vitaliy Tretyakov article: "Yegor Ligachev and Others"]

[Text] Little by little glasnost has been eroding the top Soviet leaders' conspiracy of silence about themselves. Not very successfully so far, but still, certain contrasting figures are coming into sharp relief against the general background. One of these is Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev.

An Exception From the Rule

We should thank Ligachev: He doesn't hide behind others, doesn't try to camouflage himself under the "official decorum." For all his insistence on the "lack of differences in the Soviet leadership," his behaviour suggests othewise. Ligachev shows us what others try to hide.

Ligachev's openness (up to a point) is a personal, rather than political trait. His readiness to tell the people what he, Ligachev, thinks is far more obvious than his readiness to listen to these people or hear them.

Place in History

Ligachev's position is risky. If his line in perestroyka doesn't gain the upper hand, he will have to quit the political scene earlier than many others on whose behalf he is fighting and speaking out. But in a certain respect the risk is justified. First, there may be a victory despite all odds. And second, even given defeat, unlike many of his faceless and nameless followers, Ligachev will go down in history and the people's memory not merely as a "member of the Politburo," but as Yegor Ligachev, the personality and politician.

Fundamental Principles

Ligachev consideres that property should belong to the people, not to individuals: "Without having ever flown round the Statue of Liberty, I believe that we are marching towards communism."

[Footnote—Given that Ligachev's statements in the press and on TV are fairly well known, here I have used the text of his speech in Tomsk on December 6, 1989, during a meeting with the city's intelligentsia and students. The text was published in the newspaper Za Solveskuyu Nauku (December 14, 1989)—V.T.] He seeks to draw for support on what has become outdate, having demonstrated its fantastic inefficiency: on the one-party system, on a technocratically modernized command-based economy, on unanimity in ideology. Ligachev stands up for the most unhealthy elements in socialism, however healthy they seem to him. Appeals to fundamental principles are good when society rests on these principles, but when they shake society up to the point of imminent collapse, this fundamental conservatism has no historical prospects and cannot find broad response in society, despite people's natural striving for stability.

Soviet-Style Conservatism

Soviet conservatism is paradoxical. It claims to be the only really revolutionary theory, it is ashamed of its own name. It borrows from the past only what is conservative, even reactionary. A typical example is its handling of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets." Our conservatives wrote this slogan on their banner, picking from the entire history of the Soviets (Councils) the one period when Soviets consisted of members of only one party. Yet neither the origin nor the history of this slogan can be reduced to a one-party orientation. I am not calling upon conservatives to advocate a multiparty system. I simply want to say that linkage—even via slogans—with history must be honest. Ligachev believes in communism, which is not at all surprising for a leader of a Party calling itself Communist. Believing in communism, he consequently, wishes a better future for all of us. Where is conservatism here? Of course, not in the belief as such, and not in the fact that this better future, according to Ligachev, must be built on the basis of the stability of the present day, which has taken everything valuable from the past. This chain is impeccable in its logic and attractive in its words. And yet it contains that unsolvable paradox which constitutes the most distinctive hallmark of conservatism: "the Soviet way." Essentially, this means that this conservatism deduces a "better future" not from the achievements, but from the mistakes of the past.

Communism Built on Blood?

Stalin's mistakes were great, say the more "flexible" of the latter-day Soviet conservatives; his repressive measures were unjustified and appalling. But they were merely distortions of the way which was correct on the whole. One of the proofs of his correctness "on the whole" is the Soviet people's victory in the war against fascism. What other system except the Soviet socialist one would not have collapsed when enemy forces penetrated so deep inside the country, coming within a few dozen kilometres of its capital?

But can't it be presumed that Stalin's own socialist administrative-command (or rather feudal-communist)

system brought the country to the brink of military collapse? And the people saved the country (and the system) not with the help of the system, but in spite of it.

History makes no mistakes—mistakes are made by those who interpret it as they see fit. Look through this prism at the past 70 years of our history and you will undersand that a negative assessment of socialism—and this, says Ligachev, existed even under Stalin—is possible. But conservatives deny the others' right to interpret history. Well, let us suppose that they, the conservatives, are right. Then communism will inevitably be built. But, I am afraid, it will be built on blood. Not only the blood spilt in 1937, but also in 1989 in Tbilisi.

'Collective Farm Logic'

Sacred examples of Ligachev's logic are his statements about the superiority of collective farms over any other form of land tenure—statements which have been repeatedly analyzed in the Soviet press. This, conditionally speaking, "collective farm logic" can be called iron, if not steel logic—from the standpoint of those who use it, it endures any criticism by life, even criticism by the current, pre-famine conditions in our country.

One of the favourable arguments in this "logical system" is "were it not": what successes we would have scored were it not for mistakes (distortions, reprisals, the untrodden path, imperialist encirclement, and the like). This "were it not", however, is always turned only to one side as it were. Characteristic in this sense is the following cut-and-dried reasoning.

If the whole of the Soviet industry (agriculture) were raised to the level of labour productivity achieved by the best Soviet enterprises (collective farms), we would have outstripped the West. Indeed we would if we followed the conservatives' logic. But a person with a different kind of logic would immediately ask: and what would happen if, for instance, the whole of American industry reached the level of the best American enterprises?

An Inconvenient Question

Every time I listen to Ligachev I think, are the conservatives deceiving us wittingly or not?

Though I understand the conservatives' right to delude and to propagandize their delusions, it has to be admitted that more often than not they engage in half-truths and lies quite deliberately. And that's the best of what they do.

Speaking last December in Tomsk, Ligachev said: "There is no, nor has there ever been anywhere in the world, political formation as solid as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." Shortly after this statement, the Communist Party of Lithuania seceded from the CPSU. I can't imagine that a Politburo Member should know less about the inner-Party situation than I, for example.

I don't know how Ligachev views the latest developments in Eastern Europe. I think that soon his public remarks will be confined to vague musings about the "distortions of socialism". But only recently, returning from a still-Honecker-run East Germany, Ligachev assured us that everything was normal with socialism there. That country was always the model Ligachev wanted us to follow.

I don't exclude the possibility of deliberate fraud because, for all its immorality, fraud under the elegant name of "windowdressing" has entered the flesh and blood of our managerial and especially Party apparat (as the Apparat of all apparats).

They Don't Deceive Us

Assuming innocence—in the given case the conservatives' honesty—let's examine a different scenario; they don't deceive us. What follows from this? Only two things: either they are unwise, or they take us for fools. And the latter looks more like the truth. From the latter proposition, the former one follows: Who, after all, takes his own people for fools?

Power

At the meeting in Tomsk Ligachev was asked how he differed from Gorbachev. Those who follow Gorbachev's and Ligachev's statements could easily have answered this question. Ligachev, however, reacted nervously:

"Those radicals are so eager to see differences between me and Comrade Gorbachev. This is your wish. We came to the Party's Central Committee together, we have always been and remain like-minded colleagues. That he and I can have different points of view on certain questions is our right. Don't think about the differences. You are so eager to see them. That makes it easier for you, for some of you, i.e., those who write this, to worm your way into power."

This question made Ligachev come forth as one of the monopoly owners of power in this country. And indeed, why does Ligachev, who definitely possesses power, deny the person who asked this question the right even to dream of it? How does this person, how do I differ from Ligachev so that we should not even dare think about "worming" our way into power in order to govern with Ligachev or instead of him?

Usually the reply is this: I have been placed in this post by the Party. And ours is the ruling Party. Even in the West, so beloved by the pluralists, the party which carries the day in the elections forms the nation's leadership from among its members.

There is much that could be said in reply to this, about the Party which once placed Stalin and Brezhnev in the top post, but now I am interested in the stand of the conservatives, not in the arguments of those who oppose them.

Party Conservatism

Many were surprised when Ligachev revealed the information of the USSR Procurator-General—information that acquitted Ligachev and implicated Gdlyan and Ivanov—not at the USSR Supreme Soviet or the Congress of People's Deputies, but at the CPSU Central Committee Plenary Meeting. I think he did this for two reasons. One was pragmatic; no one could guarantee that people's deputies would keep quiet given their well-known hostility towards certain higher-ups. But the second reason was the main one; a Party member, what's more a member of the Central Committee, what's more a Member of the Politburo, can only make excuses before his equals, and that is justification enough. The highest court is not the Supreme Court or the Supreme Soviet, or even a People's Court. The highest court is the Communists' Court. I think that Ligachev sincerely believes this.

This instantly eliminates all questions about where the people come in. The people are immaterial, as are questions of democracy, and the power of the people. This is, I'm sorry to say, typical of a certain brand of Soviet conservatism—Party conservatism. This is the issue on which Ligachev differs with the spirit of the day.

Vicious Circle

Slogans, words, ideals or theories generated by our conservatism may be of interest to political scientists. But practically speaking they are rather dull because they all move in their own closed circle, in a vicious circle from the point of view of society and history. Ligachev has brilliantly illustrated the sense (or rather absurdity) of this movement by calling socialist pluralism "a variety of opinions which are mainly for socialism, rather than against." It doesn't matter to him that socialism is different things to different people. What matters here is the choice without choice which Ligachev insists upon.

No Guilt Complex

That members of the party apparat are ready and eager to be in charge of absolutely everything is old news. It's also old news that the best man to run everything is the man who knows nothing about it just as long as he knows how to pull the power strings of the apparat. So it's wrong to blame apparatchiks for that. "Shuffling portfolios" is common practice the world over, and "trading ideology for agriculture," strictly speaking, doesn't happen only in the USSR, where the practice has been reduced to farce. Our own apparat is distinguished for its absence of alternatives in external (there was no contest in coming to power) and internal (excessive ideologizing and standardization of all decisions) policies. With perestroika, especially in recent months, it has become obvious how adept members of the conservative apparat are at using the mechanism of permanent rotation to shirk responsibility for what they haven't done and especially for what they have done. The complete absence of a sense of guilt for the country's failures is typical of Party conservatism in the USSR.

Ligachev welcomed the publication of the notorious (pro-Stalinist) article by Nina Andreyeva. One would have thought that some moral urge, essential in any politician, would have caused him to admit his mistake, his guilt. Or to stick to his guns—principles are principles. Unfortunately, such a frank advocate of conservatism as Ligachev seems to be guided not by principles, but by propositions, preferring to "forget" about his old political sympathies. Is this failed logic or compromising with his conscience? At any rate, this "forgetfulness" is conspicuous. Silence in this case is not golden.

On one occasion, Ligachev said casually that he had been building socialism during the years of stagnation. Considering the important post he held at that time, one might think that he would apologize for the disparity between what was promised and what was achieved. There was no apology. There is a sincere desire to remain at the head of this construction project. What people think about socialism, about its construction, and about those in charge of it is of no interest to Ligachev.

Ligachev and Yeltsin

At the start of perestroika, there was a joke: "What's one unit of glasnost called?" Answer: "One Yeltsin." And indeed, compared to that level of candour, Ligachev's outspokenness is hardly exceptional. It's just that he is prepared, more than anyone else in the apparat, to risk his own name in order to keep secrets which have long been open secrets. During the open debates at the 19th Party Conference, Ligachev accused Yeltsin of only one thing, of breaking the vow of silence which prohibits a party official from publicly discussing such things as the apparat's privileges, the biggest being its monopoly on power, and the differences among top party officials. If we ignore the personal, unknown motives of that duel of words, Ligachev was only trying to protect the myth about the unity and unselfishness of the Party leadership.

Unity Myth Hostage

What mostly dooms Ligachev's policy and his political future is that, willingly or at the Party's behest, he has become a hostage of the myth about the unity (of the Party, the country, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the models of socialism). No such unity existed, even under Stalin's criminal, repressive regime. Neither it exists today.

But the myths knocking about in the head of someone vested with real power are dangerous even if the soil that produced them no longer exists. It isn't just the emperor who's a hostage of imperial thinking, but the whole empire. Which will fall first depends on many things. Somethimes the empire crumbles first, burying not the emperor, but his subjects under the rubble.

Man of 1985

If Ligachev's political career had ended in 1986, he would have been remembered as one of the handful of

men who pioneered perestroika; his name wouldn't have had the notoriety it does today. The persistence with which he keeps bringing up that role of his shows that Ligachev is no stranger to historical ambition.

Some of perestroika's almost symbolic gestures show its progress better then the most radical reforms. Within a matter of months in 1989, Ligachev and other Party bosses of his rank were obliged to step down from the Presidium in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses to a special box below, and ultimately to sit in the orchestra like other people's deputies. After that, the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies raised the question of abolishing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution about the Party's leading role.

These developments went beyond the Stalin-Brezhnev model of socialism and perplexed Ligachev and turned him from a supporter of progress into his opponent.

Experiments

No one can deny that Ligachev has tried to modernize some of the apparat's policies, specifically, tradtional methods of controlling the "rank-and-file". He has been using glasnost to try and promote his own understanding of perestroika. All those appearances on TV in the summer of 1989 can't but inspire admiration.

Yet I can't help feeling that the "apparat" has been experimenting with Ligachev, using him to test the effectiveness of the new methods of disseminating conservative policies and propaganda, and using him as the target for all criticism from democratic radicals. "Sacrificing the Queen" is a common gambit in chess and politics.

I have no evidence to prove that Ligachev has no sense of humour or irony, so vital for any serious politician. Please, excuse me, therefore, if my suppositions hurt my hero. No offence is meant, really. The one thing I'm perfectly sure of is that many of Ligachev's supporters are well aware of the scathing power of popular ridicule. The fact that the most absurd rumours "stick" to Ligachev and the fact that he got the most "nays" last year when people's deputies were elected from the Communist Party appear to me to be in the same category.

Political Perspective - 1

Perestroika is not a bed of roses. The political processes unleashed by perestroika are various and far from radiant in some of their consequences. Therefore, a man of the 1985 make, be it Ligachev or any of his lower-profile admirers who may not have caught the public eye yet, is not wholly without political prospects.

We often ask ourselves about the guarantees of perestroka's irreversibility. In fact its irreversibility is assured. What is not assured is the democratic tendency of its development. It is unlikely that Ligachev would become the leader of the alternative policy, should its supporters come to power. More likely, it would be "others", as is generally the case in times of trouble. But the possibility of their coming to power still exists, if only because Ligachev is still active politically.

Perspective - 2

Incidentally, the most radiant prospects loom for Ligachev if perestroika proceeds in a normal democratic way, if the 19-million-strong CPSU divides into several more or less independent political formations. Ligachev's good services to the Party conservatives make him eligible for a leading role in their movement and for a legitimate and constructive place in the country's policy-making structures.

Ironically, it is against this scenario that Ligachev himself is speaking out most fervently.

Perspective - 3

As a staunch supporter of socialism in its most traditional and orthodox form, Ligachev is helping to test its compatibility or interchangeability with all sorts of "patriotic" and populist sentiments (including primitive chauvinism). Party conservatism has got many points of contact with nationalist conservatism. The tests continue. If orthodox "socialism" is to be discarded altogether, Ligachev will have to go with it. If a "synthetic" variety prevails, so will Ligachev.

'And Others'

All maxims are inaccurate. They say, politics is the art of the possible. In my opinion, Lenin proved that politics is also the art of the impossible. Therefore, I see the new politics based on the new thinking as the art of the possible the people need.

Conservatism in life and politics is no luxury. It is a prequisite for democracy, even a democracy in the making. But conservative policies as state policies, even if they are a lesser evil compared to downright reactionary policies, are still a luxury we cannot afford. Perhaps, democratic societies spoiled by radical reforms can afford to fall back for a time on political puritanism. We are still very far removed from that. I don't mean the political puritanism which is in fact an option close at hand, because the balance of forces is fragile. Sooner or later someone is bound to take political risks. Is the one who takes the first step bound to win? Not necessarily. But he who does not take the first step is sure to lose. And so are all of us. This is exactly what "others" are waiting for.

Perspective - 4

I would much rather have stopped at the last paragraph, but the civil war that has broken out in the southern USSR prevents me. There is no point in analyzing Ligachev's political stance with regard to inter-ethnic relations. His views have been borrowed wholesale from the past and can be summed up in a few lines: The Union must be unified not only in territory, but also in

thinking. Ideology, economy and all other aspects. The Russian Federation is central, both geographically and politically. Class distinctions are more important than ethnic or religious ones. The myth of unity is universal, as are the methods of instilling it—be it in the Baltic Republics or in Transcaucasia.

Given the normal peaceful course of events and the democratic tendency of perestroika, all the above postulates are bound to collapse of their own accord, because in this particular field the myth of unity is the least relevant. A policy of "tightening all the screws" with the same wrench, both in the west and the south of the country, would not take long to prove its inefficacy.

But in a situation where an inter-ethnic conflict has escalated into a civil war, few will take time to adjust the wrench. In all probability, they will simply grab the biggest one, and use it in a way that could entail unpredictable consequences for democracy. If the country's leadership, including Ligachev, is prepared to give up the imperial mind-set forthwith, democracy may still have a chance of winning in the months to come. Then democracy will have to arm herself with real, not ephemeral power. There are indications, however, that the tendency to compromise has gone too far—beyond the danger point.

In the given situation, Ligachev may appear to be the most acceptable figure, even though the political setback should it take place, is likely to be far more serious. Anyway, conservatism has acquired some fresh propsects. Will it be able to stave off any reaction? Or will it be only a retaining wall on the way to democracy? Either scenario is possible.

If worst comes to worst, none of the country's top Party leaders may be personally to blame. They will have simply failed to completely renounce the well-known choice between dogma and life. That's the way they—and we—have been taught. The teachers are dead now.

The teachers' and students' collective guilt will once again have to be expiated by the people.

MOSCOW NEWS Offices Damaged by Fire

PM1602111190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 1

[S. Pluzhnikov report: "Fire Victims Report"]

[Text] Alarming news has swept Moscow: The MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI editorial office has burned down.

The fire broke out in the evening of 14 February. It raged across the top stories of block no. 16/2 on Gorkiy Street and threatened to spread to adjacent buildings housing the editorial offices of the journal SSHA and the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. But at 2225 hours the guard at the SSHA editorial office smelled something burning and called the fire service. The first fire truck arrived at the site five minutes after the alarm call, followed by a further 40 emergency teams. The fire was extinguished at 0248 hours.

Casualties were not avoided. GITIS [V.A. Lunacharskiy State Institute of Theatrical Art] student Oleg Bizin jumped out of a fifth story window from block No. 16/2 on Gorkiy Street during the fire.

The building housing the editorial offices of the weekly MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI suffered major damage, partly due to the fire but mainly resulting from water, foam, and fire-fighting operations. As luck would have it, only the chief editor's office remained intact and safe, and it was there that an emergency news conference was held.

"The cause of the fire has been established," Nikolay Ivanov, chief of Moscow City Fire Service, said. "The fire started at a rear entrance shared by all three adjacent buildings. It is more than likely that someone threw a cigarette butt onto a pile of cardboard boxes. Three firemen suffered serious injuries when the ceiling separating the fifth and sixth stories of the burning building collapsed. They have been hospitalized and their lives are not in danger."

"We are not ruling out the possibility of arson," Lev Belyaninov, deputy chief of Moscow Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration, expressed his opinion. "An investigation is under way."

"There will be no interruption in the newspaper's publication," MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Chief Editor Yegor Yakovlev said. "The building's restoration will take 18 months and will cost R5 million. We do not have this kind of money, and we are appealing for help from our readers, from Soviet and foreign enterprises and firms. Actually, we would be able to resolve by ourselves the problems caused by the fire if MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI were to finally become available on subscription in our country. Sociological studies indicate that, should this materialize, the weekly's print run would be about 15 million copies."

MOSCOW NEWS Describes Informal Groupings

LD1502003190 Moscow TASS in English 2100 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 14 TASS—According to various estimates, there are from 2,000 to 3,000 informal groups and associations with a total number from two to 2.5 million people in the Soviet Union, the MOSCOW NEWS weekly reports.

The major tendency in the past year was the expansion of the geography of informal movements. The development of popular fronts and movements activised in Uzbekistan, Moldavia and the autonomous republics and regions of Abkhazia, southern Ossetia, Daghestan, Checheno-Ingush and Buryatiya.

New spots marked the Soviet political geography—the Donetsk basin, Vorkuta, Volgograd and Petrozavodsk. Yaroslavl has become the capital of Russian informal movements and witnessed the establishment of the Popular Front of the Russian Federation.

Informal groups and associations can be divided into three major types: popular fronts, clubs, associations and societies, parties and party-type political associations.

The newspaper classified the movements on political and socio-political basis into patriotic, workers', socialist, social-democratic, ecological, monarchist, anarcho-syndicalist and religious.

PRAVDA Views Party's Vision of Socialism

PM2002200190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Our Ideal Is Humane, Democratic Socialism"]

[Text] Our ideal is humane, democratic socialism. This is stated in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th party congress. This assertion is not a routine imposition of an image of the future, of guidelines and schemes alien to reality, as used to happen in the past. This ideal grows out of the present, out of our life. It is organically linked with the revolutionary perestroyka of socialism. Step by step we have approached a fuller and more comprehensive realization of what we have built and what we are restructuring.

The ideal of humane, democratic socialism is a result of the party's intellectual work underpinned by an analysis over many years of the natural laws of social development and by the creative thinking of the classics of Marxism. This work received a new boost after the Central Committee April (1985) plenum. Its important landmarks were the 27th party congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, the Central Committee January (1987) and February (1988) plenums, and M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka."

In this way the party has come to comprehend the purpose of perestroyka and to specify the main "parameters" of the new aspect of socialism, the new qualitative state of society. Priority in this work belongs precisely to our party and its progressive forces. Thus, this program formula—humane, democratic socialism—is the result of radical changes in our country, of the fundamental shifts in public awareness engendered by perestroyka.

In today's confusion in minds and in the heat of debate it is sometimes possible to encounter a denial of the socialist idea itself and a proclamation that it is "incongruous" with human nature and is the fruit of the speculative constructs of theoreticians who are out of touch with life. But can an idea that is centered on the person and his comprehensive material, intellectual, and moral development in a society freed from exploitation and oppression really be alien to people? Now that the socialist idea is being subjected to attacks, the overwhelming majority of Soviet people retain a sincere allegiance to the values of socialism, which have deep roots in the people's experience and common sense and in the age-old dream of a better life and social justice. Our ideal is not "dreams beyond the clouds," not "castles in the air." The more keenly we feel the discrepancy between the proclaimed ideals and the far from "ideal" reality, the more we sense the need to define what we want to achieve in the course of perestroyka.

Our ideal is not socialism "in general" but precisely humane and democratic socialism. This clarification is necessary because for decades we attempted to pass off as socialism its simplified and distorted image and to identify the authoritarian-bureaucratic system and Stalinist deformations with it. Today we are reviving the scientific and moral first principle of the socialist idea and seeking to really turn socialism from a utopia into a science and practice.

The draft platform clearly states that we are not satisfied with what we resolutely reject. Underpinned by the ideological legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, guided by the reference points outlined by them, and adhering to the positions of the working class and all working people, we renounce the simplistic class-based approach contrasted with the values of the whole people and of the whole of mankind. We say a resolute "no" to the total statization of social life, to the authoritarian-bureaucratic system, to arbitrariness and lawlessness, to undeserved privileges. We are revising our views on socialist ownership and commodity-money relations and abandoning all forms and methods of administration and management which give rise to man's alienation. We are changing our attitude to nature. We are rejecting stereotypes in respect of other working people's parties which make their contribution to the progressive development of countries and peoples. In short, we are casting off ideological blinders and callused dogmatism and seeking to be "enrolled" in the context of progressive homegrown and world theoretical thought.

Of course, it is not so simple to portray the look of the future, even the near future, in all its details. One thing is clear—it will be a quite different society. It will take shape as a result of perestroyka, under conditions of democracy and scientific and technical progress, and will be based on the traditions and the humanist values not only of our country's peoples but also of all mankind.

The idea of socialism as we understand it today is, above all, the idea of freedom. Freedom underpinned by man's reason, by the humanist notion of the rights of the individual living among other people and of freedom which has nothing in common with anarchy or with mercenary and profitable willfulness but which is organically linked with the ideas of commonality and collectivism. Only not barracks collectivism but that which gives a person support and new strength. Humane,

democratic socialism will create a society which is conscious of the integrity of civilization and nature and in which man is the end in itself of history.

The party will really place man at the center of social development, the draft platform emphasizes, and will ensure for him worthy living and working conditions, social justice, political freedom, and opportunities for the all-around development and spiritual flowering of the personality. Recognition of personal freedom as the chief asset in life and a resolute shift toward ensuring the whole package of citizens' rights are the most important gains of perestroyka. A policy has been adopted of building a rule-of-law state, and everything is being done to consolidate human rights and to give them a sound material, juridical, and political foundation. In a state governed by law the individual and the citizen's dignity must be respected, the inviolability of his dwelling and property must be ensured, and law and order and the requirements of the Soviet laws must be strictly observed.

The right to work and to a pension, free education and health care, and other social benefits which first appeared on Soviet soil have become the property of every civilized society. The draft platform states that we will continue along this road. The guarantess of our right to work will continue to be strengthened, including ensuring labor remuneration in accordance with the quantity, quality, and the end result. The party will uphold freedom of creativity and the attitude toward talent as a national asset, man's free self-determination in the spiritual sphere, and freedom of conscience and of religion. The development of education, science, and culture remains a priority.

The document sets as one of the chief tasks that of persistently striving to strengthen and develop the economic and social rights of Soviet people and to enhance their well-being. Concern for those social sections and groups of the population which need priority assistance and support from society occupies a special place in this context.

An essential feature of socialism is the assertion of the genuine power of the people. Party policy proceeds from the recognition of the sovereign will of the people as the sole source of power. Important steps have already been taken away from the authoritarian system toward a democratic one. The top organs of power have been formed on new principles and approaches. The perestroyka of the structure of all state organs and the transfer of power to the soviets have to be completed.

Our state's future depends to a large degree on how interethnic relations take shape. "Barracks socialism" deformed them in many ways. The party sees the main way out of the difficulties which have arisen in this sphere as lying in the consistent implementation of the economic and political reforms and in the full realization of the principle of federalism. The key principles here are unconditional observance of the rights of a citizen of any nationality throughout the country's territory; giving real expression to the union republics' sovereignty and a new level of independence of all kinds of national autonomy; preservation of the integrity of the country as a federation of free and equal republics voluntarily delegating some of their rights to the union for the sake of achieving common goals.

An ideal loses real ground if a person forgets or disdains his own history. Love of the motherland, historical awareness, and patriotism are signs of a people's health and vitality. It is important to take care of one's spiritual heritage. We have on our side the traditions of our great homegrown culture and the democratic and revolutionary values stemming from the antiserfdom peasant revolts, from Radishchev and the Decembrists, Herzen and Chernyshevskiy, Russian social democracy and the national liberation movements. We have on our side loyalty to the choice which our country's peoples made in October 1917.

The principles of humanism and democracy and the priorities of panhuman values are becoming an increasingly organic part of the party's foreign policy activity, too. This policy based on the new thinking has already yielded positive results. The world is being freed from the fetters of confrontation, and important steps have been taken in the matter of disarmament, toward the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. The danger of a world military conflict has lessened. But a long and hard path must still be traveled to realize the ideal of mankind's peaceful future. The draft platform charts very important landmarks on this path.

The party is assuming a great responsibility by designating humane, democratic socialism as its goal. The radical perestroyka of society on these principles is a unique opportunity for real advancement along the path of progress.

Yeltsin Rules Out Running for Soviet President

AU2002163690 Paris AFP in English 1555 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 20 (AFP)—Maverick communist deputy Boris Yeltsin Monday ruled out running for the position of Soviet president, "under current circumstances", if the post were created as planned by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Mr. Yeltsin has announced that he is a candidate for the presidency of the Russian Federation, the largest Soviet republic, in elections to be held next month. But "in the current situation, where the bureaucratic system has not been dismantled, and where the party still has a monopoly, I am not a candidate for the position of president... of the Soviet Union," the former Politburo member told reporters at the Soviet parliament with a smile.

The Communist Party's platform adopted by the policy-making Central Committee earlier this month provides for the creation of a strong Soviet presidency. A bill on the presidency was distributed Tuesday to some deputies

here, including to Mr. Yeltsin, but it has not been officially submitted to the Supreme Soviet, or parliament. Last week, the Supreme Soviet set up a commission to look into the presidential proposal, rebuffing Mr. Gorbachev who said the need for a president with sweeping powers was now urgent.

Moscow Crime-Solving Rate Improves

PM1402145990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by S. Borisov: "Petrovka 38 Reports"]

[Text] The Moscow Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] Internal Affairs Main Administration has summed up the outcome for 1989.

A total of approximately 20,000 crimes were recorded in the city. A crime was committed by 61 in every 10,000 Moscow inhabitants. In comparison with 1988, 5,000 more offenses were cleared up.

Major economic crimes have become more frequent. Last year there were 19 (in 1988 there were only three). One of these was the criminal case against workers at the Stupinskiy Metallurgical Combine. They tried to sell a cooperative approximately 70 tonnes of strategic raw materials—titanium—for a bribe of 145,000 rubles.

Last year 155 racketeers were neutralized in Moscow, along with 13 criminal groups who robbed foreigners at Sheremetyevo Airport.

30 Kg of Drugs Seized in Moscow in December

LD1602152490 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] The antinarcobusiness campaign in the Soviet Union has been gaining momentum. Over the last few months, groups of drug traffickers have been arrested across the country. During a raid in Moscow in December, drug dealers surrendered about 30 kg of narcotics. More than 80 smugglers have been brought to trial. Soviet customs officers—helped by their opposite numbers in Belgium, Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands—have confiscated more than 11 tonnes of drugs over three years.

CPSU Central Auditing Commission Meets

PM1402093790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Feb 90 Single Edition p 7

[Unattributed report: "Session of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission"]

[Text] At its session held 7 February 1990, the CPSU Central Auditing Commission discussed the results of the commission's work in 1989 and its tasks for 1990, with which the Central Auditing Commission [CAC] members were familiarized beforehand.

Opening the session, A.A. Nizovtseva, deputy chairman of the CPSU CAC, noted that the February (1990) Plenum which examined the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress was an important political event in the life of the party and the country. Provisions from this platform and decisions from the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum will form the basis of the commission's work in the precongress period.

The report on the CPSU CAC's activity in 1989 stressed that the Bureau had concentrated CAC members' efforts on the implementation of the commission's 28 November 1988 decisions on activating and deepening restructuring processes in auditing work, strengthening discipline and order in the party, and broadening glasnost in auditing work.

It was noted that the CAC's work schedule for 1989 has been fulfilled. During the course of the year, over 20 questions were examined at three sessions of the commission and ten sessions of the CAC bureau. Among them was progress in the realization of proposals made by commission members on the question of improving the CAC's work in accordance the requirements of the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference and the results of a check of the work done by the editorial boards of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and STROITELNAYA GAZETA and of the journals PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN and AGITATOR on examining workers' letters, statements, and complaints. The following were examined in detail: the results of analysis of republic, kray, and oblast party organization auditing commissions; the results of a check of the educational, production, financial, and economic activity of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences and the CPSU Central Committee "Plakat" publishing house; the work of the CPSU Central Committee General Department's information and reception system; the CAC's preparation measures for the 28th CPSU Congress; and other questions.

The CAC Bureau gave serious attention to an analysis of the execution of the party budget. It was noted that in the past period the CPSU Central Committee, in accordance with the 19th All-Union Party Conference provisions and local party organizations' proposals, had adopted measures to extend the rights of party committees as regards spending CPSU budget resources. The importance of a measure such as the allocation of funds from the party budget for the needs of primary party organizations was stressed. At the same time, the CAC Bureau turned its attention to the substantial underexploitation of funds by local party organizations. The existence of a large number of deficiencies in the execution of the party budget was also pointed out. Previously noted deficiencies in the payment and accounting of party membership dues and in the use of financial and material resources by many party committees and their institutions and organizations had not been eliminated.

One of the reasons for this is that, unfortunately, the level and essence of the activity of many auditing and

control commissions and auditing commissions does not yet meet the requirements, and auditing work lacks glasnost. This is perceived particularly strongly in the execution of the local party organizations' budget and the financial and economic activity of party committees, and it is provoking justified reproaches among communists. In this connection the CAC Bureau deemed it necessary to step up methodological assistance to local party organizations' auditing-and-control and auditing commissions, regarding the improvement of their work as one of the basic elements in developing intraparty democracy.

Proposals sent in to the CPSU Central Committee by a group of CAC members and chairmen of local party organization auditing commissions had been aimed at the improvement of control and auditing work in the party and the renewal of the CPSU Statutes.

The report noted that, with a view to extending glasnost with respect to using CPSU budget resources and the state of affairs in the party Central Committee subdivisions and institutions and organizations within their jurisdiction, as well as to improving their work, the CAC Bureau had regularly informed the CPSU Central Committee about the results of audits and checks carried out. Material on the commission's activity had been regularly published in IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS, PRAVDA, and other publications.

The CPSU CAC work schedule for 1990 (until the 28th CPSU Congress) was ratified at the session. The main direction of work will be to activate the commission's members' participation in implementing measures to renew the party on the basis of decisions adopted at the February (1990) Plenum, to deepen the processes of democratization of intraparty life, and to strengthen discipline and order. The focus of attention will be the preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress, work on the CAC accountability report to the party congress, and participation in elaborating a concept for control and auditing work in the party and the relevant documents, proposals, and the draft of the new CPSU Statutes.

An organizational question was also examined at the session. I.A. Shinkevich, chairman of the Trade Union of Railroad and Transport Construction Workers Central Committee, was elected a member of the CPSU CAC Bureau.

Zagladin Cited on New Presidential Role

PM1502093490 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 10 Feb 90 p 13

[Interview with CPSU International Department First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin by correspondent Ezio Mauro; date place not given]

[Text] Moscow—"We are on the eve of a historic change of course. The Soviet Union is about to become a presidential republic." Vadim Zagladin is the president's man, and from his office in the Kremlin, next to the head of state's, he planned and followed the great institutional operation that is transforming the leader of a party into the the leader of the country. At the same time, he has witnessed the sacrifice made by the CPSU, which is relinquishing its leading role in Soviet society and asking parliament to amend the Constitution to open the way to a multiparty system. "I have been a CPSU member since 1955, that is, for over 30 years. So I can understand the dismay of many comrades at such a radical change for the party. Yet even an old communist like me has no doubts: The time had come when we could wait no longer, and the option for pluralism is unavoidable in the USSR of perestroyka."

[Mauro] Dr Zagladin, why has Gorbachev decided to request full presidential powers right now, in the fifth year of perestroyka?

[Zagladin] It was decided not just by him, but by the Politburo, and now the Central Committee, too. Then, after the CPSU congress, it will be up to parliament to consider it. We believe that this step can now no longer be delayed, as has been shown by the experience of the last year, during which Gorbachev became chairman of the Supreme Soviet as well as general secretary.

[Mauro] Is this not already a presidential post, as leader of the USSR, not only of the CPSU?

[Zagladin] It is, but its nature, role, tasks, and powers are different from those that Gorbachev needs now, at a time such as that in which we are living. A year ago, Gorbachev expressly chose to become president not of the Soviet Union but of parliament. There is a profound difference, and even though Gorbachev does head the state, the difference between the two posts is primarily one of roles. Now we can say that it was not a correct decision, because the post forces the leader to lead parliamentary proceedings and to attend virtually all sessions of the Soviet, which thus takes up much of his time and effort.

[Mauro] So is it a matter of releasing Gorbachev from his parliamentary tasks so as to return him to a more general kind of leadership?

[Zagladin] Yes, but that is not all. We have realized over the past year that there are situations in which somebody has to make important decisions immediately, and he has to be able to do so without waiting for parliament to convene. So it is necessary to invent a constitutional figure that can decide and intervene on the state's behalf, while of course parliament retains its right to monitor his actions. Last, in the international context, too, there remained a disparity between the institutional status of our leader and that of other international figures. Of course Gorbachev fully represented the USSR both in Malta and in Rome, but officially as head of parliament, whereas he was dealing with heads of state. It seems to me that these reasons are enough to justify an urgent change.

[Mauro] But it is not merely a superficial change, because it could alter the nature of the Soviet system. Can it be said, on the basis of the draft congress platform, that the USSR will become a presidential state like France or the United States?

[Zagladin] If we want to use international constitutional terminology, I would say that it is necessary to speak in terms of a presidential republic. For the time being this is just a project, and its definition is up to parliament. But the model is fairly similar to the French and American one, with a few corrections that take account of our country's specific characteristics.

[Mauro] Will the new president be elected by the people, thus breaking with communist provenance from the Politburo, by means of a parliamentary vote?

[Zagladin] We have assessed the various existing systems, but have received a great many proposals for having the president elected directly by the citizens. In any case, we all know that the president of the Unite States or France constitutionally has greater power than the president of the Italian Republic or the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany). This is exactly what we want: To give powers to the president so that he can decide. This power must be based on the people.

[Mauro] Is it not also a way of separating Gorbachev from the influence of the Politburo and of the forces within the party?

[Zagladin] Yes, it is also a way of separating Gorbachev from any kind of influence. For instance, he must also have a right of veto, which he does not have now, in order to block parliamentary legislation in special instances envisaged by law.

[Mauro] Will the sudden emergence of a multiparty system not also make it necessary for Gorbachev to separate the two posts that he now combines, thus relinquishing the CPSU general secretaryship in order to become president of the USSR?

[Zagladin] This is a very definite problem, and one that we are discussing. Of course the leader of a party can become president of a republic. But if the system does become pluralistic, with several forces at play, then we must have someone to act as an arbiter leading the state. So when a party leader is elected head of state he represents the nation and no longer an individual political force. So after the congress Gorbachev will in all likelihood be chairman of the party and president of the USSR. But a separation of the two posts is by no means ruled out: In any case their combination is not required by either the constitution or the party statutes.

[Mauro] Why has the CPSU suddenly decided right now to give way to pluralism, having opposed it until very recently?

[Zagladin] I will answer you as I do when people ask me why perestroyka was born in 1985 and not before: Simply because it was necessary, and inevitable, at that point. The same applies here. There are now many movements that act as proper potential parties. It is necessary to acknowledge the real situation and to realize that the communists will have to struggle for power and accustom themselves to forming alliances and coalitions with other forces.

[Mauro] Gorbachev's speech announcing this change mentions the need to recognize parties acting within the constitutional sphere. But the present constitution is that of a state which has hitherto been led by a communist dictatorship and which in any case is by definition "socialist" and "Soviet." Can parties that do not identify with this political blueprint—such as a Christian democratic or liberal force, for instance—be formed?

[Zagladin] I really do believe so. The only obligation is observance of the constitution, in the sense that subversive forces are unacceptable. That is all. We have adhered to the approach the exists every where else, in other countries.

[Mauro] Does the platform reject private ownership?

[Zagladin] It accepts personal ownership, even of means of production.

[Mauro] Is Gorbachev stronger following this plenum?

[Zagladin] Yes, definitely. There was certainly a tough battle at the plenum; it was not definitely not easy. But it was decisive. Perhaps we really have moved on from democratization to democracy.

[Mauro] Are the main adversaries now the radicals or the conservatives?

[Zagladin] The conservatives. Somebody said at the plenum that in a while we will probably have two communist parties in the USSR—a more moderate one and a more progressive one: Why not?

Regional Affairs

Estonian 'Geneva-49' Body Aids Draft Evasion

PM2102103190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[TASS correspondents A. Maloveryan and A. Kharchenko report, including interview with military prosecutor Colonel A. Gladilin: "Estonia: So Where Next?"]

[Text] The newspaper VECHERNIY TALLINN has published a report that Tallinn City Soviet has adopted a decision—supposedly in accordance with the Law on the Principles of Local Self-Government and the Code of Laws on Labor of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—to judge inadmissible the participation of its executive organs in the draft for active service in the USSR Armed Forces and to declare invalid the previously adopted decisions of the city soviet executive

committee which obliged enterprises, establishments, and organizations to assist in carrying out the draft campaign in the republic.

At the request of the TASS correspondents military prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. Gladilin comments on this report:

The decisions adopted contradict the requirements of the USSR Constitution and the Estonian SSR Constitution, as well as a number of other legislative acts. Thus, the republic Supreme Soviet resolution of 6 December 1989 "On the Organization of Military Service for Estonian SSR Citizens" pointed out the need to avoid excesses as regards questions connected with the USSR Armed Forces. And indeed the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On a Historical and Legal Assessment of the Events Which Took Place in Estonia in 1940" did not entail suspending the operation of previously adopted normative acts which possessed legal force in the republic.

The decisions on questions of military service adopted by Tallinn City Soviet, as well as by Tartu, Yygevas, and a number of others, also contradict the Estonian SSR Law "On the Principles of Local Self-Government," to which they refer. After all, article seven of this law directly points out that activity within the limits established by the laws of the republic falls within the competence of the organs of local self-goverment.

Officials' disrespect for the law is giving rise to disrespect for it among citizens also. The military prosecutor's office is now having to check up on several servicemen who, believing in the justice of the unlawful action on the part of individual officials and leaders of so-called organizations for the struggle against "the occupation forces" (as they have started calling Soviet Army and Navy units stationed on Estonian territory), have tried to avoid military service. In a word, these people have committed acts that come under the articles on military crimes.

During and after the fall draft campaign the military prosecutor's office repeatedly informed the Estonian SSR Prosecutor's Office about instances of draftees failing to show up at the military commissariats. However, no measures were taken against the "objectors" either by prosecutor's office organs or by internal affairs organs.

The "Geneva-49" committee has declared itself one of the main "fighters" against the "occupation regime." At its Tallinn headquarters you can if you wish obtain a "professional" consultation on methods of avoiding military service.

Tarmo Kivi, who comes from Payde, and who has had criminal proceedings instituted against him (he went AWOL from his place of service in Kaliningrad and turned up in Tallinn, where he appealed to "Geneva-49" for "assistance"), testified during questioning that when he asked Yu. Liym, one of the "Geneva-49" leaders, whether he should report to Major General R. Pyder, the republic military commissar, Liym advised him not to do so but to hide up at the homes of friends or acquaintances and not to return to his unit on any account.

Kivi now deeply regrets the fact that he met this "helper" and took his advice. The soldier's family also regret it—his mother, and his wife and year-old child. Tarmo's fate is being decided not by "Geneva-49" but by a military tribunal.

Altogether in the fall of 1989 over 100 draftees who were sent draft papers failed to arrive at military commissariats in Estonia. This is a serious signal for the territorial law-enforcement organs, but their attitude toward the activity of the "Geneva-49" committee, which is inciting young people to commit crimes, is still one of extreme complacency.

Estonian Communist Youth Union Rules

90US0517A Tallinn MOLODDEZH ESTONII in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 3

[Draft Estonian Communist Youth League Rules]

[Text] The Estonian Communist Youth League is an independent, voluntary social and political organization of the youth of Estonia, uniting young people for the purpose of the actual transformation of society for the realization and defense of the interests and rights of the youth.

The KSME [Estonian Communist Youth League] understands communism as actual movement toward the establishment of a society in which "The free development of each is a condition for the free development of all" and advocates the building in Estonia of humane, democratic socialism.

The KSME sees as the basic principle of its activity man's full and free development, the revelation of the creative capabilities of the personality and the creation of the appropriate conditions for this.

The KSME is a part of the political system of the republic and organizes its work in accordance with the ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution and current legislation.

The KSME has its own program and rules, independently decides all questions of its internal arrangement and functioning, determines the procedure for forming its elective bodies, creates the normative basis and has its own budget. The KSME is part of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] and recognizes the program and rules of the VLKSM, which were formulated with its participation.

The KSME organizes its relations with the Communist Party on the principle of the total independence of the Youth League. These are relations of comradeship, allies, and partnership based on the ideological proximity of program aims and community of political values and goals.

The KSME strives for the realization of its program tasks and prescribed goals by political methods and has the right:
of legislative initiative;
to nominate candidates for deputy to the legislative authorities and organs of local self-administration of various levels;
of publishing activity.
The KSME cooperates with republic, regional, All-Union, and international organizations on the basis of affinity of programs, platforms, and interests.

I. Principles of the Organizational Composition of the KSME 1. The basis of the organizational composition, life, and activity of the KSME are the following principles:
a) the electivity [vybornost] of all executive bodies, top to bottom;
b) delegation of rights upward;
c) periodic accountability of the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] authorities to their organizations and the organizations' notification of the higher authorities of their activity;
d) respect for and defense of the rights and interests of the majority and minority;
the majority acting on behalf of the organization and using its resources and the priority of the majority at the time of elections of the executive bodies;
the minority's defense of its own position, appealing to the higher authorities and public opinion and the minority's right to organizational self-determination up to and including separation;
e) the binding nature of the decisions of the higher authorities for the lower authorities if adopted within their jurisdiction as determined by the rules;
f) collegiality in decision-making, collegiality in the work of all organizations and authorities and the personal responsibility of members of the KSME for the utilization of the occupation they have assumed.

2. Assemblies, conferences, and meetings of committees of the Komsomol of primary organizations, conferences, plenums, and meetings of the bureau of territorial and functional organizations and congresses, plenums, and Bureau meetings of the KSME Central Committee are competent if they are attended by no less than half the members of the organization, delegates, or members of the elective body.

3. A decision is considered adopted if more than half of those present have voted for it.

4. A year following the election or at the demand of no less than one-fourth of the members of the organization (executive body) a vote of confidence in the leader of the organization and the members of the elective body is conducted.

5. The KSME is composed on a territorial-production and functional basis:
The primary organizations are created according to the place of work, study, and residence (territorial-production basis) or according to the principle of community of interests, political platform, and professional and social characteristics (functional basis).

The primary organizations located on the territory of a single rayon or city may unite in rayon and city Komsomol organizations.

Primary Komsomol organizations formed on a functional basis may unite according to the territory and form their executive bodies, becoming a separate structural entity of the corresponding territorial organization.

An organization uniting primary organizations on a territorial or functional basis is the higher organization in relation to all the organizations constituting it.

6. Komsomol organizations of all levels may have their own symbols.

II. Members of the KSME and Their Rights and Duties

7. Any young person aged 14 to 30 who recognizes the KSME Rules, participates in fulfillment of the KSME Program and pays his membership dues may be a member of the KSME.
8. A member of the KSME is a member of the VLKSM by virtue of membership in the KSME.
9. Members of the KSME have a Komsomol card and a Komsomol badge.
10. The question of admittance to the KSME is discussed and decided by the primary organization on the basis of the personal application of the enrollee. A decision is considered adopted if no less than two-thirds of the members of the KSME who participated in the ballot voted in favor of it. On the basis of the decision of the primary organization the territorial body of the KSME issues the enrollee his Komsomol papers.

11. Membership in the KSME may be terminated:
a) by a member of the KSME at his own request after he has notified the primary Komsomol organization of this and handed in his Komsomol card;
b) in connection with attainment of the age limiting membership in the KSME (note: membership in the KSME by KSME members who have reached 30 years of age may by decision of the primary organization be extended on the basis of their personal application);
c) in connection with expulsion from the Komsomol.
12. A decision on the expulsion of a member of the KSME from the KSME is adopted by the primary organization by two-thirds majority vote.
13. A person expelled from the Komsomol retains the right to lodge an appeal with higher Komsomol authorities within a two-month period. The appeal is examined by the Komsomol authorities within a period of no more than one month following the day it was received.
14. On the basis of a decision to reinstate membership in the KSME, the KSME territorial authority issues the person who has been reinstated in the Komsomol his Komsomol card.

15. A member of the KSME has the right:
to elect the primary organization in whose work he wishes to participate or to be an individual member of the KSME;
to nominate, elect, and be elected to Komsomol bodies of any level;
to discuss at assemblies, conferences, congresses or meetings of executive bodies, and in the youth media any issues, submit proposals, and openly express his opinion and defend it;
to criticize and evaluate the activity of any Komsomol body and any Komsomol member, regardless of the office he holds;
to personally take part in discussion of the question of his activity or behavior and appeal to a Komsomol body of any level;
to address questions, applications, and proposals to any Komsomol body and obtain an answer pertaining to the point of his appeal;
to obtain information at the disposal of the Komsomol authorities;
to the protection of his civil rights by the organization;
to petition the organization on his candidacy for organs of state and public self-administration;
to assistance in the realization of his interests in the sphere of policy, culture, economic activity, and leisure time;
to avail himself of the organization's property in the established procedure;
to participate in the activity of other public and political organizations and movements whose principles and activity are not in conflict with the KSME Program and Rules.

16. A member of the KSME is obliged:
to fulfill the requirements of the KSME Rules;
to participate in the accomplishment of assignments determined by the KSME Program;
to propagandize the ideas of the program documents of the KSME;
to be tolerant of those expressing their opinion;
to contribute to mutual understanding between inhabitants of Estonia of different nationality;
to display concern for the authority of the KSME and the fitting replenishment of its ranks.

III. KSME Primary Organizations

17. The political and organizational basis of the KSME are the primary Komsomol organizations—self-determining youth organizations uniting for the defense and realization of their interests and rights.
18. The decision to create a primary organization is adopted by a constituent assembly of no less than three KSME members and is registered in the executive body of a higher organization.
19. The highest authority of the primary organization is the general assembly or conference of KSME members of this organization, which elect the Komsomol committee and (or) secretary. The Komsomol committee (secretary) organizes all the current work of the Komsomol organization. The primary Komsomol organizations may elect a control commission.

20. The primary organization has the right:
to decide all questions connected with membership of the KSME;
to elect the higher organization within which it prefers to work;
to determine the forms of activity and its own structure and budget;
to elaborate and adopt its own action program and status which are not in conflict with the KSME Program and Rules;
to nominate its representatives for the higher and executive bodies of the organization, give them instructions, make inquiries, receive reports and, if necessary, recall them;
to be a body corporate and engage in economic activity in the procedure determined by law;
to engage in publishing activity and have its own news organs;
to participate in the administration of state and public affairs in accordance with current legislation;
to examine questions connected with a recommendation from members of the KSME for enrollment in the Communist Party, in accordance with its normative documents.

21. In its day-to-day work the primary organization is guided by the KSME Rules and Program, the decisions of its assemblies and conferences and the decisions of higher (the highest) Komsomol authorities.

IV. Rayon, City Organizations

22. Rayon and city organizations of the KSME are created by a decision of the primary organizations.
23. The highest body of the rayon and city organization is the conference, which determines the procedure for forming a committee and league commission and determines their rights and duties.

24. The rayon and city organization:
independently determines the structure and mechanism of administration of the organization;
admits to and expels from it primary organizations;
elaborates and adopts its own action program and its status not in conflict with the KSME Program and Rules;
nominates its representatives to the highest and executive bodies of the KSME, gives them instructions, makes inquiries, receives reports and, if necessary, recalls them;
is a body corporate and engages in economic activity in the procedure determined by law;
engages in publishing activity and has its own news organs;
participates in the administration of state and public affairs in accordance with current legislation.

25. The rayon and city organization organizes its work proceeding from the KSME Program and Rules and guided by the decisions of its conferences and higher Komsomol authorities.

V. The KSME Central Authorities

26. The highest body of the KSME is the KSME congress.
27. Congresses of the KSME are convened by a plenum of the KSME Central Committee at least once every three years. The convening of a congress and the procedure of its work are announced not later than three months prior to the congress.
28. Special congresses of the KSME are convened by a plenum of the KSME Central Committee in accordance with a decision of the KSME Central Committee or Komsomol organizations uniting no less than one-third of the membership of the KSME.
A special congress is convened within a period of two months and is deemed valid if no less than half the members of the KSME are represented at it.
29. The KSME congress representation quotas are determined by a plenum of the KSME Central Committee. The procedure for the election of delegates to a KSME congress is determined by the city and rayon KSME organizations.

30. The KSME congress:
determines the general policy line and immediate tasks of the KSME;
adopts the KSME Program and Rules and makes alterations to them;
receives, discusses and confirms reports of the Central Committee and Higher League Commission;
elects the KSME Central Committee first secretary;
approves the KSME Central Committee second secretary according to the proposal of the KSME Central Committee first secretary;
confirms the authority of members of the KSME Central Committee elected from territorial organizations and elects part of the members of the KSME Central Committee;
forms the Higher League Commission (HLC) and approves its representative;
decides other questions of significance for the activity of the organization.

31. The executive body of the KSME is the Central Committee.
32. A Central Committee plenum meets at the decision of the KSME Central Committee Bureau or one-third of the members of the Central Committee as necessary, but at least once every three months.

33. The Central Committee:
is guided in the period between congresses by the work of the KSME;
determines the specific paths for realizing decisions of the KSME congress;
realizes the right of legislative initiative;
represents the KSME in state and public organizations;
exercises relations with foreign organizations;
forms the KSME Central Committee Bureau and KSME Central Committee Secretariat;
reelects the KSME Central Committee first secretary and members of the KSME Central Committee elected by the KSME congress;
approves the structure and lists of staff of the KSME Central Committee machinery;
decides questions concerning registration of the lower organizations;
convenes the KSME congress and KSME conference and determines the time, venue, and delegate representation quotas;
adopts a decision on holding a Komsomol referendum;
examines and approves the KSME Central Committee budget;
decides questions connected with utilization of the property and material values belonging to the KSME Central Committee and the expenditure of financial receipts from the activity of enterprises belonging to the KSME Central Committee.

34. Members of the Central Committee are elected:
no less than 90 percent, by direct delegation from the ranks of delegates to the congress from the territorial organizations registered in the KSME in accordance with one representative from every full two percent of the numbers of the KSME within a given territorial organization, but no less than one representative each;
up to 10 percent, by the KSME congress directly.

35. Any Central Committee member may be recalled at the decision of the territorial organization which delegated that Central Committee member.
36. For leadership of the work of the Komsomol between Central Committee plenums the KSME Central Committee forms from Central Committee members a Central Committee Bureau. The Bureau incorporates the first and second secretaries of the Central Committee.
37. The KSME Central Committee Bureau does not have the right to adopt decisions within the province of the KSME congress and the KSME plenum.
38. The KSME Central Committee first secretary is elected on a multi-choice basis by secret ballot for no more than two terms in succession. The Central Committee first secretary is a member of the Central Committee and Central Committee Bureau and heads the Central Committee Secretariat.
39. The executive body of the KSME is the KSME Central Committee Secretariat.
40. The KSME Central Committee Secretariat is approved by a KSME Central Committee plenum in accordance with a proposal of the KSME Central Committee first secretary for the performance of current work and leadership of the KSME Central Committee apparatus.

VI. A Republic Komsomol Referendum

41. Is held at the decision of the KSME congress and plenum of the KSME Central Committee or on the initiative of Komsomol organizations uniting no less than one-third of KSME members for the solution of most important political and intra-league problems.

Is competent to make changes to the KSME Program and Rules.

VII. The Republic Komsomol Conference

42. Is convened by a plenum of the KSME Central Committee in the period between KSME congresses for the solution of urgent political and intra-league problems of the Komsomol. The procedure for organizing the conference and the delegate representation quota are determined by a plenum of the KSME Central Committee. The republic Komsomol conference may make changes to the KSME Program and Rules.

VIII. League Commissions

43. For the exercise of control functions league commissions are formed in the KSME. The work procedure of the league commissions of the Komsomol organizations is determined by the "Regulations" approved by the pertinent Komsomol body.

44. The League Commission:
examines questions concerning the registration of the lower primary organizations and submits its findings for approval by the executive body of the organization;
exercises supervision of the course of the election of the highest and executive bodies of the KSME of its level;
exercises supervision of fulfillment of the decisions of conferences (congresses) and committees of the Komsomol;
exercises supervision of the activity of the executive body and the utilization of material and financial resources of the organization;
examines appeals of KSME members;
has the right to veto a decision of the executive body of its organization prior to examination of the question by the executive body of this organization.

IX. Material-Financial Base of the KSME

45. Monetary resources, buildings, installations, and other material values are the property of the KSME.

46. The city and rayon and also primary organizations which are part of the KSME have the right of possession, use, and disposal of that part of KSME property assigned them in accordance with these rules.

47. KSME organizations in the shape of their elective bodies (the KSME Central Committee, the Komsomol city and rayon committees, and the Komsomol primary organization committees) are bodies corporate, have an independent balance sheet and meet their obligations with the property and monetary resources which, in accordance with USSR and ESSR legislation, may be exacted.

48. For the accomplishment of their program tasks the Komsomol authorities may create enterprises and other economic organizations. The procedure for the creation, functioning, reorganization, and liquidation of Komsomol enterprises is determined by the KSME Central Committee on the basis of current legislation.

49. Given the self-determination of a minority within the framework of the KSME, the question of the division of the organization's property is decided by the highest body of this organization.

50. The monetary resources of the KSME (property and resources of a Komsomol organization) are formed from membership dues, money received from Komsomol organization activities, income from tourist-excursion and foreign economic activity, and deductions from the profits of publishing houses and publications and enterprises and economic establishments of the Komsomol, and other forms of activity. Voluntary contributions received from Soviet and foreign citizens, foreign, national and international organizations, the work force and state, cooperative and public enterprises, organizations and establishments, and other sources may also form KSME (a Komsomol organization) budget revenue. The primary Komsomol organizations independently determine the amounts of monetary resources employed for their needs.

51. The KSME budget is formed upward on the basis of the budgets of the primary, rayon, and city Komsomol organizations. The monetary resources of the KSME are spent on purposes determined by the KSME Rules and Program.

52. The amounts and procedure for the payment of membership dues are determined by the KSME congress. Dues are paid by a member of the KSME to the primary organization in accordance with the place where he is registered and are the property of this primary organization and are spent in accordance with its decision.

Members of the KSME with no income and also those on maternity leave or on leave to care for a child are exempted from the payment of Komsomol dues.

53. Members of the KSME who are simultaneously members or candidates of the CPSU also pay Komsomol membership dues.

X. Termination of the Activity of the KSME

54. The activity of the organization may be terminated:
a) in accordance with current legislation;
b) in the event of termination of the activity of all primary organizations;
c) by decision of a congress according to the results of a Komsomol referendum, in the course of which more than three-fourths of KSME members voted for a termination of activity.

55. The activity of the KSME is terminated by a liquidation commission which is appointed by the congress and which hands over KSME property to the organizations, establishments or enterprises whose activity most corresponds to the program aims of the KSME.

Estonian Daily Editor Explains Resignation

90UN0940A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 13 Feb 90 pp 3-4

[Article by S. Tarakanov: "A Risky Swing"]

[Text] Tallinn—Following the publication of the first article by Sergey Tarakanov, "Prescriptions for the 'Indigenes'" (RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 21 January 1990), which reported that the author of these notes had been approved as correspondent of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Estonia, puzzled calls were received in the editorial office: Something is wrong here—he is known in journalism circles and among readers also as the editor of the republic paper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. This is all correct, this is what he was even recently, but was forced to voluntarily quit this responsible position. S. Tarakanov recounts today the principles which motivated him to take this surprising step.

Political processes in Estonia are developing rapidly. Like mushrooms after the rain, public movements, associations, alliances, and parties have appeared and are springing up on the wave of perestroyka. Political pluralism has become a reality. Finding one's way through the diversity of programs, declarations, and statements which these public forces are engendering in an inestimable quantity is not easy.

In this complex situation what should be the appearance of a party newspaper published in Russian? What position should it adopt? The newspaper was constantly being rebuked for misunderstanding this or that, explaining things wrongly and so forth. It was assigned the role of translator into Russian and reprinter of material from Estonian papers. It was accused of all sins. This, for example, is what E. Vetemaa, secretary of the Writers Union Party Bureau and ESSR [Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic] writer emeritus, said in an interview with the newspaper VECHERNIY TALLINN:

SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA is the Russian-language organ of the ECP [Estonian Communist Party] Central Committee, but frequently acts counter to the line of the Central Committee and disorients its readers here and outside of Estonia. The Central Committee is not exercising sway over its organ. This problem should have been resolved at least a year ago. Our relations with the non indigenous population would not then be as they are now, although they are not as bad as is being loudly proclaimed."

A serious charge, don't you agree? But it was heard within the context of a report on the decision of the Estonian Writers Union primary party organization concerning a suspension of its work prior to the ECP congress.

In keeping with these opinions, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA should have unconditionally adopted positions close to those of Ennu Vetemaa and urged the total independence of the ECP, sweeping other viewpoints aside. Although he knows full well that a debate is under way in the newspaper on the future of the ECP, which presupposes a pluralism of opinions. As far, however, as the "unfit" editor of the newspaper is concerned, this is not new for me. I recall that the writer T. Kallas was irritated by the position of Deputy Tarakanov at a session of the Supreme Soviet, when the matter of the official language was being examined. He observed at that time that "Tarakanov personally has no language problems so it is not a question of nationality." So what, then, are there are no more people for me to worry about since I myself speak Estonian?

It is time we understood that the newspaper reflects what is happening in reality. If we are unwilling to see and hear the dissent and the discordant interests, we will return to the deception and the myth of universal love and mutual understanding, whose sorry consequences we perceive today. I have repeatedly asked myself: Do we have real pluralism? Are we capable of accepting and understanding the viewpoint of this opponent or the other, even if we do not care for it all that much? If this is so, what is preventing us from working calmly, freely, and in an atmosphere of respect and benevolence?

Alas, it is just such an atmosphere which I have not perceived of late. We could not mechanically copy the Estonian press nor had we the right: We had our own audience and our own readers. Of course, account also had to be taken of the national mentality and the specifics of the region. Or, crudely put, the following apportionment: some "For tallinn," some "For Moscow". Adequacy of information here is usually understood as presenting one fact or another in Russian publications in absolutely the same way as in the Estonian papers.

But the root of this problem lies in the structure of the Russian-language press as it exists currently. Even in terms of volume it is not in a position to cater to the requirements of all readers. Nonetheless, the editorial office endeavored to provide individual translations from the republic and city newspapers, published lessons in Estonian and ran a history and geography series. However, because of the increased politicization of public life in the republic in recent times, it was unable to perform its cultural and educational function normally. Recognizing this, we repeatedly raised the question of the need for the publication of a weekly supplement to the paper. Such a decision was adopted by the ECP Central Committee in 1988, but it remained unimplemented.

And how, for example, could we cover in the republic the activity of the public movements which had come into being? When on the wave of Estonians' growing national self-awareness the vociferous People's Front emerged, the newspaper benevolently reported this to its readers. The child grew up to be a sturdy fellow.

It was pampered by the print and electronic media of the republic. And although signs of an unbalanced character

came to be displayed increasingly often in the behavior of this child, the press was stubbornly reluctant to notice this. Finally, some central newspapers resolved to take the People's Front to task somewhat. They were immediately accused of failing to see the forest for the trees and were for this reason covering events in the republic tendentiously. Journalists of the center did truly have their "oversights," but there was also an accurate depiction of the symptoms of a carefully concealed illness. However, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA had only to touch on this highly ticklish subject to be showered with rebukes: "stagnationists," "fanning interethnic discord," "conducting a purposeful campaign of falsehood...," "call the Russian-language press to order," "start new newspapers translated from the Estonian...". And all this with appeals to the ECP Central Committee.

It is now clear what the past assurances of the People's Front's concerning full support for the ECP and its leadership were worth. In a word, we in the editorial office were once more persuaded of the soundness of the policy which had been adopted in respect of the actions of the People's Front leaders. But maintaining this attitude was difficult—the leadership of the Central Committee and the republic did not particularly approve of our guardedness and "carping".

A similar metamorphosis occurred with another public organization also—the Estonian Union of Labor Collectives (STKE) uniting workers of enterprises and organizations of local jurisdiction at which Estonians work, in the main. This had been formed as an economic organization, but subsequently, under the influence of the People's Front, rapidly became politicized. At a workers' assembly held at the end of last year the STKE proclaimed as the ultimate goal of its activity an independent democratic Estonian state and the nonviability of Soviet socialist partnership.

The Estonian National Independence Party (PNNE) entered the political arena with its cards face up. Its goal is restoration of the independent state which existed up to 1940. The method of achieving the goal is the creation of citizens' committees locally, which are urgently registering people who resided in the Estonian Republic prior to the June revolution of 1940 and their descendants and also those who wish to be "citizen candidates". The main republic committee, which will prepare a congress of Estonian citizens and its legal recognition internationally, has been formed. This congress is intended to proclaim the creation of a new state.

The programs of the Christian Democratic Union, the Society for the Protection of Monuments of Antiquity and certain other political associations practically coincide with that of the PNNE.

The newspaper has familiarized its readers with the positions of this bloc of political forces, having published for the elections to the local soviets a series of interviews with the leaders of the organizations, and expressed its attitude toward their election platforms. The editorial office attempted to conduct an argument with the PNNE. But the official viewpoint was such: Inasmuch as the People's Front has opposed this party and its allies, the Communist Party should not become involved in this struggle. Even less because the row concerning the citizens' committees is nothing other than a political stunt aimed at attracting to their ranks supporters of the national idea.

The newspaper's relations with the Intermovement (ID), United Council of Labor Collectives (OSTK) and the Republic Strike Committee, representing the interests of considerable numbers of the non-Estonian population, have taken shape in complex fashion. From the time of their emergence these associations acquired with the aid of the republic's mass media the labels "inter-Nazis," "Stalinists," "provocateurs," "conspirators," "semi-criminal elements". SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA was the first to publish ID and OSTK documents and to afford their leaders a chance to speak. Understanding full well here that in the person of certain supporters of the ID we were dealing with views and a consciousness shaped under the undivided sway of the command-administrative system. For this reason we accompanied the publications on this subject with commentaries which argued and substantiated their viewpoint. We saw the OSTK as a movement helping the consolidation of the working class and the technical intelligentsia around the ideas of perestroyka capable of practicable actions to strengthen the republic's socioeconomic potential. Subsequently, with the growth of confrontation, these forces joined actively in the political struggle and practically came together at the time of mass meetings and strikes. The latest action of the OSTK and the ID was to boycott the elections to the local soviets on the grounds that certain articles of the ESSR Election Act failed to correspond to the constitutions of the republic and the country. Together with the republic section of war and labor veterans and soldier-internationalists these organizations adopted a resolution on the formation of an autonomous region in the northeast of the republic and two rayons of Tallinn, where the Russian-speaking population lives, in the main.

The newspaper provided information on the course of events and made its pages over to the supporters and opponents of this bloc of political forces. As distinct from many other mass media, in our publications we avoided a condescending tone and gloating comments, showing the whole seriousness and possible consequences of the steps which had been taken. And in two words, the editorial office held firm when illustrating the activity of various political currents to center positions.

I have the feeling that I have in my observations been persistently attempting to justify the course by which we led the party newspaper in recent years. But if it was correct and was supported by the readers, why did I quit as editor? Where is the logic?

So, holding to the center. Does this mean for the newspaper always following in the wake of the Central Committee, whose organ it is? It seems to me that it does. But Yaak Allik, member of the ECP Central Committee Bureau and first secretary of the Vilyandiskiy Rayon Party Committee, for example, thinks otherwise. In an interview he gave last year to VECHERNIY TALLINN he praised the republic party newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL for the fact that "it reflects not the viewpoint of the Central Committee or some Central Committee leader but has quite a clear platform."

There are two viewpoints on a single problem, and there is also a mass of specific situations "to be filled in," as they say. I shall cite just one, the most striking, perhaps.

At an ECP Central Committee plenum last spring the secretary for ideology sharply and uncompromisingly posed the question of the priority of the indigenous nation on its territory. This idea became a part of party documents and legislative instruments. It was expressed in most concentrated form in Article 5 of the law "Principles of Financial Autonomy of the ESSR," which proclaims: "The direction of economic activity proceeds from the need to ensure the preservation of the indigenous nation on its historical territory as the principal subject determining political, cultural, and socioeconomic development."

The concern of the indigenous population for its future existence was shared by the SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA editorial office also. We understood that until a feeling of protection in their primordial home had strengthened in the Estonian people, no one in the republic could feel confident. This idea was reflected in the newspaper. On the other hand, we gave space to scholars who showed convincingly that the basis of the new thinking was unconditional recognition of the priority of values common to all mankind. The subject of this thinking is not only the nation but also the individual. How should the paper's position be seen in this case? Had it departed from the Central Committee line?

Repudiation of the idea of the unconditional priority of the indigenous nation was explained by the need for its replacement with a broader concept—the nation's right to self-determination. Under the conditions of the multistructure nature of Estonia's political life various viewpoints are united by the need to achieve the republic's genuine sovereignty. The ECP, for example, believes that the acquisition of independence is a complex and contradictory process. To achieve it it is necessary to create not only the legal foundations but also a dependable political, economic, and social base. But the varying understandings of sovereignty—from federation within the USSR to an independent state with a capitalist economic structure—make them mutually exclusive. It is here, in my opinion, that we run into the brick wall....

The confusion of minds and political sentiments could not have failed to have been reflected in the situation in the ECP also. A multiparty system has in practice taken shape and is operating in the republic. Under these conditions many communists are proceeding from the fact that the ECP needs to fundamentally reform itself and that its own program and rules and complete and unconditional party independence are needed. If the ideas of the ECP prove close to those of the CPSU, cooperation is possible.

Other communists believe that the principle of democratic centralism in the party should be revised toward a broadening of democracy and the independence of the communist parties of the union republics. The ECP is seeking Estonia's sovereignty within a renewed Soviet federation and considers itself an inalienable part of the CPSU.

These positions were confirmed in the speeches of communists at the ECP Central Committee 16th Plenum held last December, although the Central Committee Bureau report, "The Political Situation in the Republic and the Convening of the 20th ECP Congress," attempted to bring these positions closer together. In thesis form the ideas of the report sounded as follows: The vital interests of the people are higher than the interests of any party or group. For this reason the ECP confirms abrogation of Article 6 of the constitution; the Communist Party proceeds from the fact that there is in Estonia no one political force which would alone be capable of extricating Estonia from the crisis; the constitutional enshrinement of the diversity of political forces will create the legal grounds for the formation of coalitions adhering to close positions, and a new type of party which would operate under the conditions of political and economic pluralism is needed; in a future party there may not be complete unity of views, opposition is anticipated, different opinions will arise at the execution stage also....

What was an editor of a party newspaper, obliged to propagandize and explain the plenum's material, to do when the second position, to which the majority of Russian-speaking communists adhere, is closer to him? I confess that, after this, the decision to leave finally matured.

Now concerning a coalition of political forces adhering to close positions. It is in principle possible when the Communist Party itself is strong and it does not have to play the part of Cinderella in such an alliance. Precision of position is needed for this. After all, a political organization is judged by its program documents. The ECP action program submitted for discussion suits neither Estonian nor Russian-speaking communists. It is incapable of uniting party members and averting their split on national grounds. The Central Committee, as also, incidentally, the People's Front, lacks a positive Russian program. Attempts are being made to reduce disagreements to the ideological and psychological level. It was said at this Central Committee plenum that "the question turns generally on the perception of perestroyka and the democratization of society and the decentralization of power. Abandoning the ideal of the unitary state,

which has been rooted for decades, is not easy." And, further: "We would like to hope that the Russian Communists, who are disturbed by inward misgivings, will also overcome the psychological barrier which has arisen and understand the dialectic of the present worrying period. Estonia's sovereignty is needed not only by Estonians, it is needed by all who have linked their destiny with Estonia. Estonia's aspiration to sovereignty is simultaneously an aspiration to the renewal of our federation. If we think about this more deeply, no contradiction is revealed here."

But how are we to rid ourselves of inward misgivings if only the People's Front is declared a coalition ally? And inasmuch as they exist, I could not lead the newspaper in the wake of the Central Committee. But nor could I remain abeam of it. Otherwise the newspaper would have had to have either played the same tune as the People's Front or not repelled but expressed the opinion of the Russian-speaking communists. As a journalist and member of the ECP Central Committee, I could do this, as a newspaper editor, I could not.

A "Russian program" is not the whim of national feelings which have suddenly become carried away. It is, in my view, a vital necessity, by ignoring which we may lose all. We recall the political mass meetings and strikes and the boycott of the elections to the local soviets. Were they an offensive on the part of conservative forces? If so, is the majority of the Russian-speaking population opposed to perestroyka? I will never agree with this. The reasons go deeper. One of the main reasons is the absence of an effective mechanism for consideration and realization of the opinions of the minority. Such a mechanism is an inalienable attribute of any state which is in the least bit democratic. It was its absence which engendered the idea of the creation of a bicameral parliament, territorial autonomy, and elections on a production-outfit basis and was the consequence of the Russian-speaking deputies' walkout at the meeting of the republic Supreme Soviet session.

Incidentally, the esteemed deputies from the Baltic republics are acting temperamentally at meetings of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, demanding that the interests of the minority be protected. But they frequently ignore this demand back home in the republic. There is something to think about here.

Estonia has now been granted economic independence. Its embodiment in practice will mean the recognized work of the utmost intensity of all inhabitants of the republic. I am sure that only on an economic basis is it possible to overcome all the current disorders; however, this does not rule out but presupposes the existence of an effective mechanism for the consideration and realization of the opinions of the minority. And the support by this minority for the real aspirations of the Estonian people.

Article 42 of the draft press law, which speaks of the impermissibility of interference in the activity of the mass media, would seem very valuable in this connection. In my view, this article should operate without any restrictions. I therefore consider the supplement to it given by the group of USSR people's deputies unacceptable since it enshrines in practice the diktat of the founder or publisher in relation to the editorial offices and reduces to nothing the meaning and spirit of Article 42.

...Personal experiences and doubts have in my notes remained out of the frame practically. Little has been said also about the newspaper's relations with the Central Committee leadership. I am convinced that they should be built on the basis of benevolence and partnership and recognition of the editorial office's right to its own view, to its own opinion, even if this opinion is controversial. We did not always have such relations, unfortunately. There was, on the other hand, enough psychological pressure. But this is, as you know, a delicate business, like the ethics of human relations also.

Decree on Lithuanian Law on Parties

90UN0945C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 1

[Decree on draft law on political parties by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in Vilnius on 31 January]

[Text] Decree of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium on the Draft Lithuanian SSR Law on Political Parties:

The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolves:

1. To publish the draft Lithuanian SSR law on political parties in the newspapers TIYESA, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, and CZERWONY SZTANDAR for public discussion during the period up to 15 April 1990.

2. To instruct the working group which prepared the draft law to examine the proposals and observations received in the course of the discussion and, following their collation, submit them to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
[Signed] A. Brazauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
[Signed] L. Sabutis, secretary of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Vilnius, 31 January 1990

Lithuanian Draft Law on Political Parties

90UN0945B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 1

[Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet draft law on political parties]

[Text] The democratization of the political system of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] is possible only under the conditions of the functioning of various

political parties. Political parties unite a particular part of society for the accomplishment of general political goals and contribute to the formation and expression of interests and political expression in Lithuania.

Endeavoring to guarantee the equality of political parties in Lithuania and ensure that their activity be used to serve the goals of the creation and strengthening of an independent Lithuanian state and also guided by the generally recognized rules of international law, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet enacts and proclaims this law.

I. General Provisions

Article 1. Right to association in political parties.

Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR have the right to associate in political parties and participate in their activity. A citizen of the Lithuanian SSR with positive suffrage may be a member of a political party. Each Lithuanian SSR citizen may be a member of only one political party.

Article 2. Principles of the activity of political parties.

Political parties operate in accordance with the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and this and other laws and are guided in their activity by the statute (rules) of the party registered in the established procedure.

Political parties of other states and their organizations may not be formed or operate on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR. The founding and functioning of political parties is prohibited in the event of their proclaiming in their program documents or realizing in their practical activity ideas of racial, national, religious, class, or social exclusivity or enmity and methods of authoritarian or totalitarian control or the forcible seizure of power and conducting propaganda of war and also permitting a violation of human rights and liberties and implementing other ideas and actions contrary to the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and incompatible with the generally recognized rules of international law.

II. Creation of Political Parties, Suspension and Termination of Their Activity

Article 3. Creation of political parties.

For the creation of political parties in Lithuania it is essential that the party have not less than 500 members and that a congress or conference thereof confirm the statute (rules) and program and elect the executive bodies.

Article 4. Registration of political parties.

The statute (rules) of a political party is registered by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice.

The statute (rules) of a political party is registered by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice no later than one month following presentation if it is not in violation of the requirements of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of this law.

In the event of a refusal to register the statute (rules) of a political party, the founders are notified of this in writing within three days, the reasons for the refusal being given.

Changes to the statute (rules) of a political party are registered in the procedure determined in this article.

A political party and the organizations enumerated in its statute (rules) are a body corporate as of the time of registration of the party's statute (rules).

Article 5. Suspending the activity of political parties.

The activity of a political party is suspended by the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice in the event of it having breached the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and this or other laws.

In the event of the suspension of the activity of a political party, its executive bodies are notified in writing of the violations of the corresponding requirements of the laws perpetrated by the political party, and a time frame for the removal of these violations is determined.

Following an end to the violations, the political party notifies of this the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice, which within one month from the time the information is received authorizes the political party to continue its activity.

In the event of a suspension of the activity of a political party, it is not allowed to avail itself of any mass medium, engage in canvassing and propaganda, or participate in elections.

The activity of a political party may not be suspended for a term of more than six months. In the event of a political party, following suspension of its activity, once again within one year being in breach of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and this and other laws, its activity is suspended for one year.

Article 6. Termination of the activity of political parties.

The Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice has the right to terminate the activity of political parties in the event of their breaching the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and this law within one year following a repeat suspension of the activity of political parties.

Article 7. Appeals procedure.

A refusal to register the statute (rules) of a political party and the suspension or termination of its activity may be appealed in the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Court.

III. Guarantees of the Activity of Political Parties

Article 8. Political parties' freedom of action.

All political parties operate on the territory of the republic freely and independently. State authorities,

enterprises, establishments and organizations, and individual officials are prohibited from interfering in political parties' internal affairs. Persons impeding the operation of political parties are liable in accordance with Lithuanian SSR legislation.

State authorities, enterprises, establishments and organizations, and other political parties and also individuals are obliged to make restitution for material and moral damage caused a political party by unlawful actions.

Article 9. Limitation of political activity.

Persons serving in the Army and working in the internal affairs authorities, the procuracy, state arbitration and state control, and in the courts may not be members of political parties.

Persons serving in the Army or working in organizations listed in paragraph one of this article may remain members of a political party if they were members prior to the start of service or work in these organizations, but their membership in the political party is suspended for the whole period of service of work in these organizations.

A person whose membership in a political party has been suspended may not elect or be elected to the bodies of a political party and its organizations or also perform their assignments.

Article 10. Property of political parties.

Political parties may own buildings, installations, means of transport and production, and other facilities and also other property necessary for the accomplishments of the tasks provided for in their statute (rules).

The right of ownership of political parties is regulated by Lithuanian SSR legislation.

Political parties have the right to avail themselves of buildings and other property in accordance with a loan or lease agreement concluded with state and public enterprises and organizations and also with citizens.

Membership dues, income from production or other economic activity, money contributed by citizens and public organizations gratis, and also other income legitimately obtained constitute the resources of political parties.

Organs of state power and administration and state enterprises, establishments, and organizations do not have the right in any form or method to finance political parties and their organizations and also deputies or groups thereof representing political parties.

Article 11. Control of the financial activity of political parties.

Control of the financial activity of political parties is exercised by the republic's financial establishments. Political parties annually, but before 1 February of the coming year, submit to the financial establishments statements of their annual financial activity and also make public information on their income and expenditure.

Article 12. Right to participate in the election of organs of state power.

All political parties have equal rights to the nomination of their candidates for organs of state power and to participate in the elections.

At election time, candidates for deputy of all political parties are accorded equal opportunities for availing themselves free of charge of the press and other official mass media.

Article 13. Right to participate in the formation of organs of state administration.

Political parties have the right to participate in the formation of the Lithuanian SSR Government and be represented therein and also in local organs of state administration with regard for the number of deputies representing these parties in the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet or in local soviets of people's deputies of the republic.

A political party or a coalition of several political parties constituting a majority of deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet have the right to submit proposals pertaining to the candidates for chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

Article 14. Right to disseminate information concerning the activity of a political party.

Political parties have the right to disseminate unhindered in written, verbal, or other form information about their activity and to propagandize the ideas, aims, and program of the political party.

Political parties have the right to found a press and other mass media and also avail themselves in the established procedure of the press and other official mass media.

Article 15. Right to engage in mass activities.

Political parties have the right to conduct mass meetings, demonstrations, assemblies, and other mass activities in the procedure determined by Lithuanian SSR legislation.

Article 16. Collective members for the support of political parties.

Public organizations and movements, whose relations with the political parties are determined by their statutes (rules) and based on agreements, may be created and may operate under the auspices of political parties.

Article 17. Responsibility of political parties.

A political party which by unlawful actions inflicts material and moral damage on the state, its enterprises, establishments, and organizations, citizens, and other political parties and public movements is obliged to

make restitution for this damage from its property in the procedure provided for by Lithuanian SSR legislation.

IV. Final Provisions

Article 18. International relations of political parties.

Political parties have the right to maintain relations with political parties and international and other organizations of other states.

Article 19. Supervision of the activity of political parties.

The Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice exercises supervision of the compliance by a political party with the Lithuanian SSR Constitution and this and other laws.

The republic prosecutor and also other political parties have the right to appeal to the Lithuanian SSR Ministry of Justice on the question of the activity of political parties.

Democratic Organizations Meet in Vilnius

90UN0945A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 3

[N. Natalina report: "Far From Having Come of Age"]

[Text] Our capital has not recently had cause to complain about a shortage of events of a social and political nature. Congresses, rallies, forums, visits, meetings—the public does not have time to react to them all. Perhaps it was for this reason that the MADO (Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations) Conference held in Vilnius 2-4 February passed almost unnoticed. And this despite the stormy debate which distinguished the conference.

To my question concerning the representatives of which democratic movements attended the meeting the reply was that it was easier to say which did not attend. Indeed, democrats from 11 union republics, participants in various organizations of Russia, including the Russian People's Front, the Union of Constitutional Democrats, the Leningrad People's Front, the Democratic Party and others, work in the MADO.

The purpose of the meeting, as far as I understood, was the concordance of actions of democratic forces on the eve of elections and the formulation of a common election platform and action tactics. Do not wonder at the vagueness of my words. The point is that the democrats discussed a multitude of questions. Also on the agenda were such topics as the events in Azerbaijan and Armenia, "The Sakharov Story," problems of the Tajiks and Tajik-speaking population in Uzbekistan, and certain others—questions which are undoubtedly important but which, it seemed to me, are not that closely connected with the meeting's main topic.

This desire to "encompass the boundless" was ultimately reflected in the course of the entire conference, making it chaotic, talkative and ineffective.

It was not fortuitous, evidently, that Yu. Afanasyev, a member of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, who attended the MADO on 3 February, described the democratic movement in the country as porous and amorphous and as permitting, by virtue of this, the policy of the center to shift to the right.

Yu. Afanasyev said: "Many democrats view events in the Baltic as a fresh wind which should spread everywhere. The example of the decisiveness and resilience of 'Sajudis' is a path which very many people will have to take."

Who knows, such an opinion was, possibly, the reason why the conference was held precisely in Vilnius. But it really did lack, perhaps, both the resilience and purposiveness which distinguish "Sajudis" in its aspiration to the set goals.

Resolutions and documents were adopted as the result of the conference's work. But the main impression was most likely as follows: The country's democratic movement is still far from having come of age.

Sakalauskas Resignation Offer Not Accepted

90UN0930A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy report: "Resignation of Head of Government Not Accepted"]

[Text] We may put down as unprecedented the offer to resign of Vitautas Sakalauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, made at a session of the republic Supreme Soviet. Many critical remarks have been leveled at the government of late, and it has been accused of indecisive action in implementing the economic reform and defense of the republic's interests against the center. Quite a number of critical darts were fired at the Council of Ministers at the last "Sajudis" conference also. The day before "Sajudis" leader V. Landsbergis accused the republic's prime minister of a virtual betrayal of national interests.

In his statement Vitautas Sakalauskas said that his decision to resign was not just connected with the steep wave of criticism, which he considered prejudiced. Among the reasons for the deterioration in the economy, V. Sakalauskas believes, not the least part is played by the fact that Lithuania has in its model of economic independence put forward a number of maximalist demands whose solution is proceeding slowly, and precious time is being lost.

A considerable part of Sakalauskas' speech was devoted to the abnormal situation which has taken shape in the Council of Ministers in the relations of the leadership of the Council of Ministers with the Commission for Economic Reform headed by Kazimera Prunskene, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

A serious economic and political situation has taken shape in Lithuania today. Emerging from it is possible only through united efforts and rejected inordinate ambitions.

V. Sakalauskas emphasized that he did not accept extremes in policy and in the economy.

"I tender my resignation at a difficult time for Lithuania and my compatriots. I am doing so not because I am afraid of the difficulties. The situation is bad now. Far from the best times lie ahead of us also. I will not claim that we have not made mistakes but the republic government cannot be blamed for the deterioration in the situation. The only thing that can save us is work. So far everyone is involved in politics, work is secondary."

Of the 237 deputies present at the session, 62 votes were for accepting the offer of the chairman of the Council of Ministers to resign, 140 were against and 20 abstained.

Belorussian Party Boss Visits Collective

90UN0926 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 13 Jan 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Perestroyka Needs Acceleration"]

[Text] The Minsk Electrical Equipment Plant imeni V.I. Kozlov is not an ordinary enterprise. Its products are exported to 80 countries and meet the highest world standards. During the years of perestroyka labor turnover has decreased by almost half here, labor productivity has increased, and thousands of tons of rolled metal and millions of kilowatt-hours of electric energy have been saved. Where if not in a labor collective like this can one discuss the problems of the present day and the course of perestroyka in the republic? These were the subjects that became the leitmotif of the meeting at the plant between Ye.Ye. Sokolov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and the workers, engineers, and employees on 11 January.

On the whole perestroyka is going fairly well but there are still many problems. Moreover, the leader of the republic party organization noted, recently we have forgotten the main thing with which it began—acceleration. Acceleration of scientific and technical progress and the development of the economy and culture. At some point public opinion focused mainly on criticism of our shortcomings. But this deficit of criticism which is from the recent past has been largely eliminated. Today the words in the press and the word of the working man should be about what to do. We must return to the main thing—acceleration of economic development.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov emphasized that although the republic economy completed last year went fairly well, the rates of production of industrial and agricultural output have begun to lag behind the rates of growth of wages. One is alarmed by the outbreak of speculation, many industrial goods are being shipped out of the republic by middlemen, and the situation concerning the storage of agricultural products is poor.

The republic has begun to work under conditions of self-financing and self-management. We have already figured out the causes of the shortage of goods—beginning with refrigerators and color television sets and ending with ordinary nails. Even this year we are guaranteeing a sharp increase in their production and consumption—the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia noted.

The forthcoming growth in the capacities of the construction industry will make it possible even in the next few years to eliminate the shortage of construction materials and to increase the rates of upgrading facilities in rural areas.

During the course of the meeting with the plant workers a considerable place was devoted to social programs and concrete cases of their implementation were cited. Thus the plant for producing feed supplements for animal husbandry that was built in Drogichinskiy Rayon has been reprofiled to produce disposable syringes and needles. In Gomel Oblast the Ministry of Local Industry is arranging production of 200 million syringes. Production of medical preparations under foreign licenses is being set up. Concrete measures are being taken to increase the production of food and to increase the rates housing construction.

During the meeting with the collective of the enterprise Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, answered questions related to the growth of crime, the cleanup after the Chernobyl disaster, the situation in the Baltic republics, and relations with social movements.

Address to Ukrainians on Pogrom Rumors

LD1502164590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1516 GMT 15 Feb 90

["Address by the Ukraine's Procuracy and Interior Ministry to the Population"—TASS headline]

[Text] Kiev, 15 Feb (TASS)—The law enforcement bodies of the Soviet Ukraine are waging a struggle against the ill-intentioned spreading of rumors, aimed at whipping up interethnic dissension and enmity. The republic's Procuracy and Interior Ministry have called on the population through the mass media to help in unmasking persons who are spreading these fabrications.

Numerous calls to these organizations by citizens, concerned about rumors regarding possible pogroms in Kiev and other towns in the republic and alarmed by interethnic conflicts in a number of regions of the USSR, served as the basis for the appeal for help.

The Procuarcy and the Interior Minister do not possess any reliable information about pogroms and other crimes on a national basis being prepared, the address says.

It is reported that the procuracy of the city of Kiev has institued a criminal case and is carrying out an investigation into a fact of spreading provocative rumors in the republic's capital. Procurators locally are also being instructed to institute criminal cases and, jointly with the internal affairs bodies, to charge persons spreading rumor exciting the population.

The law enforcement bodies are watching [kontroliruyut] the situation and will take decisive measures in the event of it becoming really acute.

Ukraine Supreme Soviet Discusses Ecology

LD1602144190 Moscow TASS in English 1157 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Kiev February 16 TASS—By TASS correspondent Stanislav Volnyanskiy:

An extremely grave ecological situation, almost critical in some places, has developed in the Ukraine. This conclusion was drawn by the republic's Supreme Soviet which met here to discuss ecologic problems.

In his report, Ukrainian Premier Vitaliy Masol noted that the present state of ecology was closely linked with the Ukraine's historical and industrial development, structure and volumes of production.

The aggravation was also caused by serious shortcomings in the development and siting of productive forces, and industry's insufficient technological standards. There was ecological ignorance in many economic areas and at administrative levels for many past years. This led, for instance, to the exhaustion and degradation of arable land. Eroded areas reached 10 million hectares, almost a third of the republic's farmland, due to continuously boosted volumes of agricultural production and intensification of farming methods. The situation was gravely worsened by the Chernobyl disaster that upset the natural balance.

Masol said that the Ukrainain Council of Ministers, the local government and economic bodies began to devote much more attention in recent years to the solution of ecological problems. Many nature protection measures were taken. Almost eight billion roubles were spent on them during the past four years. Territorial environment protection plans were drawn up in several towns and districts where the ecological situation became threatening.

The Ukrainian Government submitted for parliament's consideration a package of proposals to improve the environment and enhance people's safety. These measures are to be carried out before 2005. According to preliminary estimates they will cost 20 billion roubles. About 15 billion roubles will be required to carry out a comprehensive programme to liquidate the Chernobyl consequences in the period up to 2000.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet then went over to the discussion of the report.

Complaint of Election Problems in Ukraine Rejected

LD1602145390 Kiev in UKrainian to North America 2200 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] A meeting of the Central Electoral Commission for supervising the Elections of UKrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies on 15 February examined the petition to the Presidiium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet lodged by USSR People's Deputies Dmytro Pavlychko and Yuriy Shcherbak regarding the application of certain clauses of the election law of the Ukrainiaan SSR.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium handed the petition to the Central Electoral Commission in order to elucidate the facts in accordance with the existing legislation. The commission's substantiated reply notes that the allegations in the petition that the central and regional electoral commissions had incorectly applied the election law during the registration of candidates nominated by the Ukrainian Language and Green World societies are groundless.

It was noted at the session that breaches of the law were committed during the nomination of candidates, by the two organizations as well. The commission concluded that the clauses in the law complained about are edited in a clear language and therefore does not see the end for the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet to discuss them again.

Demand for Resignation of Officials in Ukraine

LD2002141790 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Over the last two weeks stormy events have continued in Poltava oblast. As a result, the situation in the oblast has greatly changed. We have phoned Mykola Kulchynskyy, leader of the oblast branch of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka [RUKH].

[Begin Kulchynskyy recording] Today, for the first time in the past two weeks, no pickets will be seen outside the buildings of the party oblast committee and oblast soviet with posters demanding the resignation of the bureaus of the party oblast and city committees and of the oblast executive committee.

A mass meeting held there yesterday adopted a decision to stop picketing and to start forming [words indistinct] the city committee of self-government. And also this: If, before the week runs out, the party and government bodies refuse to come out with an answer, in accordance with the demand of Poltava residents an eight- hour strike will begin. The oblast branch of RUKH, together

with the public, is fully resolved to achieve the resignation of the bureaus of the party oblast and city committees and the oblast and city executive committees, that is, the resignation of people who have no moral right to occupy these posts. This is the stance of the entire population of the oblast. [end recording]

Ukraine Deputy Expresses Pessimism

LD2002131190 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet completed its work last Saturday. Here is how Petro Talanchuk, USSR people's deputy, reported its proceedings to his work collective.

[Begin Talanchuk recording] What did this session spotlight? Two very important points. First, the ecological question has turned for Ukraine into a question of life and death. [passage omitted] Second, it pointed to the falsity of our union. It has all the decorative attributes—the flag, hymn, coat of arms, individual republics. But none of us enjoys any rights. The central ministries just do what they like. They have ruined such a wonderful land as ours. These are two important moments. Therefore I think that this cry of our souls will produce nothing, the more so since many speeches at the session were delivered in Ukrainian. For so long we used Russian without any effect, now we hear Ukrainian and many deputies, I am afraid, probably did not understand much.

Therefore, to speak seriously, what we have to do is to take over sovereignty and hand it to a government elected by the people. Only then will things start changing. What we have now merely amounts to invocations and incantations and, as I see it, it will lead us to nowhere. [end recording]

Ukrainian Independent Trade Unionist Interviewed

AU2002123790 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 16 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Viktor Furmanov, chairman of the "Strajkom" Lvov Civil Rights Defense Committee, by Tadeusz Bialy; date and place not given: "They Are Less Alone Now"]

[Excerpts] [Bialy] What political position does "Strajkom" occupy in the Ukrainian Movement for Restructuring?

[Furmanov] The movement is a kind of coalition of independent organizations. "Strajkom," which is in itself a union of independent trade unions, is one of the most influential groups within the movement. Along with the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, it is one of the most radical groupings. [passage omitted]

[Bialy] To what extent is the situation in Lvov typical of the whole Ukraine?

[Furmanov] Lvov is the democratic movement's best organized center and provides something of a model for the whole Ukraine. On the other hand, this place has been ruled by a strong, cohesive post-Stalinist party-secret police mafia for years. There is cheap rabble-rousing from the highest podiums, the local press calls us extremists and "advocates of banditry," and the KGB has got its people everywhere.

[Bialy] What kind of organizational structure do you have?

[Furmanov] It is regional. Factory strike committees delegate two representatives to us (in writing, so as to avoid informers), and many civic associations, political and cultural, provide single representatives. Today, the 60-man committee is primarily made up of delegates from Lvov, but it also includes activists from Drogobych, Truskavets, and Yavorov. The focus is our current activities centers on the upcoming local government elections and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet elections, which will take place on 4 March.

[Bialy] How useful do you find "Solidarity" experiences?

[Furmanov] The situation here is different. It is also different from Lithuania. However, there are issues on which we are following the path that you took. We have, for example, already formed a "shadow cabinet." We will have to win elections sooner. Besides, I am running for election myself....

[Bialy] What do you for a living?

[Furmanov] I operate a lathe at the Lvov "Karpaty" furniture factory. We have already had our factory "roundtable," in July of last year.

[Bialy] A certain electrician from Gdansk has already blazed a trail. I wish you just as much success.

Mass Meeting, Tension in Poltava, Ukraine

LD0602133690 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] This evening pickets appeared outside the Poltava Oblast Party Committee and the oblast soviet. As we have ascertained, the pickets were formed by the local branches of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], the Ukrainian Language Society, and also by electoral clubs. We have managed to get in touch over the phone with Mykola Kulchynskyy, member of the Poltava Rukh council. Why have you resorted to this form of protest?

[Kulchynskyy] This form of protest was agreed at a 20,000 strong meeting held on 3 February in connection with the resolution that demanded the resignation of the party oblast committee politburo executive committee as well as of the Poltava party city committee and city soviet executive committee. We consider that during the perestroyka period, neither the oblast committee politburo nor the committee's organs have done anything to

implement those democratic measures that had been expected by the people of Poltava. They have not improved the economic situation of the inhabitants. This has led to tension in the city. One meeting was held, then another which passed a decision to start picketing. If this step will lead nowhere, then we, that is Rukh, the electoral clubs, and the Ukrainian Language Society will call on the people of Poltava to come out on general strike. No one here wants to live in the old way, people want changes, they want to believe that changes for the better will come.

The meeting has adopted an appeal to the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. May I read a few lines from it? Listen: The mass meeting in Poltava resolutely supports the restructuring under Gorbachev, the democratic forces of the CPSU and their efforts to liberate the country from the chains of Stalinist totalitarian socialism. We demand the resignation of the stagnant politburo of the party oblast committee and its first secretary, Comrade Myakota; the holding of democratic elections; and the removal of Article 6 from the Constitution.

KGB Debunks Postwar Ukrainian Nationalists

PM1402110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Sergey Tsikora under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "KGB Clarification"]

[Text] Kiev—Appeals for the rehabilitation of the Banderites, voiced of late at informals' rallies, have compelled security officers to say something about the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists [OUN] and its military formations—the Ukrainian Insurgents Army [UIA]. A press conference organized by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB was held in Kiev with this in view.

The Banderite movement represents a deep wound in the history of the Ukraine during the war years and the postwar years, which possesses what is more a considerable number of "blank pages." For many years our historians depicted the bands of Ukrainian nationalists operating in the Western areas of the republic as small, uncoordinated, disorganized gangs, when they were in fact well-trained, well-armed subunits modeled on the fascist SA storm trooper detachments. In the spring of 1945, according to KGB data, these formations numbered 90,000 men.

The tragedy of many rank-and-file UIA members, Major General V. Yevtushenko, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR KGB, said at the press conference, was that they joined UIA detachments to combat the German occupiers but were in fact deployed to fight the Soviet Army. The KGB has no information to confirm wide-ranging OUN and UIA operations against the fascists. The rumors now circulating that Ukrainian nationalist units fought their way almost to Berlin are false. Whereas OUN-UIA subunits did in fact fight Soviet power in the Western areas of the Ukraine to the death. Approximately 25,000 servicemen and law-enforcement personnel died at their hands after 1944. The Banderites organized the hunting down of party and soviet officials. The journalists were given the following figures: During the postwar years 30 rayon party committee secretaries, 32 rayon soviet executive committee chairmen and deputy chairmen, 37 All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League oblast committee and rayon committee secretaries, hundreds of deputies from oblast, city, and rayon soviets, and 50 orthodox priests were killed in the Western regions of the Ukraine by OUN members. More than 30,000 peaceful Soviet citizens died at the hands of nationalists in these regions.

"To imagine the Banderites as a kind of 'national liberation movement' combating the Stalinist regime would simply be to mock the memory of the patriots who fell at the hands of the UIA," Maj Gen V. Musiyenko said.

The press conference also raised a painful question in Ukrainian history, frequently raised now at rallies: the mass evacuation of people to Siberia from the Western oblasts of the Ukraine for aiding and abetting OUN-UIA detachments. According to archive material, 65,906 families—203,662 people—were evacuated between 1945 and 1951. Most of them returned home after serving their sentence. Questions of rehabilitation, sometimes raised by representatives of these families' subsequent generations, are being considered under the principles of the rule-of-law state—each case individually.

1930's Ukrainian Famine Documents Viewed

90UN0916A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Sergey Tsikora: "The Truth About the Famine of the 1930's"]

[Text] Finally the truth will be revealed about the tragic events of the Ukraine's recent past—the starvation of 1932-1933 which killed millions of people. It will become known from the authentic documents found in the archives by the scientists of the Party History Institute under the UkCP [Ukrainian Communist Party] Central Committee. These documents will be published this year by the Ukrainian Politizdat publishing house which has been asked to print a collection of research articles and archive papers dealing with those events.

The moral and political evaluations of the people's tragedy were given in the new decision of the UkCP Central Committee, "About the Famine of 1932-1933 in the Ukraine and the Publication of Related Archive Materials". From the documents it transpires that the immediate cause of starvation in the republic in the early 1930's lay in the mandatory application of the state grain procurement policy, with its large-scale repressions and fatal consequences for the peasants.

As early as the winter of 1931-32 the food situation in Ukrainian villages had become severe and in spring real hunger came to dozens of rural areas. But the Stalinist government kept intensifying the pressure on the republican party and authoritative organs to increase the grain supplies.

It has been proven that the authorities of the republic could not withstand the pressure and in reality they resorted to the type of policy that resulted in huge numbers of victims among the Ukrainian people. Decisions were adopted by the UkCP Central Committee and by the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] according to which the main emphasis in grain procurement was made on administrative and repressive methods. Itinerant court sessions were created in a hurry as well as special commissions—the so-called "four". The legal organs, the procuracy, the state security organs,—all got involved in the grain procurement business. Thousands of collective farm chairmen and council members, experts, party and soviet officials were arrested and convicted for the "connivance of the kulak sabotage."

However, in spite of all the repressive measures the republic failed to meet even the diminished target figures. Under those conditions the authorities decided to confiscate the seed, fodder, and food funds, a fatal action for the people. The archive materials confirm the tragic picture of the mass deaths from starvation and epidemics, especially beginning in March 1933.

The decision of the UkCP Central Committee contains three main resolutions resulting from the study of the revealing materials: "To recognize the starvation of 1932-1933 as a real tragedy of our people, the result of the criminal policy of Stalin and his closest helpers (Molotov and Kaganovich) towards the peasants. To condemn the unscrupulous grain procurement policy of the leaders of the republic of the time (Kosior, Chubar). To dissociate ourselves decisively from forcible and repressive methods as a means of resolving social development problems."

As one can see, everything falls into place with time. But how many people lost their lives in the process....

Ukraine Registers Antifascist Movement

LD1602193790 Kiev in English to North America 0030 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] The Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has registered the statute of the Ukrainian organization of the Antifascist Resistance Movement. It unites the efforts of its members in their activities for peace, stopping the arms race, disarmament, and consolidation of relations with foreign World War II veteran organizations which come out for security of nations and international cooperation.

Ukrainians Protest Effects of Chernobyl Accident

LD1902212290 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Now our correspondents Vadym Slipko and Lyudmyla Zadvorna will acquaint you with the 12th session of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet which is to discuss the ecological situation in Ukraine.

[Slipko] That this question is a very pressing one, I became convinced of on my way to the session this morning. Apart from deputies walking to the building of the Supreme Soviet, there were also dozens of people holding posters bordered with black ribbons, women wearing black kerchiefs, older men and children. Listen to a scene recorded on a tape.

[Begin recording] [Women shouting: Why, why such negligence? Why does no one want to see it?]

[Slipko] It is not easy for me to talk now with these people who, with this spontaneous demonstration, strive to catch the eye of the session. Almost all of them sigh out the painful word: Chernobyl.

[Unidentified woman] Here is our poster. Come and see in what conditions our children live. Here these markings show the state of the radiation background. Look here—exceeded, here—exceeded, here as well. For four years the mothers in Polesye have been weeping their eyes out, for four years we have been not able to get anywhere, they simply don't want to hear us, they don't. We've gotten tired of this indifference.

[Unidentified man] I am from Ovruch. The fourth year is with us and no one tells us why the illness rate is growing in our region as well as mortality. How can one explain all this. Our doctors keep telling us that something will be done. When? That's why I have come here. We hear that material assistance is arriving from Canada and the United States. But what is our government doing?

[Woman] What is most important to us is the life of our children. We, teachers, have come here from Polessk on behalf of all teachers and pupils of our rayon. The children are not well. They are seriously ill. How can our government look upon all this with cool eyes and keep sending to us one commission after another. We've got tired of this attitude....[passage omitted] [end recording]

[Zadvorna] I asked academician Paton to comment on these complaints.

(Begin recording] [Paton] We consider that the Chernobyl nuclear electric power plant has to be gradually closed, for it cannot go on like this. And no more nuclear power plants should be built in Ukraine, we already have too many of them. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Zadvorna] Some suprises cropped up at the session. Thus, Dmytro Pavlychko, USSR people's deputy, made

a statement that owing to the fact that certain representatives of public organizations, associations, movements, and collectives were refused registration as candidates to republican and local soviets, a group of USSR people's deputies from Ukraine is withdrawing their candidatures to the UKSSR Supreme Soviet. We should note, however, that this statement produced a diverse response at the session.

Archbishop Warns of 'Religious War' in Ukraine

AU1902151790 Rome ANSA in English 1235 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, February 18—The Soviet Union risks sliding into a religious war between the Uniate Catholics, whose stronghold is in the Ukraine, and the Russian Orthodox Christians, according to an interview with Archbishop Kiril of Smolensk published by the Roman daily, IL MESSAGGERO, here.

According to the daily, the archbishop, who is the Russian Orthodox Church's top spokesman for foreign relations, said the situation has been deteriorating since Uniate Catholics started the "violent occupation" of Orthodox churches.

The Uniate Catholics were disbanded by Stalin after World War II because of the Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis. Their goods were handed over to the Orthodox Church.

The problem has been one of the major stumbling blocks to relations between the Soviet Union and the Vatican. Negotiations between the two sides are still under way, but a statement from Pope John Paul II late last year indicated that he regards the Uniates' freedom of worship as more important than the return of Uniate property.

In the weekend interview, Archbishop Kiril noted that two have been slain by the Uniate Catholics in the Ukraine recently. "We've sent the Vatican the documentation on these facts," said the archbishop. "We say to the Roman Church's authorities, do something quickly before it's too late."

"We and the Vatican agreed that a joint Catholic-Orthodox commission would decide on the assignation of our communities' churches on a case by case basis," said the archbishop. "Now, the authorities are taking our churches away. They refuse to listen to us, and hand them over to the Uniates...."

According to the Russian Orthodox prelate, however, the "gravest thing is the violent occupations of churches" by the Uniates. "That is why I say that, if there is much delay, the situation may get out of control."

Asked how the Pope would be welcomed if he made his planned visit to the Soviet Union now, the archbishop said the Russian Orthodox Church would "welcome his holiness with honour, but the visit must close one page of history and open another."

Ukrainian Official on Religious Conflict

90UN0861A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by S. Tsikora: "A Path to Temples"]

[Text] A festive service in the square in front of the Cathedral of Resurrection in Ivano-Frankovsk ended with the traditional "Many years..." sung by several thousand people in honor of President M. Gorbachev and the pope.

This time, the solemn hymns marked not only the completion of the service but also the end of a protracted conflict into which the Orthodox and Eastern Rite Catholics were drawn. Negotiations with the representatives of religious communities, goodwill and understanding of the issues of the believers on the part of local authorities made it possible to resolve the issues which seemed to be unsolvable. Currently, both communities have their churches in Ivano-Frankovsk. By a resolution of the executive committees of the city and oblast soviets, the Cathedral of Resurrection was handed over to the Eastern Rite Catholics. A magnificent cathedral with splendid frescoes in which until recently a local museum was located will be returned to the Orthodox community.

N. Kolesnik, chairman of the republic Council for Religious Affairs, said: "I am convinced that this approach will definitely reduce the sharpness of opposition on religious grounds in some western oblasts of the Ukraine. Currently, we are involved in a search for fundamentally new ways to resolve the issues which we have never faced before. It turns out that, given certain discretion in handling them, you can redistribute places of worship; it is permissible to sign contracts for the use of churches, and discussing other sensitive issues with the communities is quite proper. This experience is valuable for developing future legislation which will lay the foundation for a legal solution to quite delicate issues of religion.

N. Kolesnik went on to say: "I think that progress in this matter will be greatly facilitated by the work done in the course of negotiations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church. Their representatives met in Moscow in the middle of January of this year. A number of recommendations for normalizing relations between the Eastern Rite Catholics and the Orthodox in western oblasts of the Ukraine were worked out. In particular, the thought that relations between the Catholics and the Orthodox should be developed on a new foundation turned out to be mutually acceptable. The abandonment of the union should become the first step in the endeavor of building this foundation. The union, conceived as a form of unifying the churches, still has not brought them closer together."

Our time has proven unambiguously that peace and mutual understanding between the people of different religions are found through dialogue and cooperation,

through giving them equal opportunities for their religious activities. This applies equally to the communities in question. They should treat each other with respect and keep in mind the main commandments of Christian teachings. Ukrainian Council for Religious Affairs Chairman N. Kolesnik said in summation that we have to remind them of this because in the heat of arguments, at meetings which are frequently held on the pretext of quasi-religious issues, the speakers are beginning to forget the basics of Christianity. However, there has not been a case yet when even the simplest issue of faith was resolved in a square or a stadium. Different approaches and a different requirement are needed for this. I am bringing up this banal truth only out of concern for the future because it is always easier to prevent a conflict on religious grounds than to subsequently resolve it.

Complaints From Religions Viewed in Ukraine

90UN0947A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 3

[Article under the rubric: "In The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers": "Respect for the Law Is Everybody's Duty"]

[Text] Recently the Ukrainian Council of Ministers has been receiving numerous complaints from religious people. The complaints tell about the violations of present laws on religious worship; there are stories of congregations being prevented from conducting services and of places of worship being occupied by somebody else. The follow-up on the complaints proved that such actions did occur in certain areas of the Lvovskaya, Ivano- Frankovskaya, and Ternopolskaya Oblasts.

The Ukrainian Council of Ministers considered the resulting tension in the above mentioned localities and it called upon the believers of all creeds—Russian Orthodox, Catholics, and others—to cultivate respect for the spiritual and moral values of the nationalities living on the territory of the Ukraine. They should behave with prudence and self-restraint. They should not follow those who demand freedom for some religious communities and deny that right to others, those who condemn the persecutions of the past but resort to violence themselves. Such people should be held responsible for their unlawful actions.

The local soviets of people's deputies, law-enforcing organs, clergy, and the most active parish members should do all they can to prevent any further worsening of the situation. This can be done only after a definite end is put to the confrontation, after both sides stop their mutual reproaches and insults, after they decide to resolve their problems solely according to the law and consider mutual interests in equal measure.

The government of the republic thinks that a disagreement born of religious differences might drive everybody into a cul-de-sac and provoke new confrontations. Therefore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine was requested to conduct a thorough investigation of all occasions when the existing state regulations on the use of places of worship were violated. They should also take steps to fully prevent similar occasions in future.

1st Church Paper Published in Ukraine

LD1402174890 Moscow TASS in English 1103 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] Kiev February 14 TASS—By TASS correspondent Vladimir Novak,

The first church newspaper in the Ukraine, THE DIOCESAN HERALD, has come off the presses in Ternopol, centre of [words indistinct] quite recently, but has already become one of the biggest in the Soviet Union: It unites more than 800 orthodox parishes, 320 of which were opened last year. This information is contained in the first issue of this new publication, which [words indistinct] 30,000 copies.

The newspaper will spread the faith and speak about the life and chores of believers. It will also publish different church messages, an orthodox church calendar and religious songs.

"The new newspaper gives us a great opportunity to bring people up in a spiritual and patriotic way," Archbishop Lazar of Ternopol and Kremenets said.

Ukraine's Voroshilovgrad Party Chief Resigns

PM1502143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general heading: "Plenums Held"]

[Text] Voroshilovgrad, 14 Feb—A plenum of the Voroshilovgrad Obkom [oblast committee] of the Ukrainian Communist Party has been held to examine an organizational question.

In connection with his submitted application the plenum relieved I.A. Lyakhov of his duties as first secretary of the obkom.

Ukrainian Informals Hit Over Lvov Demonstrations

PM1802212190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy report: "Lvov: Familiar Methods"]

[Text] For a number of days now the mood in Lvov and some other cities in the oblast has been one of euphoria generated by the rallies held there. The organizers of a rally at the university last Sunday seemed to want to discuss urgent problems—human rights, the religious situation in the region, and the erection of a monument to T.G. Shevchenko in the city. However, a balanced

discussion did not take place. V. Furmanov, chairman of the civic rights committee, blamed all the present ills in particular on the local administration. Hence his appeal to picket the party obkom [oblast committee] and demand its unconditional resignation. Admittedly, the representative of the "democratic bloc" disagreed with that conclusion. In his opinion, the situation in the oblast does not need actions prompted by rallies. Perestroyka is in progress. There must be a consolidation of forces on that path. However, his voice was not heeded.

Then on 13 February another crowd gathered outside the Lvov party obkom. In the center of the crowd was a portrait of S. Bandera. There were many yellow and blue flags and placards.

Well, it is up to each person's conscience what kind of flag he takes along to a rally. However... The placards categorically demanded: "Occupation forces out of the Ukraine!" and "Obkom Bureau—Resign!" The speeches were equally unambiguous.

Why is there this lack of trust in the apparatus? Why are people discontent? Furmanov again, addressing the crowd, declared that the pickets will remain outside the obkom until the leaders of the law enforcement agencies are put on trial for the events in Lvov on 1 October. But the prosecutor has published an official report which says who has been punished, why, and how. So why inflame an already difficult situation? Nor was there anything constructive in the speech by O. Bitovich, representative of the Ukrainian independent youth union, who stated that "every communist was, is, and will be the hated enemy of all Ukrainians." And a third speaker preemptorily demanded: Our guys must do their military service on Ukrainian territory alone; the time has come to form a Ukrainian national army.

Such appeals, furthermore, are being voiced not only in Lvov but in Stryy, Drogobych, and other population centers in the oblast. And in the process people are resorting not to dialogue but to open diktat. In Stryy they forced Lieutenant Colonel P. Talam, the city military commissar, to sign a document prohibiting military reservists from being sent to eliminate the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster and prohibiting draftees from being sent to do military service outside the Carpathian Military District. A similar event happened in Drogobych.

The ralliers often disregard not only common sense but also the existing law. They also refuse to listen to people whose opinions differ from their own. That could be seen outside the party obkom, too. Obkom secretaries V. Goncharuk, V. Dimitskiy, and O. Pilipuk went to answer the pickets' questions. However, they simply weren't allowed to do that. It seems that the informals are adopting methods familiar back in Stalin's time.

Interview With Ukrainian Academy President

90UN0814A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report on interview with B. Paton, president of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine and member of the CPSU Central Committee, by M. Odinets under the rubric "The Party and Perestroyka: Commemorating the 28th CPSU Congress": "Member of the Central Committee"]

[Text] For more than a quarter of a century Boris Yevgenyevich Paton has headed the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. It is a substantial obligation.... At the same time he is a member of the Central Committee of our party. And of course I found it interesting to learn how he manages to combine two functions so diverse as these seem to be.

"I do not see anything unusual in such a combination. The Central Committee and the party's other elective organs should not consider only professional party workers as their focus. And the fact that the Central Committee is made up of representatives of the various social levels and professional groups is, in my view, a necessary condition for its fruitful work and the competency of the decisions it makes. Of course when I am working in the CPSU Central Committee I give my attention most of all to questions which directly or indirectly affect the development of science and technology or the improvement of science's ties to production." [end bold]

[Paton] More than 37 years have passed since I first became a member of the CPSU. All these years I have been on the party register at the local Institute of Arc Welding, and I still take part in its work. I was elected to the party committee. This allowed me to be constantly in the circle of the collective's daily affairs—in other words, not to be parted from the land.

Our institute is a major scientific center. Many ideas and undertakings to consolidate ties between science and production have been born here. We try not to expect "manna from heaven" or any sort of stimuli or prepared recipes from above. We just work at our own pace to find optimum ways to resolve problems that come up. Such an approach also helps me when I take part in the activities of the CPSU Central Committee. There is no doubt that the experience and opinions of my colleagues at the UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences concerning issues of accelerating scientific and technical progress influence the formation of my positions and give me rich material for working out concrete proposals. In turn, reporting to the communists at the institute and the academy about the work at the Central Committee, I have the opportunity to explain new approaches and views concerning many timely problems.

[Odinets] At the time we now call the period of stagnancy, many opportunities in the realm of science and

technology were lost. Today this gives rise to very severe criticism. How fair is this in your opinion?

[Paton] Of course there are legitimate grounds. And all who were concerned with the development of science must bear their portion of the responsibility, including the members of the Central Committee. In all earnestness, I must say that even science did not manage to avoid the negative influence of those deformations that all the social structures suffered, including the party itself. As a result, as M.S. Gorbachev noted in his article "The Socialist Idea and Revolutionary Perestroyka," the country has remained as though in a past technological era. Basic research suffered in particular, and its results alone make up the foundation for technological innovations and for modern technologies themselves.

I will note that the majority of the ideas and undertakings coming out of the depths of our academy have received the support of the CPSU Central Party and Politburo. For instance, our proposals underlie the resolutions of the party and government concerning the creation of interbranch scientific and technical complexes. Although they are currently experiencing serious difficulties, we are just as convinced of their progressive character as before. It is only necessary to immediately improve the mechanism of their activity as applied to conditions of radical economic reform, and to properly use the unique possibilities of the MNTK [Interbranch Scientific and Technical Complex].

[Odinets] In other words, Boris Yevgenyevich, everything is not hopeless?

[Paton] The truth is that enterprising scholars who can think creatively in spite of the difficulties have achieved significant results both in basic research as well as in concrete development. But the whole problem lies in the fact that they are not in proper demand.

If we take the example of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, its efforts, I dare say, were of a certain benefit. At the risk of provoking ill will, the academy firmly defended its point of view on many difficult questions concerning ecology and the development of atomic energy. Construction at the Dunay-Dniepr canal and erection of the Chigirin and Crimea AES's [nuclear power station] were discontinued, partly in response to our recommendations. At the same time I must say that we did far from everything that we might have done.

[Odinets] Do you mean to say that the scholars, on instructions from above, deliberately substantiated false results?

[Paton] Frankly speaking, there were such instances. The pressures of conformism were such that even in scientific circles an inability to object turned into an ability to agree. This was especially obvious in the social sciences. Everyone knows what it led to. As a member of the Central Committee, I consider it my duty to help renew science and give it a fresh appearance.

[Odinets] What do you mean by a fresh appearance for science as applied to the UkSSR Academy of Sciences?

[Paton] First of all it, like the other academies, must in fact become an independent public organization bringing together the foremost scholars and leaders in the promising trends being explored at the academy's institutes. Academies must be granted complete independence to define the directions of scientific inquiry and to distribute without outside interference the resources allotted by the government for research. The life of the academy must be constructed according to the rules of its internal logic. Only then will the conclusions and recommendations of the scholars, as well as the examinations they conduct of large projects, be objective and free from partisan considerations. Both the government and the public have an interest for the most part in just this kind of science.

[Odinets] There is an opinion that economic reform is not being accompanied by the appropriate development of science or by an acceleration of scientific and technological progress. Is this true?

[Paton] Unfortunately it is. I would put it even stronger. The open lack of esteem for scientific and technological progress, which forms the background for economic reform, makes up a serious threat to perestroyka itself. In the pursuit of immediate results and the receipt of profits, many enterprises refuse to introduce the achievements of NTP [scientific and technical progress] and break down accepted relationships. This could make our lag in the realm of modern technology irreversible.

[Odinets] Boris Yevgenyevich, our conversation inevitably dwells on the problems of developing science and technology. But as a member of the CPSU Central Committee your activities probably go beyond this.

[Paton] Of course. For example, I also had the opportunity to take part in the preparation of proposals for implementing reforms of the political system of Soviet society. The commission prepared a concrete program for the first stage of political reform and began work on the problems of its consequent stages. I have also worked on other commissions of the CPSU Central Committee.

Like all communists, I am deeply troubled by issues concerning the development of interparty democracy, especially now that practical preparations for the upcoming CPSU Congress are underway. In this context, attention should be paid to the proposals of many communists concerning changes to the system for electing delegates to the congress. I am talking about granting the primary organizations the right to elect them directly. Apparently this issue could be discussed and decided before the congress adopts a new CPSU Charter.

I believe we should immediately introduce proposals defining the status of the members of the party's elective organs, including the CPSU Central Committee, into the text of the CPSU Charter. It is no secret that many

members of the Central Committee take part only in the adoption of resolutions that have been prepared beforehand. I believe we must concur with the opinion expressed in PRAVDA (20 November 1989) by K. Panov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and worker at the "Krasnoye Sormovo" factory, where, incidentally, I began my own work career in 1941. The time has most likely come to renounce the practice of adopting documents in the name of the CPSU Central Committee without a preliminary discussion by all the members of the Central Committee at the plenums or in the course of work. It is also appropriate to significantly narrow the circle of party documents classified for restricted circulation.

Transcaucasus Situation

Baku Radio Broadcasts Transcaucasus Events

Militia Hampers Crime-Investigations

LD2102112590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0204 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] We have informed our listeners of the explosion that occured on the Shusha-Stepanakert road. We mentioned that the passenger bus travelling between Shusha and Baku was damaged and there were women and children among many people who were injured. The operational investigation group of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has established that three fire extinguishers were filled with explosives and these devices were used in the destruction.

According to the leader of the operational group, local militia bodies are obstructing detection of crimes. Workers of the rayon internal affairs department are not engaged in pursuing and finding those who committed this and other crimes and do not pursue criminals in the rayons and villages where Armenians are living. Since there are no mutual relations between the law and enforcement bodies of the two republics, crimes like theft of the livestock of people living in the border rayons are not in fact detected. It can be said that nothing is being done to confiscate weapons.

Because of this and for other reasons, the operational group has to rely only on its own strength. Recently, in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] alone criminal proceedings started in nearly 60 cases. A thorough investigation is being carried out on these cases. Some of them have been referred to the court.

Smyslov Appeals to Residents

NC2102103790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Appeal by Lieutenant General Smyslov, military commandant of Baku City—read by announcer]

[Text] Esteemed residents of Baku, I am Lieutenant General Boris Konstantinov Smyslov, first deputy head of the USSR internal affairs troops. I have been appointed the military commandant of Baku City. After familiarizing myself with the life and the situation in the republic's capital, I have assumed my duties as of today.

I have come to know Baku as a city of workers and internationalist people. The republic's capital, which has fascinated everyone with its [word indistinct], hospitality, and friendliness, does not look like it used to. Internal tension continues to prevail. Educational courses are not being held at night. Signs of mourning recall the tragic days in January. In addition to Baku, other cities in the Soviet Union have also (?suffered).

Many write about the causes of the incidents which occurred in January as they know them. However, it is a fact that those who started the incidents regard themselves as a source of inspiration to the Azerbaijani people. In fact, they urge the people to engage in reckless activities. Time is needed to assess the incidents correctly. Everything will be clarified and all the (?ideological strategists), organizers, and participants in the activities which have brought disaster and catastrophe will be exposed.

The city commandant, district commandants, and law enforcement organs' assignments are not easy. Our main task is to work together with the workers, the party, and the soviet organs to protect the public order, maintain the security of the citizens, and restore work to normal. The troops are serving under difficult conditions. They are aware that the safety of the Baku residents depends on them. They are prepared to do everything to normalize the situation.

However, the problem cannot be resolved only through military measures. A united effort is required in that regard. Each and every resident of Baku must have a place in this difficult procedure.

Esteemed residents of Baku, in light of this, I urge you and the representatives of the steadfast forces of society to contribute in every way toward the settlement of this difficult problem. I am confident that this task is in line with your wishes.

This was the appeal to the residents of Baku by Lt. Gen. Smyslov, the military commandant of Baku City.

Situation in Baku Reported

NC2102113390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Report on situation in Baku—read by announcer]

[Text] Dear listeners, good evening! I wish to inform you of the general crime situation as of 20 February. According to criminal investigations, 253 criminal cases have been reported in the city. Fourty-five of these cases were serious crimes and 80 of them have been solved. Five deaths, 14 cases of theft of state property, three cases of robbery, 10 cases of serious accidents, and 82

cases of burglary have been uncovered. [Words indistinct] and two of the drivers who caused highway accidents have fled. An average of two cars have been stolen every day during this period [not further specified]. This indicates that preventive measures are insufficient. The investigation of the incidents reveal that anti-theft devices were not installed in the stolen cars.

Criminals used 700 rounds of ammunition from 13 to 17 January. In many cases personal property was stolen. We need the help of the city residents to investigate these crimes.

I appeal to the residents of Baku to urge them to fulfill their obligations as citizens. I also urge them to inform the internal affairs organs.

Two cases of theft of state property were recorded in the city during the day. Furthermore, two houses were robbed, three cars were stolen, and one person suffered serious body injuries. Criminal acts of hooliganism were also recorded. Military servicemen arrested 14 individuals for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree on the state of emergency last night. Another two were detained for violating the passport regulations and 17 for violating the curfew.

Two firearms and 2,000 cartridges were discovered and seized in the Narimanov district.

I wish to note that the military servicemen have confiscated 159 firearms since 20 January. I urge the citizens to surrender their firearms voluntarily. I also remind the citizens that those who do will not be liable to criminal charges.

A month has passed since the declaration of the state of emergency in the city. The internal affairs organs and the military servicemen detained 577 individuals for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree since then. Of these, 305 were detained under administrative procedure. A total of 295 individuals were detained for violating the passport regulations and 1,604 individuals were detained for violating the curfew. A total of 257 vehicles were impounded for violating the rules which apply to the checking and dispatching of vehicles.

The internal affairs organs are receiving information from the citizens in connection with the unlawful activities of the military servicemen. The people of the city wish to be informed of the outcome of these investigations. I announce that preliminary investigations are being conducted by the internal affairs organs. The compiled information is conveyed to the military procuracy of the Baku garrison for investigation. As also reported by the press organs, the procuracy of the committee for state security and the internal affairs organs are investigating the incidents which occurred during the mass disturbances in Baku from 13 to 20 January.

I conclude by announcing that the old curfew passes will not be valid as of 0000 hours.

Educational, Cultural Problems Examined

NC2002114490 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] What can be done to achieve the required level of work in providing cultural services to the people of the rayons which border the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], resolving matters related to the education and discipline of the children, and removing backwardness in those areas? These topics were examined at the meeting the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee held with the leading officials of the popular education and cultural organs in the Dashkesanskiy, Zangelanskiy, Kazakhskiy, Kel'badzharkskiy, Kubatlinskiy, Lachinskiy, Tauzskiy, and Khanlarskiy Rayons. The minister of popular education and the minister of culture briefed the meeting. [Words indistinct] addressed the debate during the meeting.

Instructions were given to the republic's state planning committee, state agroindustrial committee, and the Ministry of Finance for the development of the said fields.

Activity Platform Debated

NC2002122090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 17 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Workers in Sumgait have focused significant attention on the Azerbaijan Government's concept of its activity platform. The platform calls for measures aimed at extricating the republic from the existing situation and consolidating the economic work. The meeting held by the Sumgait party economic aktivs and the representatives of the city's work collectives and social organizations examined the concept. Gasan Gasanov, chairman of the Azerbiajan SSR Council of Ministers, participated in the meeting. Ismailov, first secretary of the Sumgait City Party Committee, opened the meeting.

The participants observed a one-minute silence in memory of those who were killed in the tragic days in January. A view was expressed that the [words indistinct] and the auspicious future of the republic will be the best monument to the martyrs. The speakers at the meeting said that Azerbaijan must be turned into a republic with a (?functioning) economy. They noted that the productivity of all the economic domains must be increased and the welfare of the people must be improved in order to achieve this.

The people of Sumgait have approved the measures to increase the material and humanitarian aid to the families of those who have perished, who have been wounded, and who have suffered.

The meeting participants unanimously agreed that the effective restoration of Azerbaijan's sovereign rights in the republic's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

[NKAO] and the Shaumyanskiy Rayon, in as short a time as possible, must be the government's primary objective. Gasan Gasanov explained the government work pending and noted in particular that the settlement of the most important problems of the Azerbaijani people depends primarily on the removal of the present crisis by the republic's workers and on the restoration of normal work in the republic. The work collectives in Sumgait, which is an industrial city, have an important role in this responsible stage. The meeting participants noted that every effort must be made for all the industrial establishments, construction organizations, and city administrations to resume planned work without exeception and the backwardness removed as quickly as possible.

Bus Services Restored

NC2002113990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] The movement of buses between Gendzha and Zangelan has been restored after a long interruption. The western section of the highway crosses the Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian extremists continue to obstruct the normal passage of vehicles. The movement of vehicles to Shusha, Mardakert, and Kel'badzhar has not yet been arranged. Buses are not moving between Gendzha, Nakhichevan, and [word indistinct]. People who want to go to these cities and rayons [words indistinct].

Drivers are also reluctant to travel to Shaumyanskiy Rayon. The buses in that rayon are not being allowed to drive to the rayon center and to the Azerbaijani villages. [sentence indistinct] The continuing strikes in a number of large establishments in Gendzha, including the textile weaving and [word indistinct] installations, the tailoring production union named after the 26 Baku commissars, the [name indistinct] factory, and in a number of other esablishments are seriously effecting the economy.

MVD: Situation 'Gradually Normalizing'

NC2102115790 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Report on situation in Azerbaijan—read by announcer]

[Text] The representative of the temporary press center of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry in Azerbaijan has reported that the situation in Baku and in the republic's other cities and rayons is gradually normalizing as a result of the measures being put into effect by the party, soviet, and law enforcement organs, the internal troops, and the USSR military servicemen, that is, with the help of the people, aimed at strengthening public law and order. Measures are also being taken with the help of the people to organize transportation services and to improve the work of the trade services, social livelihood establishments, and other social support departments.

The republic's people are greatly welcoming the measures taken to restore work in many of the industrial establishments and obstruct the unpopular activities of the individuals who provoke the workers and the employees into maintaining the strike. Many of the citizens of Baku helped the USSR internal units and the USSR military servicemen clean up the streets and [words indistinct] on Sunday.

The party and soviet aktivs, the internal affairs organs, and the political workers of the Soviet army held talks with the people today. Yesterday the internal affairs organs and the representatives of the border units held talks with the people living in the rayons on the Soviet border with Iran. The workers in the cities and towns are gradually realizing that the situation must be strengthened. In fact, they are angrily condemning the unpopular activities of the irresponsible individuals who try to disrupt stability and create undesirable incidents among the residents of various nationalities by spreading lies and rumors and by creating negative developments.

Two individuals were detained in Kazakhskiy Rayon on 18 February. A small caliber gun, shotguns and cartridges, [word indistinct], knives, and [words indistinct] were seized from them. The military servicemen seized [words indistinct] and a home-made explosive in (?Berdevan) town in Armenia's Noyemberyanskiy Rayon, which borders Kazakhskiy rayon, on 17 February. All of this is being investigated.

The operations and inquiry groups continue their work to determine the identities of those who have committed crimes and to make them accountable for their actions. Four individuals have been detained. They are suspected of committing crimes dealing with interethnic unrest. A total of 189 active participants in the January disturbances have been detained as a result of the measurese that have been put into effect. Intensive work is being carried out to identify and arrest those who have fled from the army and who [words indistinct].

The troops, which maintain the state of emergency regime, detained 38 individuals for violating the curfew regulations yesterday.

Military servicemen of different nationalities in other parts of the country are sending letters to the editorial offices of the local newspapers and to the military commandant's administration in Baku from [words indistinct]. They note that extremist elements visit the units they serve in to spread false rumors about the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia, trying to create a lack of confidence and a basis for interethnic discord among the military servicemen. In view of this, the military construction workers of the Transbaykal Military District have appealed to the citizens, families, and [word indistinct] of Azerbaijan and Armenia to urge them not to be carried away by these instigations and to ward off the extremists and the nationalists. They also noted that nothing can separate the USSR military forces, which are made up of Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and other nationalities.

The Azerbaijani naval personnel and aviation workers assigned to the red-bannered Pacific fleet have called on all the representatives of the peoples in Azerbaijan not to allow [words indistinct] extremist groupings and do everything possible to remove discord between the fraternal peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

You have heard a report by the representative of the temporary press center of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry in Azerbaijan.

Situation in Nakhichevan 'Tense'

NC2002113390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] The situation in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] continues to be tense. Work in the industrial establishments, construction installations, and educational and cultural establishments has been completely halted. The movement of trains has not been resumed. Military units still control the railway stations [words indistinct] in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

The military headquarters told an Azerinform correspondent that the military servicemen have completely removed the blockades on the tracks through the Armenian SSR. The mechanical workers of the locomotive depot in Dzhul'fa have [words indistinct]. The military servicemen have assured them of security for the movement of the trains. The servicemen and the leading officials of the party and soviet organs in Megrinskiy Rayon have signed an agreement on railroad track security.

Meanwhile, the situation in Nakhichevan ASSR's agroindustrial complex, particularly keeping the livestock over the winter, is becoming difficult. Due to an insufficient (?variety), the establishments are being forced to supply a greater number of cattle to the meat centers for slaughtering. The vehicles used fro transportation in Nakhichevan cannot operate because of fuel shortages.

Operational Staff Says Border Region 'Calm'

NC2002110290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] During its regular session, the Operational Staff pointed out that the situation in the republic's border regions is calm. Generally, there have been separate cases of illegal (?and criminal) acts in the be [words indistinct] republic. However, there has been no incident concerning interethnic relations. Arms are still being returned, and a [word indistinct], an automatic rifle, and two hunting rifles have been handed in.

The Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Ministry of Internal Affairs informs that between 20 January and 18 February, Armenian border regions were fired upon 24 times from the neighboring republic. As a result, one civilian was killed and four were wounded, as well as four soldiers who were guarding the border regions. [sentence as heard] This information was given in view of the fact that the central mass media (?exaggerate) every such incident, thus limiting [words indistinct]. As a result, some people, who are uninformed of the region's [words indistinct] on (?who is actually to blame) for the incidents in Armenia's border regions, get an incorrect impression. There are 245 refugees being treated in hospitals.

Armenian television programs are being received with poor quality in Stepanakert because of the low quality (?relay station) in Shushi. Other telecommunications facilities are operating normally.

The Gorisskiy-Lachin-Getashen Highway is not operating yet. As already reported, nothing is obstructing cargo transport from that highway except the quote, good-will, end quote of the Azerbaijan leadership.

Yerevan Reports on Gathering at Zvartnots Airport

NC2002135490 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Zvartnots Airport personnel protested the situation created because of injustice. People who had gathered in front of the administrative building spoke with (?disgust) on the blatant bias and asked: Why are the Armed Forces obstructing the flights carrying the most vital goods the people facing the blockade need instead of helping the people?

The collective also expressed concern over the destiny of their colleagues in Stepanakert. For a long time now they have not been receiving wages. A friendship charity has helped them with 10,000 rubles. It was proposed that the money received from ticket sales, which the Stepanakert residents were transferring to Baku, be used to pay their wages.

The Armenian pilots decided to send a protest to the USSR Supreme Soviet on the blockade of the republic and of Artsakh [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and on limiting flights to Karabakh. Since the minister of civil aviation signs the orders to limit flights, the pilots decided to immediately invite him to Yerevan to clarify the reasons for his behavior and to immediately adopt a position on the issue.

Armenian Deputies Send Message to Soviet Leaders

NC2002141090 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] The USSR People's Deputies Zoriy Balayan, Vachakan Grigoryan, and Boris Dadamyan sent the following statement to Mikhail Gorbachev; (Ulentsev), chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; [name indistinct], USSR procurator general; and Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, USSR internal affairs minister:

From 12-14 February, Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee,

and Safonov, military commandant of the district under the state of emergency, used loudspeakers on army vehicles and the radio-television [word indistinct] in Stepanakert to insult our, the USSR people's deputies', respect and honor. They called us instigators and the provocateurs of internecine fratricide, and they said we have links with collaborators, [word indistinct], and so on.

Based on Article 7 of the USSR Law on People's Deputies, the Soviet Government safeguards the deputies' rights, respect, and honor and holds those who insult the deputies' respect and honor administratively or criminally responsible. We, the people's deputies of the Soviet Union, inform the Supreme Soviet, the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR procurator general, the USSR Supreme Court, and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs that we call for judiciary steps to be taken in view of the above.

Tyumen Troops Write To Allay Fears at Home

LD1902163390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Here is a report from Baku. All kinds of rumors and conjecture are frequently becoming a dangerous catalyst to the aggravation of the situation at present. These were subject of discussion at a meeting of servicemen from Tyumen who are now in Baku and their compatriots, a delegation of the Tyumen public. They talked about rumors concerning the deaths of servicemen from Tyumen during the January events. Such reports were not just a source of concern for their mothers; hostile attitudes arose in Tyumen Oblast toward Azerbaijanis living and working there, and there are many thousands of them, mostly oilworkers, in the oblast. So the servicemen, about whose deaths the rumors had spread, sat in their club and wrote letters to send with their compatriots.

Show greater tact toward the local population, the Tyumen people told their lads in Baku. Ordinary people are not to blame for what has taken place here. Be humane! And we will do everything so that what certain forces are attempting to provoke doesn't happen in Tyumen Oblast.

Let us hope that the letters from the servicemen in Baku will help calm the passions in Tyumen, as well as a videotape recorded during the meeting with greetings from the soldiers to their relatives and near ones.

Correspondent Updates Situation in Baku

LD2002222490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Report by correspondent Islam Kuliyev in Baku]

[Text] As I was informed by Aleksandr Ivanovich (?Fasitov), head of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] temporary press center at the republican MVD, the collectives of only 300 enterprises have resumed work all over Azerbaijan. This fact confirms that there is still a long way to go before the situation is fully stabilized. Losses from strikes in Azerbaijan already amount to more than 570 million rubles, and if we add to this the losses of all the allied enterprises all over the country it presents, you will agree, a sad picture. People have cooled toward work somehow. The nervous stress of the January events—events around Nagorno-Karabakh, in areas of Azerbaijan which border Armenia—is still being felt. Until now various interethnic provocations have continued. Recently a scheduled bus going to Baku was blown up by explosives planted along the Shusha-Stepanakert road. Fortunately no one was killed, but 15 Azeri passengers were wounded—among them women and children. They were hospitalized. The criminals, still unknown, have attempted not only to break the calm which was established throughout the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] last week, but to destabilize the situation even further; to bring discord into the dialogue which has started between the representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenian peoples of the autonomous oblast. The duration of the curfew has beene extended by two hours to strengthen control on the NKAO roads.

Today I telephoned Nakhichevan. The situation in the autonomous republic is not simple. The railway is still not functioning. Along the (?Kharchevan) - Megri section which runs alongside Armenian territory the signals have been put out of action and the tunnels have been flooded with water. A special repair team guarded by military personnel is now tidying up this stretch of the railway. However, the engine drivers from Dzhulfa are still demanding that their security is guaranteed while taking the trains along this route. A meeting of party and soviet representatives together with members of the National Front of Azerbaijan stronghold and the military personnel with the locomotive drivers was planned in Dzhulfa today. Its participants were to work out measures to assure the uninterrupted working of the railway.

However, for the moment, as a result of the blockade, fuel is running out in Nakhichevan. It is only being distributed to toad transport, vital enterprises and medical establishments. Many works and factories have stopped because of a lack of raw materials. In other regions of Azerbaijan the situation is relatively calm. On the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran the situation is fully under control. Measures are being elaborated jointly with the other side to simplify [the procedure for] Soviet citizens crossing into Iran, and inhabitants of the neighboring state crossing to the territory of the USSR. Work is continuing on the confiscation and voluntary surrendering of weapons, and the checking of personal documents.

Baku 'Relatively Calm' in Last 24 Hours

LD2002140190 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Baku February 20 TASS—The past 24 hours were relatively calm in the capital of Azerbaijan. The voluntary handover and seizure of weapons from the population continued.

Over 3,000 shotguns and hunting guns have been seized, found or voluntarily handed in in Azerbaijan during the last six weeks, a spokesman said.

In the city of Agdzhabedi law enforcement agencies and servicemen found and seized two pistols, a hunting gun, other weapons and ammunition belonging to two participants in the riots, who are in hiding now.

The body of a local resident with gunshot wounds was found not far from Kesalar village of Askeranskiy district of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

Workers at some industrial plants continue their strikes. Over 300 industrial facilities, which make up about half of all factories and plants, are in operation in Azerbaijan now. Losses from strikes since January 18 now amount to 570 million roubles.

Supreme Soviet Forms Nagorno-Karabakh Commission

AU2002180990 Paris AFP in English 1701 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 20 (AFP)—The Soviet parliament has formed a non-partisan commission to draw up a bill on the status of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Soviet deputies said here Tuesday. They said the commission was created Monday after a stormy, closed-door session of the Supreme Soviet in which three government ministers were called on to justify the army crackdown last month in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, that left 100 dead.

The delegation from Azerbaijan walked out towards the end of Monday's session to protest testimony by Defense Minister General Dmitriy Yazov. The other two ministers questioned were Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin and the KGB chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov. All three told the deputies that the decision to send troops into Azerbaijan the night of January 19 was made by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which is headed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, according to an Armenian deputy from Yerevan, Genrikh Igityan.

None of the Azerbaijan delegates were present at Tuesday's normal plenary session, though the Azerbaijan government office here denied rumors that they had returned home.

The new commission on Nagorno-Karabakh has neither Armenians nor Azeris, but strictly "neutral" deputies or government representatives, informed sources said.

The enclave inhabited mainly by ethnic Armenians is claimed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow sent the army into Baku after a new round of violence in the two-year-old unrest over the issue. The Supreme Soviet of Armenia has already proposed giving Nagorno-Karabakh, now an autonomous region administered by Azerbaijan, full republic status, but Azerbaijan has repeatedly opposed this option.

The Supreme Soviet deputies were expected to meet in another closed-door session on the Caucasus Wednesday, but deputies Tuesday said this might be postponed.

Though Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was present at Monday's session, deputies said he remained silent. This contrasted with the previous week, when Mr. Gorbachev lashed out at critics of the military intervention with the challenge: "Where was the local KGB, where was the Baku militia when the trouble broke out?"

General Yazov came under fire at Monday's session by the delegation from Azerbaijan, which charged Soviet troops with murdering Azeri children during the Baku crackdown. The general dismissed the charge, saying it was a "falsification of the facts and a lie", according to Mr. Igityan. "He said that young people of 14 were killed, but they were on the barricades along with the fighters," the Armenian deputy said.

The interior minister and the KGB chief were also "sharply criticized" by a military deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, for "not opening an investigation after the events in Sumgait". This was a reference to attacks by Azeris on Armenians in the Azerbaijan city of Sumgait in February, 1988, that left 32 dead, mostly Armenians. It was one of the catalysts for the communal violence that has continued ever since.

Central Asian Situation

Tajik Party Leaders Appeal for Calm

LD2102090390 Moscow TASS in English 0605 GMT 21 Feb 90

[By TASS special correspondent]

[Text] Dushanbe, Soviet Tajikistan, February 21 TASS—The Communist Party leaders and the government of Soviet Tajikistan have called on the population to pool efforts in searching for ways to calm the situation.

The appeal was published on Tuesday [20 February] by all local Tajik-, Russian-, and Uzbek-language newspapers and is regularly broadcast by local television and radio.

It says that "political adventurers and simply hooligans availed themselves of the republican population's just dissatisfaction with the living standards and of people's wish to accelerate the solution to their social and economic problems.

"They provoked unsanctioned rallies on February 12 and 13, in which some residents of Dushanbe and its suburbs took part and which led to armed clashes with law enforcement bodies and to casualties on both sides.

"Criminal elements that have nothing in common with the Tajik people participated in arson and attacks on administrative buildings, looted stores, encroached on the honour and dignity of our women and sowed ethnic strife."

The Republican leaders assured the population that people guilty of tragic events in Dushanbe will be identified and strictly punished. Some of them will soon face trial.

Shodi Shabdolov, secretary of the Tajik Communist party Central Committee, told TASS that elections to the republican Parliament, scheduled for February 25, will not be put off.

Since the vote will take place in the daytime, the state of emergency and the curfew will not be lifted.

The leaders of the Rastokhez (Revival) public movement have opposed the holding of a new sanctioned rally in Dushanbe, Tadzhik Deputy Minister of Justice Khalifabobo Khamidov, who is member of the board of the public organisation, told TASS.

He said activists of the movement were meeting with residents of the city and nearby villages to persuade them not to send their representatives to Dushanbe.

Khamidov denied rumours that the Rastokhez Movement was involved in the developments in the republic.

"None of the members of our organisation committed unlawful actions in those tragic days of February 12 and 13," he said.

"The movement programme is based on the universal declaration of human rights and rules out violence as a method of achieving one's goals.

"We do not seek political power but only want social and economic problems to be solved—and only on the basis of the Constitution."

Khamidov said 28 Rastokhez members had been nominated for parliamentary deputies and that the parliamentary mandates would "give us the possibility to implement our goals on legal grounds."

Guilty Persons To Be Punished

LD2002122790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 20 Feb (TAJIKTA-TASS)—The leaders of the Communist Party and the government of Soviet Tajikistan have addressed an appeal to their fellow countrymen calling for consolidation of all the healthy forces of society, a general search for a way to heal the people's pain, and securing of calm in the republic. The document was published today in all local newspapers published in Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek and is being regularly broadcast on republic radio and television.

The appeal stresses that all sorts of political, adventurist, and purely hooligan elements have cunningly taken advantage of the people's justified dissatisfaction with the standard of living and of their desire to speed the solution of socioeconomic problems. It was they who incited some of the inhabitants of Dushanbe and the surrounding rayons to attend unauthorized meetings on 12-13 February which led to armed clashes with law enforcement bodies, resulting in casualties on both sides. Criminal elements who have nothing in common with the Tajik people took part in arson attacks and pogroms against administrative buildings, plundered shops, violated the honor and dignity of our women and girls, and sowed interethnic dissension, the appeal says.

The leaders of the republic's Communist Party and government have assured the populace that those guilty of the tragic events in the city of Dushanbe will be identified and punished with the full weight of the law. Some of them will soon appear in court. Furthermore, a decree of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Republic on increased accountability for actions against public order and the safety of citizens has been in force since 19 February. Administrative and criminal proceedings are being brought against individuals for producing or possessing with the intention of distributing, and also for distributing in oral, handwritten, printed, video, or audio form materials which contain calls for pogroms and the forcible eviction of civilians and which are intended to sow panic among the populace.

According to the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry temporary press center in Tajikistan, in the past 24 hours a further 53 firearms have been voluntarily surrendered by the people, and valuables worth 13,000 rubles which were stolen from a devastated jewellery shop on 12 February were returned. No ethnic-related crimes have been recorded. At the same time, 67 people have been detained for curfew violations, and 11 state and private sector motor vehicles without number plates have been noted.

Tajik Elections To Take Place as Planned

LD2002225190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; announcer-read report]

[Excerpts] A report from Dushanbe. Now that the situation in the capital of Tajikistan is gradually stabilizing, the people of Dushanbe ask themselves more and more often how are the elections of the republic's people's deputies, planned for 25 February, going to take place? And how democratic will elections held under the state of emergency which is in force in Dushanbe be? Shabdolov, secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central

Committee, has told a TASS correspondent that the elections for the republic's people's deputies will take place on the due date, since the election process proper will be taking place during daytime. The state of emergency and the curfew will not be lifted. [passage omitted]

Frequently in such critical interethnic conflicts the question arises: On what basis should we consolidate? What path do we follow to peace and order? Some candidates for people's deputies in their preelection speeches come up with the following idea—to settle the peoples of our country on the basis of their language. That's clearly a mad idea. Here are some figures. More than 65 million people live outside their mother tongue areas at the moment, including 25 million Russians. So a great resettlement, I think, would only suit those who want to destabilize the situation in the country even further.

Dushanbe Stoppage Losses Total R34 Million

LD2002225990 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Summary] The Press Center reports:

In accordance with the latest information received from ministries and departments, enterprises and organizations, in the past 48 hours losses to the national economy due to stoppages in enterprises, people not reporting to work and produce not being sold, amounted to R2.8 million. Since the beginning of the incidents up to 19 February, losses in Dushanbe city have amounted to R34 million, including 30 million for stoppages in enterprises, people not reporting to work and produce not being sold. With the approval of local soviet bodies in Tursunzada, Gissar, Ordzhonikidzeabad, Lenin and the holiday resort of Warzab, the sale of alcoholic drinks has been temporarily prohibited. Measures have been taken to supply four, (?sugar) and other essential goods to far away republican rayons. In Dushanbe bakeries are (?fully) working. In the past few days there have been many complaints about the irregular city transport services, particularly in the evenings. As the Motor Transport Ministry reports, today 320 buses, 159 trolley buses, 200 mini buses and 276 taxis were working, in accordance with the daily transport plan. The Communications Ministry reports that at present 70 of the 130 newspaper selling outlets are open. Ten newspaper selling outlets were set on fire during those tragic events. All post office branches and communications departments of Dushanbe, except two, are functioning. In the city 45 pharmacies, all polyclinics, (?seven) emergency brigades and 196 (?ambulances) are working. In accordance with a report from the Grain Produce Ministry, during the past 24 hours enterprises in the region produced 91.5 tonnes of flour. This amount is sufficient for Dushanbe's residents.

13-15 Feb Period Loses R17 Million

LD2002145390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Excerpt] The situation in Tajikistan. Information about the night of 19-20 February reports 67 people were detained for violating the curfew in Dushanbe. The majority of citizens have gone to work. An examination of the losses which the republic's economy suffered is continuing. According to data we have received, in Dushanbe alone, over the period from 13 to 15 February, losses of more than R17 million have occured. [passage omitted]

Dushanbe Casualties Detailed; City 'Calmer'

PM2002131190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Special correspondent N. Sautin report: "City Calmer"]

[Text] Dushanbe, 19 Feb—An operations investigation group of 100 officials from union and republic law-enforcement departments has begun work in Dushanbe. One important question on whose answer the situation in the city now depends in many respects is whether servicemen rightfully employed firearms. That is for military prosecutors to clear up.

After inspecting the bodies of the victims of the riots outside the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee building on 12-13 February, they encountered previously unknown facts. There are people who died from injuries inflicted by sawed-off shotguns loaded with homemade buckshot. As is well known, the Army and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] do not possess such weapons. Many people, it transpires, were killed with knives and spears.

It has hitherto proved possible to establish precisely how one of the attackers died. The extremists' tactics boiled down to stoning the soldiers, then trying to pull soldiers out of formation using boat hooks and drag them into the crowd in order to capture their submachineguns. Also used were metal coils, which were thrown over servicemen. When the officer commanding a subunit was caught in this kind of noose, a soldier coming to his rescue fired a shot into the ground. The bullet ricocheted off the asphalt into the attacker.

Military jurists claim that if the submachinegun fire had been intended to hit people the number of casualties would have run into hundreds.

Some 565 citizens were injured during the disturbance. Gunshot wounds and knife injuries were sustained by 136 and 88 people respectively and 188 people were hospitalized. Of the 22 killed, 3 were Russians and 14 were Tajiks; 180 servicemen and militiamen were injured.

Major General Yu. Balakhonov, chief of the MVD internal troops operations group, told me the following:

"The attitude toward soldiers in the city is characterized by the fact that the residents bring pilaf and eastern sweetmeats and feed those who stand in the squares day after day. The people of Dushanbe condemn the extremists. Many of those involved in the rallies now regret that they were involved in criminal actions. They have realized that those people who splashed acid on or hurled broken glass at soldiers' faces cannot be described as lovers of the truth. It is terrible that many of those who maimed the soldiers, beat up old people, and committed rape were aged 12-14. There is also a report that those involved in the excesses were paid 20-30 rubles each, while others were given wine."

The situation in Dushanbe is gradually normalizing. Many children went to school today. Admittedly, there are still few Russian pupils at their desks.

Tajik MVD Says Dushanbe 'Normal' 20 Feb

LD2102120990 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1000 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] The press center of the Tajikistan Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs reports:

Yesterday the situation was normal in our republic's capital and its suburbs. Passenger transportation was working (?normally). Some 95 percent of industrial and construction enterprises, cultural and educational institutions were working. More than 5,000 workers and employees did not report to work in labor collectives. Of course, this was because of false rumors in the city to the effect that today, 21 February, a public meeting is going to be held. We would like to point out that no meetings were held anywhere and no crowds have gathered. Some 3,000 meters of fabric have been stolen from a damaged store.

Yesterday 122 residents of the city handed over their weapons to internal affairs. Officials of the state automobile inspection yesterday detained 19 vehicles without license plates. Some 92 persons were arrested for violating curfew. There have been no interethnic crimes and public meetings.

Yesterday there was a meeting between officials of law enforcement bodies and representatives of the clergy. During the meeting it was stressed that every person should strive to ensure that rumors are not spread in the city. Every word, incident, and event should be dealt with objectively.

Moscow Radio Summarizes Dushanbe Situation

LD2002180590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] After recent tragic events, Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, is trying to get back on its feet. Our correspondent Muzafar Madzhidov reports:

[Madzhidov] First, a brief roundup of the news: The situation in Dushanbe is returning to normal. Passenger transport, industrial, commercial and everyday service enterprises are operating, classes are being held in all academic institutions, and kindergartens and creches have opened. However, attendance is still poor. Over the past 24 hours over 5,000 vehicles have been checked and 11 found to be without state license plates; 67 persons were detained for violating the curfew; 53 smooth-bore fire arms were voluntarily given up by the population or seized by the interior ministry bodies. Valuables worth R13,000, which had been pilfered from a looted jewelry shop, were handed over voluntarily. There have been no infringements of public order. No interethnic crimes, in the capital or in other regions or towns in the republic, have been registered.

According to operational information from ministries and departments, enterprises and organizations, damage to the national economy over the past 48 hours amounted to over R2.8 million. In all, since the start of these events, the capital's national economy has suffered losses of over R34 million of which about R30 million is accounted for through enterprises being idle and people not going to work.

The Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic have issued an appeal to all the inhabitants of the republic which says, in part, that it is our common human and main task to work today with increasing vigor, responsibility and discipline and to restore as quickly as possible everything which has been destroyed during these days and to create conditions for effective work to implement the tasks of perestroyka and to solve the republic's urgent socioeconomic and cultural problems.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Issues Statement on Curfew

LD2002211390 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1700 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Statement by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers—announcer-read]

[Text] The Presidium of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet and the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers state that in spite of the decree which was issued by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 12 February 1990 on introducing a state of emergency and curfew in Dushanbe city, cases of violating the demands of this decree can be seen in the republican (?press) and [words indistinct] in Dushanbe City. Therefore, it is once again reminded that the following are prohibited during the period of the state of emergency and the curfew:

—Holding illegal demonstrations, gatherings, meetings or any kind of strikes.

—Citizens, 16 years old and over, leaving home without any kind of identity documents.

—Keeping guns and ammunition during the period of state of emergency. Citizens are dutybound to handover weapons in their possession as well as registered weapons to the internal affairs organs within 24 hours from the time this decree is issued. Those citizens who voluntarily hand over their weapons will be immune from prosecution.

—To allow any kind of vehicles between 2200 to 0600 hours without special permission.

—To freely allow people between 2200 to 0600 hours without special permission.

—Verbal or physical search of those people responsible for (?keeping) order.

—Sale of drinks in all shops.

The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers inform people that those citizens who violate the state of emergency in Dushanbe city, try to hold meetings, gatherings or public marches without permission, wander about between 2200 to 0600 hours without special permission and other violations of law will be dealt with in accordance with the law.

In this connection, relevant instructions have been issued to bodies which supervise the observation of state of emergency.

Tajik Academy Regrets Anti-Armenian Acts

NC2102141790 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The papers have published the cable from Negmatullayev, president of Tajikistan Academy of Sciences, to Viktor Ambartsumyan, president of the Armenian Academy of sciences. The cable specifically states:

On behalf of the republic's scientific community, the presidium of the Tajik Academy of Sciences asks forgiveness for the provocative acts of dark forces which drew a group of inexperienced Tajik youth into anti-Armenian actions. The public resolutely condemned those actions. We will not allow the disruption of our people's traditional friendship whose roots go back a long time.

Meeting Calls for Kazakh Economic Independence

LD1702215290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 17 Feb 90

[Text] A sanctioned meeting of many thousands of people which took place here today dedicated to the unity of the democratic forces of all the nations and ethnic groups living in the republic was a notable event in the public life of the Kazakhstan capital. It was organized in the town for the first time by a number of independent informal associations.

The range of opinion of the participants at the meeting was fairly wide, but they were united on one thing: The most rapid possible consolidation of healthy forces of society, with the aim of deepening the processes of perestroyka, democratization and glasnost, is essential. Speakers spoke with concern and grief about the problems worrying all inhabitants of the republic: the need to preserve and develop the traditions of internationalism and friendship, and to bar the way to inter-ethnic dissension. It was pointed out that the reasons for the tension being maintained in the country are to be found in the failure to resolve many socio- economic problems and in distortion of Lenin's nationalities policy.

Demands were voiced for Kazakhstan to be granted economic independence, for the plunder of its natural resources to be stopped, for the problems of regions with a surplus of labor to be resolved, for the nuclear testing grounds on the territory of the republic to be closed, and for the Aral Sea to be saved.

The participants at the meeting demanded that the accusation of Kazakh nationalism given in the well-known CPSU Central Committee decision be withdrawn, and that the cases of those punished for taking part in the so-called December events of 1986 in Alma-Ata be reviewed.

The participants in the meeting adopted a resolution.

30,000 Repression Victims Rehabilitated

LD2102094490 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] In the Soviet Kazakh Republic, over 30,000 people victimized under the repressions from 1930 to 1953 have been cleared of all charges. It has been established that their trials were falsified and investigations were conducted with gross violations of the law. Five thousand four hundred and thirty people were executed by firing squad. That number included the state and Communist Party leaders, prominent scientists, writers, artists, workers, and peasants. The process of exoneration of innocent victims is continuing. Places of mass burials are being discovered. Some of them have been identified in a number of regions in the Kazakh Republic.

Kazakh Muslims Establish Spiritual Administration

LD1402170190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 14 Feb 90

[Text] A spiritual administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan has been set up in Alma-Ata. Our correspondent Dukesh Baimbetov reports.

[Baimbetov] The first kurultay, or Congress of the Muslims of Kazakhstan held recently in Alma-Ata, brought together 250 delegates and guests from other republics.

In his speech, the kazi-ata [leader] of the Muslims of Kazakhstan, (Rodbeg Nasanbay-Uli), stressed in particular the influence on the lives of believers of the restructuring process taking place in our country. It suffices to say that 15 new mosques have already been registered in the republic and former buildings belonging to them are being returned.

Deputies of the local bodies of power are now among the ministers of the religion. The mufti of the Muslims of Kazakhstan, (Rodbeg Nasanbay-Uli), elected at the kurultay, has been put forward as a candidate deputy for the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. My conversation partner is the deputy mufti, or the naib of the mufti, (Alsabekov Mukhamed Husain).

[Begin recording] [Husain] In the more than 14 centuries of Islamic history on the territory of Kazakhstan, an independent spiritual administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan has been opened for the first time. This is an event of exceptional importance in the history of the Muslim people, and places on all of us an enormous responsibility for the fate of our religion in the future, for its correct interpretation its use for the purposes of the humanist, international education of the people, and for the moral and spiritual cleansing of society.

[Baimbetov] A few words about your plans.

[Husain] In the future the construction of a new cathedral, in Arabic this is called a jami, is planned. we have already been given the land in the city of Alma-Ata. The plans are ready. If Allah wills it, we will begin construction in March.

Our respected mufti, Nasanbay Rodbeg-Haji, is translating the great Koran into Kazakh from Arabic. Religious literature in the Kazakh language will be printed. It is also planned to build new mosques in various oblasts in Kazakhstan and we are planning to open courses to train new ministers.

[Baimbetov] At the root of any faith, and of the Muslim faith, too, lies the moral education of people first and foremost, a call to what is good, goodness. Not only purely religious matters are in the designs of your administration. I know that you take a very active part in all charitable organizations, in all movements which bring good to people.

[Husain] We never refuse to take part in various charitable deeds such as charity, the defense of peace, nature protection, the Red Cross, the protection of children and many others. Our faith, Islam, teaches a love of peace, mercy, and charity, because our prophet, Muhammad, peace be upon him, said that he who is useful to the people will be close to him.

Commission Studies Semipalatinsk Problems

LD1102223690 Moscow World Service in English 2200 GMT 11 Feb 90

[Text] A special commission has studied a package of problems related to nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk test site in the Soviet Union's south and concluded that nearly 10,000 people have been exposed to radioactive irradiation over the past 10 years. Although the radioactive background does not exceed admissible norms, the commission chairman Dr. (Anatoliy Tseyeb) observed the negative psychological impact of underground nuclear tests on the population is unquestionable. The public movement calling itself Nevada-Semipalatinsk, urging the American and Soviet Governments to close down both nucelar test sites, has been increasingly active.

Economic

Miners Discuss Economic Issues With Gorbachev

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[Report on interview with V.M. Oksen and N.M. Pastukhov, members of a delegation of workers meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, by Ye. Karpov; place and date not given: "How Can We Help Perestroyka?"]

[Text] Vladimir Maksimovich Oksen is a drifter at the Lenin Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] of the Ukraine from the City of Pavlograd. Nikolay Mikhaylovich Pastukhov is an excavator operator at the Production Association Yakutugol. Both took part in a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev a couple days ago as members of a large workers' delegation. We have asked them to share their impressions.

The Miners Demanded It—What Has Been Accomplished?

N. Pastukhov: Recently, Moscow has almost become our second home. Volodya and I are frequent visitors to the white-walled city: We are involved in implementing Resolution No. 608 within a state commission. We have been tackling our miners' business for many months now. Personally, I have acquired priceless experiences—I have learned to communicate with the Moscow bureaucracy, and even the capital city luster has appeared. I now know how an official is to be approached, how a matter is to be settled. I have mastered all kinds of intricacies in securing allocations and funds, perhaps, better than some professional supply procurers. At times, I amaze myself...

However Nikolay Mikhaylovich preferred not to dwell specifically on his business connections and contacts: "It may not be good for business." If so, the excavator operator was on his guard, and frequently repeated so that the TRUD correspondent would not forget: "This is off the record." All that he allowed me to mention is that he has in his notebook the numbers of direct lines to ministers, and not just them. Whose telephones exactly? This is a secret. Later, he added, half seriously and half jokingly: "Now that I am the go-getter, I work as an intelligence officer: Procure information, analyze it, and seek out acquaintances."

V. Oksen: However, Resolution No. 608 is stuck, it is not being fulfilled properly. Certain things are being done slowly, but the main problems remain. Let us look at, say, supplies. After all, this hurts not only one industry or one region, it hurts the entire country. Foodstuffs are in short supply everywhere.

N. Pastukhov: For a month at a stretch or longer, they sell nothing but horse meat in our miners' settlement of Kangalassy. I am not going to conceal it: I am taking sausage home; after all, they still have it in Moscow. However, I will tell you right away that we did not meet with M.S. Gorbachev in order to wring something out or to resolve what we call "bread-and butter issues." When one of the delegates began "to wring out the nails" we just rebuffed him.

V. Oksen: In general, having evaluated how the resolutions of the government are carried out, we, the miners, have come to the conclusion: A dead end lies ahead no matter how we hustle. It is impossible to resolve particular issues separately. We talk much about the economic independence of mines. How can we assume the burden of it without serious support, without serious economic transformations?

N. Pastukhov: Look at the situation around us: The country is in a trance, the people are in a shock. The further it goes, the worse it gets. This is why we decided to sort things out and determine for ourselves: What is being done and what should be done in order to overcome the crisis in our great country. We met here with the heads of ministries and offices... We came to the conclusion that in order to ultimately understand everything we absolutely have to see Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and ask him directly: Who and what interferes with you?

Karpov: Is it clear now?

V. Oksen:I cannot say that they spelled it out for us and explained everything. However, I understood—note that this is my personal conviction—that the measures which will help in relieving tension in the immediate future have been planned and envisaged. Nonetheless, I am no more optimistic than I was before. Quite the contrary, I saw how much more complicated everything is than I used to think. When you write about our conversation today also try not to distort it.

N. Pastukhov:I for one looked up in the newspapers reports on the meeting of miners with M.S. Gorbachev and saw quite a few stretched points and distortions of sorts. Please understand this: The situation in the country is so tense that, unless changes occur, a wave of strikes will begin, perhaps not at the same time or in all industries. There are grounds for the strikes, primarily the worsening situation with the material-technical supply.

Karpov: Do you think that the miners will strike again?

V. Oksen: The work might stop without us wanting it. The economy is falling apart, and no changes for the better are apparent as of now.

N. Pastukhov: Yes, here, in Moscow, I have seen to my heart's content how issues are resolved. It hurts to see that a problem which a boy with a high-school education is capable of solving is solved at the level of, say, the chief of an administration. On top of that, they are up to their eyeballs in clerks. Getting an appointment is no picnic: On approaches to their offices, there are militiamen and some people in civilian clothes. Perhaps, you know what the arrangement is there. Sometimes you cannot get through, try as you might. We learned it the hard way!

V. Oksen: This is what the practice is: They pass the buck...

N. Pastukhov: On the eve of the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, our delegation gathered at the Central Committee of the trade union of coal miners, and for two days we discussed the course of the execution of the resolution and, of course, general state problems. I think (am I right, Volodya?) that we came to a unanimous conclusion: We now have to change the established and obsolete economic and political structures. Otherwise, perestroyka will inevitably die.

At the Meeting

V. Oksen: Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion we drew. We agreed that K. Fisenko, a foreman of blasters from the Kochegarka Mine of the Artemugol Association, would speak first. Incidentally, he also spoke at the plenum. Later, Pastukhov would take the floor..

N. Pastukhov: If we omit the details this is what I talked about—that an iron and steel or oil industry worker, a miner, or a power or chemical industry worker cannot work properly because the technology itself would not let him work that way. If there is no progress how are we, the workers, to blame? I named the industries which essentially are the backbone of the economy. However, they live on charity. I do not know whether you will print this or not. All in all, I doubt it.

Nikolay Ivanovich picked up the typed theses of his statement at the meeting with Gorbachev and underlined with a thick line: "Show me nations of the world which have been the subjects of so many political and social experiments in the past 70 plus years, nations which have sacrificed so much. We do not mean wars—let us recall our peasantry... A period of historical fatigue of the people has now set in which is fraught with an explosion..."

N. Pastukhov explained: "Incidentally, the expression 'historical fatigue' is my own. As far as the experiments are concerned, there should not be any. We've had enough!"

My interlocutors are very much unlike the workers whom I have happened to see during my numerous trips to plants and factories—the ones who avoided a direct answer, flattered the management, and said "yes" to the trade union committee chairman. People could be encountered virtually everywhere who had neither their own point of view or position, but firmly adopted one principle and one philosophy: "Don't make waves." Perestroyka has changed the people greatly and roused them after many years of hibernation. During and after the strikes, I have talked to miners and heads of strike committees. Many of them have started to teach themselves vigorously; they have been working on Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and contemporary sociologists.

N. Pastukhov:I also want to note this: Extensive politicization of our society is now under way; workers' unions are being formed within regions. These are healthy forces which do not lean either to the right or to the left. Apparently, this year their unification into a new party will occur, and a congress will be held.

My interlocutors kept going back to the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, recalling particular details, and making them specific. They told me how Mikhail Sergeyevich immediately responded to the wish (voiced by N. Pastukhov) to have workers invited to a CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Nikolay Mikhaylovich himself recalled: "I said more or less the following. Since we are developing democracy and raising the issue of worker representation in the Politburo, we should take the first step—allow someone from among the miners present here take part in the work of the plenum. Then Mikhail Sergeyevich suggested that we elect a delegation consisting of 10 people. I was also delegated, and I immediately turned in my ticket because I was about to fly home. In general, as the miners say, they did not fail Gorbachev and elected representatives on a democratic basis. However, when the workers came to pick up the documents at the CPSU Central Committee, five of them were not given invitations: Only communists were allowed to take part in the work of the plenum. V. Oksen was very much annoyed by that. Being a nonparty member, he did not attend the session. Vladimir Maksimovich is puzzled: "After all, there was no understanding that only party members would go. Something failed somewhere."

The drifter and the excavator operator recalled how M.S. Gorbachev responded to the speeches and remarks by miners and noted what they did and did not like in his speech, what they do and do not quite agree with. They spoke frankly, without evasion, as if having cast off the burden of the epoch of stagnation which demanded unqualified approval. We are now "delivering up" a tremendous intellectual potential of society! It was obvious how enormous the emotional impression of the miners was, how sincerely uneasy they were about the meeting and what was going on at the plenum. Many evaluations had not been verified yet, their outline had not become clear. However, the workers are capable of making a choice on their own. I believe that of all people Nikolay Mikhaylovich has something to recall in this regard.

It seems that quite recently, in 1986, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA YAKUTIYA carried an article under the headline "An Inconvenient Man." This is what N. Pastukhov was. At the time, he was expelled from the party for his statement against ostentatious displays and window dressing, for writing a critical letter. However, the time now has come for exactly these inconvenient people with independent opinions and statesman-like thinking. One would like to believe that this is an irreversible process.

This is also a fact of his biography now: Nikolay Mikhaylovich has become a candidate people's deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. He showed me his election program with some pride. It included points such as the actual implementation of the principle "All power to the soviets!" or "To facilitate the creation of a law-governed state which will rule out forever the dictatorships of both a particular individual and any organization."

N. Pastukhov: The law should be above the state rather than the other way around. This is what I mean first of all. In our country, this is how it is for now: The law comes first, the state is above it, and the party apparatus is above the state.

There are notable points in the election program of the worker: The introduction of varied forms of property, protection of the interests of toilers against infringements by officials... It is written on the left margin of the program of the candidate, the excavator operator, in firm and bold hand: "Well, good luck!" Underneath that, it is signed "M. Gorbachev."

Karpov: What can you say about the mood of the workers locally? **V. Oksen:**Every year—this is easy to check—they persuaded us: Wait, perestroyka is merely picking up steam. All of the difficulties are merely growth problems. We should wait and be patient—supposedly, it is a crucial moment now. Meanwhile, the people get so tired of persuasion and promises that they themselves may break. This is easy to see, and this is alarming.

N. Pastukhov: Now they criticize the party widely. Yesterday, after the session of the plenum, BBC correspondents interviewed me. They asked me: "What can you tell us about the crisis in the party?" I told them that we have a crisis in our society. This is what we should take into account: There is the party, and there also is the inner party, the nomenklatura, the apparatus which has concentrated enormous power. Today, the main issue is that of power. We have seen the truth: It is not the soviets and the party that have power but the bureaucrats and those who control quotas.

What Is To Be Done?

Karpov: We criticize a lot now. However, to your mind, where is the way out of the crisis?

V. Oksen: The command-administrative system must be destroyed with a view to enterprises finally gaining independence and not acting on pointers from above.

N. Pastukhov:I believe that as far as searching for some specific solutions and developing a position are concerned, our meeting was even more productive than the recent conference with workers and peasants. That one was held in keeping with an old script. I viewed it as a "propaganda show" of sorts.

Karpov: Explanations and proof will be needed in this matter.

N. Pastukhov: After all, we got to see how candidates for the conference were selected in the regions—mainly within a quota system, because there were no elections. There only were behind-the-scenes, apparatus games. At this meeting with M.S. Gorbachev we, perhaps, understood each other, and this is very important.

Karpov: What do you mean?

V. Oksen: We found out what the position of the leader of the party and the state is, and M.S. Gorbachev himself had an occasion to be convinced that the working class, we, the miners, are primarily who he should count on.

Karpov: What conclusions could you draw?

N. Pastukhov: We will fight the middle bureaucratic echelon together, from the top and the bottom. The rightist forces have now consolidated there. They include functionaries of the party apparatus and economic managers... They are the ones leading perestroyka into a dead end. What gets in our way and in the way of perestroyka must be crushed. In summation, Mikhail Sergeyevich said: Let us act together!

Karpov: In this conversation of ours, you complained that the headlines for materials on the meeting were not right. What headline would you suggest?

N. Pastukhov: Please, nothing about us shouldering [the burden], enough of this clowning. I would suggest a simpler one—remember, like the one Lenin had: "What Is to Be Done?"

V. Oksen:I agree.

Petrakov Discusses Economic, Ethnic Tension Links

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[Interview with N.Ya. Petrakov, deputy chairman of the Plan, Budget, and Finance Commission of the Soviet Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by IZVESTIYA economic commentator Mikhail Berger; place and date not given: "The Economy of Our Country: A Tensile Test"]

[Berger] Nikolay Yakovlevich, let us start our conversation by discussing partial rather than general problems of our economy. Recently, some "partial issues" have become so acute that, in the opinion of domestic and foreign observers, they pose a serious danger for the "whole." Among the partial issues of the heaviest caliber are the disintegration and decay of normal economic links between producers at different levels: enterprise—region—republic. I think the foundation for this process is dual: monetary and political.

The first aspect is due to our currency not being a currency; this is why economic links degenerate into a "primeval" market: "one frock-coat for two axes," "give us cement, and we will give you metal," and you will get to keep as souvenirs your money, your quotas, and your requisition slips.

The second aspect is reflected in the aspiration of a number of union republics to economic isolation, in the desire to primarily fence off their consumer goods market from "someone else's" consumers.

In your opinion, how did these tendencies arise and what can they bring about?

[Petrakov] Disintegration and centrifugal forces are an extremely unpleasant thing. I cannot but agree with this. However, let us figure out the reasons for their development. Look at present-day Europe. I think that average, abstract Frenchmen like or dislike West Germans or Englishmen no more and no less than contemporary abstract Latvians do Russians or Ukrainians. However, as is known, in Europe centripetal rather than centrifugal trends are mounting. The European Common Market, without frontiers and restrictions, in 1992 will come about in the immediate future.

It is exactly economics and the need for cooperation, as well as its advantages, that bring the peoples closer together, unite them, and work to alleviate ethnic intolerance and hostility.

In our country, it is the other way around: the economy or, more precisely, its decay is one of the main "irritants" in ethnic problems. Mutual resentment and calculations—who takes more from whom and who has a debt to pay to whom—begin when life is hard, when meeting the most basic daily needs sometimes becomes a hard-to-solve problem.

I do not at all want to say that centrifugal processes are due only to material causes. Political motives play a quite significant role in the matter but it seems to me that they are secondary nonetheless.

[Berger] I would be interested to know how you would classify the introduction of a national currency—as an economic measure or a political one?

[Petrakov] Technically, this is a purely financial measure though, understandably, it is difficult to separate economics from politics in this instance because the presence of one's own currency is one of the classical attributes of statehood.

[Berger] One of the concepts of republic currencies, at least at the early stages of the development and discussion of such projects, had a strictly practical goal: to protect a more saturated consumer market from "commercial tourism," from "occubuyers."

[Petrakov] I am not going to evaluate the decision itself. Its proponents may or may not be right. At any rate, the aspiration to stand out, at least by using the currency, is understandable. However, let us look at the purely financial aspect of the issue, let us, so to say, play out the scenario of introducing "one's own" money.

Throughout the world, national currencies are used for contacts with the world market, with the currencies of other countries rather than for fencing off the domestic market. There are other ways to ensure the latter (customs inspection or, for example, coupons accompanied by a passport). Otherwise, the national economy is doomed to being completely isolated, and I do not think that, say, the Baltic republics aspire to autarky.

However, how is the new currency going to be connected with the currency system of the world? The interest of foreign holders of monetary funds in acquiring particular goods and services of the country issuing this currency is the foundation of convertibility.

What can the Baltic producers of goods offer to get Western buyers interested? The quality of their products may be higher than on the average in the country but it is not high enough to seriously compete with Japanese or even Taiwanese goods. As I see it, they should not count on large-scale exports of foodstuffs either. The market for them in hard-currency countries is virtually completely taken. Various restrictions on the production and export of foodstuffs are introduced there all the time.

[Berger] Fine, but at the very least the republic currency will play the role of a "defender" of its own shops, and this is no small argument for the proponents of introducing it.

[Petrakov] Well, let us see whether it can play this role. For example, an individual travels to Lithuania. He has no Lithuanian money, he cannot buy anything there. Everything is fine, the goal has been reached.

The question is: In what currency is Lithuania or Latvia going to pay for oil? Perhaps, in its own, because after the reform they will have no Soviet money in circulation.

[Berger] Why? It is not at all necessary to completely withdraw it from circulation. Some Soviet currency may be left for these very purposes.

[Petrakov] Well, how many "purposes" will the currency left suffice for, and where are new proceeds to come from after the stock has been depleted?

[Berger] Tourists and just visitors will come and bring Soviet money.

[Petrakov] First, these sums are definitely going to be insufficient; second, why go through it all if any tourist may come, convert his currency into the local one, and buy whatever he likes?

Sooner or later Baltic consumers will be forced to pay in their own currency. As a result, we will accumulate certain resources of the "Baltic" currency which will be converted into the "Russian" currency and produced with a view to acquiring of Baltic goods. This means that an exchange rate will unavoidably develop which will bring about the circulation of the ruble in the Baltic area one way or the other. In this case, the new currency will immediately lose its "protective" role.

However, this is still not the main point. Some exchange rate of the Estonian crown or the Latvian lat against the ruble will develop unavoidably whereas there are no guarantees that any rate of exchange of these currencies against Western currencies will develop. To this end, adequate hard-currency proceeds will be needed.

Indeed, the real exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar is low, and it declines together with oil prices in the world market. The petrodollar may be a poor foundation for an exchange rate, but it is still a foundation, and it exists. As of now, I have difficulty saying what may play a similar role for the Baltic republics.

It is another matter that we need to create a union-wide [hard] currency market by either putting one of the Western currencies in free circulation or issuing an amount of our own parallel "hard-currency rubles" which is strictly limited by law, with a publicly announced real rate of exchange and the also real right to convert it into foreign currencies or gold. I believe that in this case the Baltic republics will strive to take in as much as possible due to a more vigorous exchange of goods and reinforcing other kinds of economic links rather than protect themselves from such rubles. That is to say that with the appearance of "real" money the prospects for the natural crowding out of the centrifugal tendencies by the centripetal ones will become quite realistic.

This brings us back to the fact that economic considerations are the basis for disintegration, at least to a predominant degree; ways to overcome it are found in these same considerations.

[Berger] What has created such a condition in our economy that entire republics strive to protect themselves as much as possible from its "detrimental influence?"

[Petrakov] Even a dozen conversations and interviews will not be enough to respond to this "simple" question.

However, I will try to dwell on some aspects. For many years, we lived under a fetish system. Industrialization, that is, the need for Group A to be definitely ahead of Group B, and significantly at that, and in every region, was one of the fetishes. Incidentally, our aid to East Europe and to Third World countries was markedly "heavy-industrial" in nature: giant metallurgical production facilities and dams of the Aswan type.

[Berger] Perhaps, this type of aid had very definite ideological underpinnings. By exporting our model of economic development which, of course, we considered to be the best, we, as we thought, ensured the industrial independence of the states receiving our aid. Besides, we ensured the formation of sizable ranks of national proletariat. However, life has shown that the giants of heavy industry turned out to be merely an excessive burden, particularly for the developing countries, and instead of boosting their independence frequently increased their debts to us and other countries. As far as the presence of the new ranks of the proletariat is concerned, it did not prevent some of the countries from abruptly changing their orientation from noncapitalist to nonsocialist.

[Petrakov] I am not a specialist in the sphere of the world economy. However, it is a fact that many of our domestic problems, including those of an interethnic nature, are due to the "heavy-industry" doctrine. After the war, we started building large enterprises in the already mentioned Baltic area not necessarily on the basis of economic feasibility. Virtually every time this required that labor be brought in.

However, heavy industry was not the only thing to be imposed universally. Look at the agrarian sector. In this instance, central Asian republics became the victims of a single-crop cotton economy. In the process, nobody calculated what was more profitable: to sow cotton everywhere or, by reducing the area under it somewhat, make vegetables and fruit overabundant in our country?

On the other hand, the planning of the development of agrarian production was conducted in such a manner that rational specialization of regions, the very foundation of efficiency in agriculture, was entirely destroyed. We may increase grain harvests by increasing yields in the chernozem regions, or we may extend grain-planting all the way to the Polar Circle, investing tremendous funds and harvesting next to nothing in the process. These are the two strategies, and we have always leaned toward the second one.

[Berger] Perhaps, this policy is a consequence of the concept of comprehensive unification of people and territories: Everybody has got to be able to do everything, and do what he is told rather than what works out best. Are all of these taken together—total industrialization, ignoring the issues of profitability or unprofitability, and the destruction of specialization—the main "advantages" of planned economic operations? The drawbacks of "the elements of the market" do not affect the uncontrollable economies of the developed countries so destructively.

[Petrakov] In general, I am against the "plan or market" antithesis. Planning is a very good thing which is extensively used in market economies.

[Berger] However, over there a plan amounts to just predictions and recommendations whereas in our country it amounts to "a sentence of the people's court."

[Petrakov] Unfortunately, from the very first years of its existence planning was interpreted in our country as an opportunity to "overcome" economic laws. Meanwhile, real planning primarily means **forecasting** so as not to find out later, having paid the price by introducing ration cards for sugar, that the output of this product was reduced by 12 percent in the years 1986-87 **according to the plan.** I would be interested to know what the planners making this decision "predicted," especially given the boom in moonshine production which also could not, should not have been a surprise?

Did anyone in our country, including those in the State Planning Committee, try to predict how wage increases would affect the structure of consumer demand rather than the equilibrium in the market as a whole? After all, a teacher whose salary is increased has one set of needs, a tractor operator another one, and the director of a plant yet another one. Meanwhile, we at best pretend to be taking into account this and many other things which objectively influence economic processes.

Actually, it is exactly the rape of economic laws that is recognized to be real planning. This is to say nothing about the fact that the State Planning Committee has never proceeded from the notions of profitability or unprofitability of the projects and programs proposed.

This approach poured oil on the fire of ethnic problems. First of all, this affected relations between the center and the republics. This entire rape of economic feasibility and its laws was identified by those in the field with Moscow because this is where it originated.

[Berger] Was it not for this reason, due to the weak economic foundation, that our plans beginning with, perhaps, the Ninth Five-Year Plan, acquired the status of a law since they were adopted by the Supreme Soviet at its sessions? This law "on violating objective economic processes" has not been fulfilled once in the entire history of planning. That is to say, the economy has been mangled but the plans still have not been fulfilled, even at the price of coercion.

[Petrakov] Given the approaches in existence, it was hard to expect anything else. As I see it, a crisis of the philosophy of planning itself occurred. An entirely different concept of planning is necessary which would make interference by the center in the economic operation of enterprises within the region unnecessary and impossible.

The center has its own specific tasks which may and should be solved at the national level only. This means creating and maintaining a stable and reliable national financial system, developing infrastructure (communications, roads, and so on), and all-union social guarantees. This means ecological safety and strategic scientific projects the results of which are due in 20-30 or more years. So, what we have in all the five endeavors is an utter failure. However, we have achieved an overwhelming success in the pursuit of small-minded tutelage of economic activities, and not only those of territories but also those of plants and even their individual shops.

Relatively petty guardianship and interference by the center may indeed be necessary when cheap assortments of goods are being eliminated. This is when planning, state orders, or something else is indeed needed. As far as profitable products are concerned, producers will start up their production without any urging and will produce them for as long as as they can sell them at a profit.

For our part, we mainly plan inflation rather than cheap goods. Combating inflation through state price controls is inadequate if not useless if the current investment policy is maintained. It is the main factor of inflation, and it is up to the center, the state, to change it.

[Berger] However, Nikolay Yakovlevich, so much has been said about changes in this sphere that, apparently, there should be some favorable shifts by now.

[Petrakov] Actually, what has been done? Investment from the budget has been reduced—this appears to be good. At the same time, noncentralized but planned capital investment has been increased by almost the same amount. That is to say, actually nothing has changed, because the same amount of money, still not "covered" by the deliveries of construction materials, machinery, and manpower has been allocated one level lower by giving it to the associations and enterprises. Prolonged construction will now be aggravated by "multiple construction." Platonov-style foundation pits will be dug by the hundreds rather than by the dozens.

What will this kind of investment planning bring about? According to preliminary estimates, the value of unfinished construction increased by 18 billion rubles [R] in 1989. Apart from everything else, this means between R5 billion and R6 billion in wages not covered by the deliveries of goods and paid to construction workers who did not give any useful product to society. I will stress that at issue is only the increment of unfinished construction. Its total value is many times greater.

We plan to keep reproducing this abnormal state of affairs. When we considered the budget for this year, I asked First Deputy Finance Minister V. Panskov about reasons for failing to reflect proceeds from the emission of currency in the revenue side of the budget. At the time, he answered that this is not revenue, and this has got nothing to do with the budget. My question is: Why then is the Ministry of Finance planning R10 billion in emission in 1990? Let us forbid it altogether. After all, if an enterprise works for the market, turns out products which are needed, and generates profits no emission is needed. It is needed, first, when an economy is expanding and this expansion needs to be funded in advance; second, when an enterprise has fulfilled, for example, state orders and nobody needs this, but wages must be paid anyway (as well as those of the construction personnel working on unfinished projects)—this is when emission is required.

As a result, what will the extra R10 billion in circulation pay for? This money will be spent for anything at all rather than the expansion and renewal of the national economy if last year's trends in the economy continue and the actual investment policy is not changed.

[Berger] Nikolay Yakovlevich, what do you think the course of events is going to be in the immediate future? Have we left the lowest point, the "Marianas Trench" of our crisis behind, or is the worst yet to come?

[Petrakov] I would like to believe that we have left the lowest mark behind, or are at it. However, we can sink even lower than the "Marianas Trench" unless we take most resolute steps.

First of all, we must overcome the shortage of goods on an emergency basis. How? I am not hopeful that in a year or two we will commission this or that plant, rush the goods to the stores, and saturate the market. I think that this will not solve the problem.

We should do everything [possible]: Give the land to those who still want to work it; we should purchase large shipments of goods abroad, the key word being large because otherwise all the imports will end up with speculators or in special distribution facilities. We should make these expenditures and these sacrifices because without the goods there will be no incentive for economic activities, and in the absence of such incentives the economy will not be restored. It is not necessary to lean on loans alone. The structure of imports may be radically revised. For example, why buy fodder grain, which accounts for 35-40 percent of the imports, for hard currency? Why should this hard-currency grain be processed by the stomachs of our cows in order to receive as a result poor-quality meat and processed meat with great losses? Is it not simpler to purchase with this money the finished product, sausage and meat, while bringing the size of our cattle herd in line with fodder resources?

In a word, there are many prescriptions in this matter, and for the most part they are widely known. The point is to use them. If we resolve the merchandise issue we will reduce social tension, including that in the field of interethnic relations. I am not saying that we will solve it this way, but at least there will be fewer reasons to count who is keeping whom fed.

[Berger] My final question is: Do you believe that the conditions necessary for a transition to the market may be created by using administrative methods?

[Petrakov] No, I don't. I don't think that anyone can convince me that the administrative-command system is capable of committing suicide.

Foreign Economic Assistance Policies Questioned

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[Article by A. Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences: "How To Restructure Programs—Eight Questions About Soviet Economic Assistance to Other Countries"]

[Text] It is well known that the Soviet Union aids other countries: It builds plants and dams, it trains engineers and doctors, and it supplies food and arms. We have become accustomed to the fact that the aid that is provided is our duty and obligation, one of the main principles of the foreign policy of socialism. Unfortunately, questions of aid have not yet become a subject of broad public discussion.

HOW MUCH DO WE SPEND? The 1990 USSR budget earmarks 26 billion rubles [R] to finance foreign trade and bank and commercial transactions and also to provide aid to foreign countries. The Law on the Budget does not state for what specific purposes these resources will be used. It is clear, however, that the lion's share—according to the latest reports, R9.7 billion—will be for aid specifically. According to data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], last year the total volume just of economic aid to developing countries (including Cuba and Vietnam) was more than R12 billion, or 1.4 percent of the GNP of the USSR.

However, this sum represents only the tip of the iceberg. First, this does not include our subsidization of the economies of the countries of East Europe by virtue of the artificial system of prices within the framework of CEMA. According to Western estimates, another R8 billion-R10 billion are expended annually on this. Second, this does not take military assistance into account.

STINGY OR GENEROUS? This question can be answered only by comparing the aid with the subsidies of other states. Even if you take the smallest of the cited figures—R9.7 billion—then it turns out that our generosity borders on extravagance: In the proportion of economic aid and GNP, we surpass the FRG, Great Britain, and the United States. We also lead in the absolute measures of economic aid.

With respect to military assistance, Soviet superiority here is even more impressive. According to Western data (we do not have our own data here either), in the eighties the USSR provided from one-third to one-half of all supplies of arms to the developing countries. About 25 percent of all military products produced in the USSR goes abroad. The fact that the USSR lagged the leading Western countries in the basic indices of economic development in the eighties did not affect this proportion in any way.

CAN WE ALLOW OURSELVES TO DO THIS? It is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. For we do allow it. But it should be remembered that the tens of billions of rubles that are torn out of our economy represent a million unbuilt apartments and thousands of kilometers of unlaid highways, nonexistent hospitals and schools, lavatory facilities, and libraries. It has become a sad paradox that in many of the indices—longevity, level of infant mortality, and sometimes even the level of consumption, we are in a worse position than some of the countries whom we are helping.

A number of the aid programs are paid for in dollars and not in rubles, which takes up a significant part of the hard currency available in the country. According to some American estimates (I admit that in some cases they are exaggerated), the resources that are expended on economic and military aid, if they were used for domestic needs, would give the country on the order of R100 billion-R150 billion annually. Also deserving attention is the fact that in a physical sense a significant part of the aid consists of supplies of equipment, power sources, and raw materials, of which there is a shortage in the Soviet Union itself. Also the best specialists, engineers, and doctors who are so needed at home are sent on assignments abroad.

IS OUR AID EFFECTIVE? At first glance, this question could be answered in the affirmative. Almost 900 various important projects were constructed in the developing countries with the aid of the USSR, including the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the huge metallurgical plants in India and Nigeria. But very often our aid, like our domestic economic programs, suffered from aspirations of "gigantomania" and prestigious and expensive projects which blended poorly into the structures of the developing countries. Moreover, along with the aid, we frequently also exported the worst principles of an administrative-economic system: bureaucracy, the supremacy of "gross output," and the expenditure approach. As a result, the majority of recipients of USSR aid could not overcome the stagnation of their own economy.

THE SUPPLY OF ARMS: COMMERCE OR PHILANTHROPY? The Soviet Union has less than five percent of the total world export. But our export of weapons represents a significantly greater percentage. Agreements on military assistance usually provide for a reimbursement of resources granted. But in practice the principle of reimbursement is implemented only with respect to a small group of oil-producing countries. The others so far have paid out a total of only several percent of what they owe. Ethiopia, Angola, and South Yemen have piled up billions in debt. From time to time, the debts are extended, but in the end they are written off.

Of course, Soviet military power reinforces the independence of the young states. But in some cases this leads to a deformation of their political development and to excessive strengthening of the military and the total militarization of public life.

POSITION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET? In my opinion, the Supreme Soviet does not in any way express its opinion on questions of aid, they are all in fact turned over to the appropriate ministries and departments for examination. But the capabilities of our highest legislative organ in this sphere are very great. I would like to express my opinion now that these problems are beginning to be discussed.

First, it seems, the Supreme Soviet should conduct an inventory of Soviet obligations with respect to other countries, their legal basis, their political significance for the interests of the USSR, and the financial costs associated with them. Accordingly, comprehensive data should be published concerning the structure of aid, the conditions for granting it, and the distribution by country and region of the world.

Second, it is necessary to clearly demarcate aid and commercial relations. Complete confusion still exists here. For example, is it possible to consider as trade the delivery to Vietnam of cement at a price that is less than the cost of extraction of the same amount of sand in Vietnam itself?

Third, the Supreme Soviet should examine and ratify not a "package" of expenditures on foreign policy, but specific programs and projects (as this is done in all democratic countries). And here, as in other spheres of foreign and military policy, a big role could be played by an independent scientific expert analysis and a preliminary discussion of the planned programs at various levels.

Fourth, the Supreme Soviet could shift part of the economic and humanitarian aid programs to nongovernmental organizations and volunteer funds and societies. Let the people decide for themselves on whom and on what scales they want to help.

WHAT IS THE MOST SENSIBLE WAY TO HELP? The USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs in our country is involved in foreign aid programs. But it also has much work in the purely trade sphere, where quite a few problems have piled up for us. Apparently, it is worth thinking about the creation of a self-dependent and independent organization that will implement these programs practically. Its resources could be made up of state budget appropriations and come from the budgets of the union republics (clearly, various republics will not be interested to the same degree in one or another program), from the dues of public organizations (for example, the Committee for the Defense of Peace, the various committees of solidarity, and friendship societies), and, finally, from individual contributions. Financial support could also come from trade unions and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League]. Finally, state enterprises and cooperatives that have trade-production ties with developing countries could contribute their share. The allocation of means for furnishing aid should also be encouraged with new taxing legislation.

It is very important that this organization in no way become a "ministry of aid...with an uncontrollable bureaucracy, departmental interests, and secrecy. It is necessary not only to ensure maximum glasnost in its work, including annual reports, public hearings, and the like, but also democratically approved decisions. Aid propaganda among the population also assumes great significance—the demonstration of its specific results for the poorest people of the world. For example, this kind of information should be readily accessible: How many persons were treated in hospitals built by us; are many children studying in Soviet schools, and did the delivery of our equipment improve the position of the poor peasants? On the other hand, the new organization is in great need of an effective consulting-information service about the economic and political situation in the aid-recipient countries, and about their ability to utilize what has been provided them. (It is known that frequently machine tools and equipment simply rust in ports, collect dust in warehouses, or are resold to other countries.)

In doing this, the first tasks of the new organization should be: A correlation of the aid measures with our internal problems (it is hardly justifiable to provide assistance to countries that, from an economic standpoint, are in a relatively more favorable position than we ourselves are), a geographic redistribution of aid (if we are to help, let us give to those in need), and control in the form of inspection of the implementation of specific programs (where the money went—for the welfare of the people or into the pockets of state officials).

IS COOPERATION WITH THE WEST POSSIBLE? It is totally realistic today to arrange things so that our aid and the aid of the West do not oppose each other, but, to the contrary, complement each other. Incidentally, we already have such experience: During the last famine in Ethiopia, American food was delivered to those in need with the help of Soviet transport means, and Soviet doctors used Western equipment and medicines.

Great opportunities are opening up for our participation in multilateral aid programs—along the UN channel and other organizations. The Soviet Union is now energetically establishing hard currency-credit relations with such regulators of international trade as the IMF and others. We can come to these major international organizations not as a suppliant seeking financial support, but as an equal participant, capable of making its own contribution to the resolution of many world problems. This would make it possible to raise the effectiveness of our expenditures and to avoid the departmental approach.

Difficulties Encountered by Cooperatives Discussed

PM1602145790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[M. Krushinskiy article under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Leasehold Methods: New Organization of Free Producers Established—USSR Leaseholders' Union"]

[Text] Maybe the bitterest contradiction of what is already a contradictory situation in the economy is the growing divide between elements of market relations in the production sphere and the rationcard system [kartochnaya systema] of material and technical supply. Like two halves of an ice floe split asunder, these sections of the same economic cycle are growing further and further apart, thereby blocking reforms and creating a serious danger: breakdown. An eloquent example is provided by the story of the cooperative movement.

The cooperatives were referred to by many participants in the discussion at the constituent congress of the USSR Leaseholders' Union. After all, what has happened? Resolved to produce goods and services both useful and necessary to society, most cooperatives have found themselves separated from the country's existing system of material and technical supply. They have had no choice other than to "get hold of" components and raw materials on the side, paying over the odds, sometimes even paying bribes, which, apart from anything else, has been reflected in the price of their own goods: Even the most "unmercenary" cooperative members are frequently forced to raise their prices under pressure from objective economic necessity.

It was no accident that the leaseholders recalled this instructive phenomenon. The fact of the matter is that many of them have already encountered similar difficulties: Having given them their "freedom" (often after long bureaucratic delays), the higher authorities have no qualms about exercising their right as fund-holders and... "cutting off" supply channels to obstinate leaseholders. Some of the congress participants felt sure that this is a deliberate ploy to make leasehold enterprises' goods more expensive and thereby compromise this new form of economic management in the eyes of the consumer.

Yes, the opponents of reform still hold many administrative-edict levers; while, on the other hand, more and more purely economic levers are "flowing" into the hands of producers striving for freedom. Evidently, whoever uses his trump cards to the best advantage is going to emerge the winner in this confrontation.

"At the moment, the rationcard system of material and technical supply is the main bastion of the administrative-edict system. But a market in means of production cannot possibly be introduced by some decree: The surplus of means of payment on enterprises' books would in that case give rise to an extreme shortage of goods. The market system must be approached gradually. And it is the leasehold system that offers us an ideal instrument for the transitional period. After all, apart from anything else, labor collectives will definitely want to buy property leased from the state and, whether they like it or not, in order to do this they will not only have to get rid of their 'surplus' money but also the above-norm stocks of raw materials and semimanufactures rotting in the warehouses..."

Prof. V. Rutgayzer, doctor of economic sciences, is renowned in the country as a theoretical and practical expert on leasehold relations; he was in charge of the work to prepare for the Leaseholders' Union's constituent congress. He is convinced that in the process of denationalizing the means of production the leasehold system is nothing more than a stepping stone from the state form of ownership to collective forms of ownership. In the scientist's opinion, the majority of fixed assets leased out will inevitably be bought up within the next two or three years, as a result of which a system of "people's" enterprises will be formed; unlike joint-stock enterprises, they will be based on the share principle of involving the work force in the profits, which, in Rutgayzer's opinion, will be an additional barrier to the infiltration into production of "shadow economy" capital.

[Krushinskiy] Valeriy Maksovich, your fundamental disagreement with a series of provisions in the Supreme Soviet-approved Basic Principles of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Leasehold System is widely known...

[Rutgayzer] That is indeed so: I am sure that, in its present form, this document essentially blocks the way to thousands of labor collectives wishing to switch to the leasehold system. Its main flaw, in my view, is that the lease payment includes amortization liability for the complete renewal of fixed capital. For very many enterprises this sum is so great that the whole venture becomes unthinkable. It is well known, for example, that our first industrial leaseholder—the collective of the Butovskiy Construction Materials Combine—payed 35,000 rubles [R] to the higher main administration in the first year, which was more than double what it had had to pay in the "preleasehold" period. And on the basis of current regulations it would have to pay out no less than R190,000! What do you think—would the new form of economic management stand up in that case?

[Krushinskiy] A serious question... In the final analysis I think that the authors of the Basic Principles themselves do not regard them as the last word in the theory and practice of leasehold relations. Especially as this document has been worked on by important people, including P. Bunich, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR people's deputy, well-known scientist, and consistent advocate of economic renewal. He has just been elected president of the Leaseholders' Union. People are becoming concerned in this connection—reflected, incidentally, in some of the speeches at the congress—lest differences of theory between the leading champions of the leasehold system have a negative impact on the practical development of leasehold relations in the country. After all, you must agree that it is now more important than ever to consolidate the advocates of the radical democratization of the national economy!

[Rutgayzer] I totally agree with you. This also fully applies to my relationship with the president of the Leaseholders' Union...

Decree Clarifing Wage Tax Regulations Adopted

904A0188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by V. Romanyuk: "The Wage Fund and Taxes"]

[Text] **The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decree on clarifying the policy for calculating wage increases when paying the adjustment tax.**

The passions stirred up by the decree adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers concerning taxing the wage fund of state enterprises have died down just recently. Proponents of this measure emphasized that the document pertains only to the growth of the wage fund brought about by an increase in the production of means of production and in no way restricts the additional output of goods and services, the construction of housing, or the startup of new facilities. Opponents see in this decision an attempt to freeze wages without, in any way, influencing prices, which continue to grow.

According to the decree, the situation as of 1990 looked like this: Three percent of the growth of the wage fund (7.2 billion rubles [R]) was not subject to taxation at all. Including the benefits for the introduction of new facilities, a total of R13.1 billion have made their way to the state sector—this is as much as payments can be increased without the risk of falling into the tax squeeze. The unpleasantry began immediately as soon as the labor collective crossed over this fateful point. Each new step forward ended with snowballing taxes. Ultimately this began to impede the growth of production and had an effect on the adoption of plans and conclusion of delivery agreements.

Much was said about how strict but necessary this measure was—like a band-aid on a hole in the hull of a ship: It is only to last until we get into port. Nonetheless, as soon as the decree went into effect, the USSR Council of Ministers was flooded with requests for tax breaks and relief. In a number of cases the government was forced to give in. As a result, during the fourth quarter of 1989 when the taxation went into effect, only R0.5 million in new taxes were received—half as much as the amount they were counting on.

The recently adopted decree by the USSR Council of Ministers makes all these tax breaks unnecessary. Now it is possible to develop production on a broader scale without risking falling into stringent tax sanctions. The decree by the USSR Council of Ministers makes it possible to raise somewhat the base amount from which the wage fund is calculated. And when calculating the adjustment tax for the increase in wages of more than four percent, its base level increases (with a coefficient of 0.3 in machine building and metal processing and 0.5 in other branches, including the nonproduction sphere).

The point of this measure is to ease the tax burden within certain limits, especially in cases where the enterprises achieve radical growth of production volumes.

But what if during the course of a year the enterprise reduces the volume of production of products to the previous year's level? With the former taxation policy this would even be advantageous—to slow things up. But now if the enterprise reduces the production volume, the base wage level drops and with the application of a coefficient of 0.7 for each percentage point of reduction of the production volume. Many branches reacted to this by immediately revising their delivery agreements. Metallurgy alone is expecting an increase in output of R2 billion!

Beneficial conditions are given to enterprises engaged in the extraction of coal and shale, their enrichment, mining developments, and removal of overburden for maintaining existing capacities and protecting the environment. Here the base wage level increases depending on the increase in commodity output (with the application of a coefficient of 0.7). And when there is a reduction of output—the causes can be objective in nature—the coefficient of reduction is not applied for the base wage level. And for those who are working on conversion of the military industry, the base wage level increases, so to speak, one to one. This procedure, and this is especially stipulated, does not apply to scientific research, planning-research, design-technological, or other scientific organizations. And this is reasonable: Everyone remembers the excessive overpayments for developments of institutes of the USSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction] and many others as well.

I asked the deputy chief of the combined department of social development and labor of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission], Ye. Kabanov, how the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers relates to the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning taxation of wages. Yevgeniy Ivanovich does not think that there are any contradictions between the decrees. But now the possibility is opened up for making structural changes in the branches of Group A which are contributing to the expansion of the production of consumer goods. In a word, in this situation the government has shown both a measure of courage and the art of diplomacy without having exceeded the authority of its executive- administrative power.

Association of Enterprise Directors Holds Debate

PM2102102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondent I. Demchenko: "Directors Display Social Responsibility"]

[Text] Orenburg—The association of young enterprise leaders of the USSR has held a debate in Orenburg entitled "The Director and Perestroyka."

The emergence of numerous informal structures in the sphere of economic life is a relatively new situation although, in my view, it is a natural one. Evidently this is nothing other than a reaction to the instability of the economic situation, the desire to find like-minded people in the struggle against hasty and incompetent decisions by higher ranking organs.

In the country there are now two outstanding organizations uniting enterprise leaders. One of them is the association of young leaders, which has gathered under its wing, irrespective of age, directors of large and small state enterprises, chairmen of cooperatives and youth centers and organizations, and leaders of other informal economic structures—commercial banks, agencies, partnerships, and firms. The other is the all-union association of leaders of state industrial, construction, transport, and communications enterprises (associations), which has been joined by the directors of state organizations alone, including very large labor collectives. The meeting in Orenburg was in fact conceived as an attempt to bring views closer, to seek common interests, to consolidate the efforts of economic leaders in participating in the transformations taking place. It is all the more annoying that representatives of the all-union association did not actually go to the meeting, despite repeated talks with its leadership. Representatives of the United Front of Working People did not come either, although they had promised to.

Of course, each organization is free to choose its own tactics. But nonetheless I think that rejecting an attempt to reach compromise and to seek points of contact between interests is not the best position in the present already contradictory times. Especially when, as the meeting showed, the leaders of state and nonstate economic structures are faced with very hard and in many ways similar problems. One of them, for instance, is disillusionment with the ability of local executive organs to exercise fitting economic management in their regions and the inconsistency of their actions and decisions. That explains the desire of many leaders, whose sole passion is economic activity, to run for the soviets from republican to rayon level.

Those assembled brought their positions closer under the flag of the desire to resurrect the spirit of Russian entrepreneurship, proclaiming as their ideals work to increase the country's wealth and to establish justice and order in business relations, and respect for the honor and dignity of every citizen. I should like to note in particular that this is virtually the first time that economic leaders have, in their statement, put foremost not economic but moral criteria, not the interests of their own collective or sector, but social responsibility for the welfare of the Fatherland and all its citizens. I add—this is noted in the final document of the meeting—that true entrepreneurship has always been ennobled by the motives of charity, patronage, and philanthropy.

Repair Work at Gusinoozerskaya GRES Detailed

LD0702184790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] From our previous broadcasts, you know about the explosion which took place at the Gusinoozerskaya state regional electric power station [GRES] in Buryatiya. A report from our correspondents deals with how the mopping up of the accident's aftermath is proceeding. [video shows exterior and interior shots of the GRES, including damaged roof, walls, and outbuildings]

[Ya. Nikolayev, identified by screen caption] In the first instance, the main building of the station's second set is being restored. The main thing now is to ensure that the equipment inside does not freeze up. Meanwhile, the temperature falls to minus 30-40 degrees. The commision specially set up to investigate the causes of the accident is also taking steps for the speedy restoration of what has been destroyed. After all, at the moment of the explosion in the fifth unit, the third and fourth units were being repaired. And at the very peak period of the winter cold snaps, the national economic complex of a large region including Buryatiya, Chita Oblast, and part of the Mongolian People's Republic has found itslef in a very critical situation.

[Begin recording] [Ye. I. Karpenko, director of the Gusinoozerskaya GRES, identified by screen caption] Today, measures have been elaborated, aimed primarily at maintaining the equipment of the basic auxilary fifth power unit, aimed at increasing the reliability of heat supply to the town of Gusinoozersk, and supplying our region with power. But the main task for the collective of the Gusinoozerskaya GRES is to commission the fifth power unit. So, taking account of the reconstruction of the dust systems, it will be commissioned in March, in the second half of March.

[Unidentified reporter] And how are you preparing to guard yourself against similar explosions in the future?

[Nikolayev] Well, it is necessary to carry out a reconstruction of the dust systems...

[Reporter, interrupting]...which was the cause...

[Nikolayev] ... which was the cause, and, second, we need reserve capacity; we need a sixth power unit. [end recording]

Work Halted on Archangelsk Nuclear Power Plant

LD2002085190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Summary] The executive committees of the oblast and town soviets of people's deputies have decided to stop preparatory work on the construction of a nuclear plant to supply heat near Arkhangelsk. This is after several years of discussion. Geologists felt that the site for the

station was unsuitable as it was near underground water. In addition, the area has enormous reserves of gas. It was therefore decided to begin designing a gas power plant and to build it on the construction site already laid.

Scientific

Conference on Improving Scientific Progress Opens

Opening Speeches

LD1902194990 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—A USSR conference on improving scientific and technological management in conditions of the comprehensive economic reform under way in the Soviet Union opened here today. It was called by the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The conference is being attended by leading Soviet scientists and specialists.

Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Nikolay Slyunkov addressed the conference with an opening speech. The main report on ways to improve scientific and technological management was deivered by Nikolay Laverov, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the state committee for science and technology.

Explaining the purpose of the conference, Nikolay Slyunkov told TASS that there had been definite positive shifts in the development of Soviet science and technology in recent years. However, they show, if compared to the dynamics of the economic reform, that no radical acceleration of scientific and technological progress had been achieved. This is why the Soviet Union is increasingly falling behind the industrially developed countries.

The situation calls for a comprehensive discussion of this matter, primarily of improving the system of management. It is not sufficient to revamp it, he said. A new system must be created.

This is reflected in the "concept of managing scientific and technolgical progress in conditions of the economic reform" submitted for the conference's consideration. The main purpose of the conference is to enrich it with new efficient approaches to the solution of the problem at hand.

Slyunkov stressed that the conference should describe what the mechanism of economic incentives to increase the output of science-intensive and competitive goods should be like, what taxation and crediting benefits should be created for this purpose.

It is equally important to discuss the shaping of a new state scientific and technological policy and methods of selecting priority areas of science and technology. It is also necessary to work out legal provisions to encourage scientific and technological progress, because this aspect is insufficiently reflected in the basic laws submitted for approval to the USSR Supreme Soviet, he said.

Slyunkov expressed hope that the conference would make constructive proposals on these and other matters.

Scientific Progress, Democracy Linked

LD1902195290 Moscow TASS in English 1739 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—More democracy and greater independence could boost scientific and technological progress in the Soviet Union, Soviet deputy prime minister, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, Academician Nikolay Laverov said at a conference on problems of the guidance of the scientific and technological progress, which opened here today.

Laverov said that the development of alternative approaches and the use of competition is an important tendency of democratisation in the area of the scientific and the technological progress. He said that managerial functions need to be decentralized. "The state should only support research in the priority areas, but should not command scientists," he said.

Laverov outlined three specific models in the guidance of scientific activity. The first applies to guiding the fundamental research financed by the state.

As to applied research, it should be conducted mostly on the basis of cost-accounting, he agreed.

He said, as world experience shows, the implementation of programmes of state importance, including ecological, defence and social programmes, should be on the basis of centralised planning and financing from the state budget.

Laverov believes that there is a need for the existence of small but mobile scientific organisations for fuller integration of science and scientific production. Laverov said the conference will make it possible to decide on the fundamental directions and methods of guiding scientific and technological progress.

A basis for legislation which should establish a democratic procedure of determining priority tendencies, sources of financing the development of science and technology and the holding of examinations with the participation of the public is being established.

The conference is being attended by Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Nikolay Slyunkov, Politburo member Lev Zaykov, secretaries of the Central Committee Oleg Baklanov and Gumer Usmanov, and President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Guri Marchuk.

Laws Needed To Stimulate Science

LD1902222490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A wide range of issues connected with the management of scientific and technological progress is being tackled by an all-union scientific-practical conference which opened in Moscow today.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent, speaking over video of people examining computers, Slyunkov addressing conference, Zaykov also on platform] From the official forecasts for development of scientific-technological progress: From 1993, science and technology will begin to make a substantial contribution to saturation of the consumer market, to qualitative transformation of the services sphere, and to improvement of people's health. Today, says Nikolay Nikitovich Slyunkov, who as you know is a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the situation is not satisfactory. The technical lag behind the highly developed Western countries is increasing. This is not surprising, if you analyze just a few figures. Some 24,000 million [rubles] is allocated from the budget for scientific-technological progress. Of this, only R5,000 million is distributed by the State Science Committee for direct financing of the most important scientific research, and only R765,000 for all the priority state programs. We have abandoned centralized methods of managing science, but the market mechanism is not yet operative. The situation must be changed. Evidently that is why there were two members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Slyunkov and Comrade Zaykov, at the opening of the all-union conference on management of scientific and technological progress, as well as major leaders of science. An outline is being discussed; several points are considered fundamental.

[Correspondent, interviewing Academician Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology] The transition from centralized state planning of development of science and technology to state-public planning: What is meant?

[Laverov] The point at issue is that we must create a legal basis, and substantially expand opportunities for public organizations, such as the council of scientific-engineering societies, the Znaniye society, and many others. And so this is not just a tribute to the fashion of democratizing, so to speak, of all management, but it is the actual reality that we would like to finally establish at this conference.

[Correspondent] From conversations in the corridor, there are no great expectations for this. They think that non-departmental, that is, impartial expert advice is necessary, which should determine what is important and what is not. But experts have to be paid, and no money is as yet envisaged for this. Do you agree with the need and importance of the next point?

[Laverov] A key issue in the outline that we will be examining today is the creation of the legal basis for the acceleration of scientific-technological progress. I have to say that in the highly developed countries there are about 200 legal bills and acts of legislation adopted every year. In our country, we so far have not one state legislative act. It is expected to create a law on innovation organizations, a law on individual activity, a law on intellectual property of workers in science, engineers and inventors, a law on the status of the scientific worker. That is something that we do not yet have. [end recording]

Secrecy Hampers Technology Transfer

LD1602220390 Moscow TASS in English 1900 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS—Secrecy and lack of advertising are among the obstacles to transferring scientific achievements from the military industries to civilian production, said Academician Vsevolod Avduyevskiy, chairman of the Soviet National Commission for the Promotion of Conversation.

The secrecy in which every new work is shrouded prevents people working in other sections of the war industry, let alone those working in the national economy, from learning about the results of research.

The Soviet scientist said that this is why the war industry quite often fails to promote scientific and technological progress and even hampers it.

Only the latest of the technologies, materials and methods in the area can be applied successfully in the national economy. The introduction of projects worked out in the military industrial complex into the national economy is hampered by the imperfection of the entire economic system, Avduyevskiy told TASS.

There is a need to finish products better in civilian industries and to maintain tighter quality control, Avduyevskiy said.

The finishing of parts, welding, reinforcement of surfaces, removal of vibration, the growing of crystals, as well as the use of flexible automated lines are priority technologies in the war industry that should be used in civilian production.

Test TV Transmission From South Pole Reported

LD2002010190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Summary] Recently, for the first time, a quality television signal was transmitted by the Polyus Station from the South Pole Mirnyy Observatory and was received by an earth-based station near Moscow. This is part of active preparations for the direct reportage of the trans-Antarctica international expedition arrival at Mirnyy.

Pure Hydrogen Production Facility Destroyed

LD2002184490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] An explosion took place yesterday [19 February] in the industrial-experimental installation for obtaining pure hydrogen at the Azot production association.

As it turned out, Marchevskiy, head of the installation, discovered hydrogen leaking in the pump house and immediately ordered everyone to leave the control desk. But they did not have time to leave. There was a powerful explosion. Two workers died and three were injured.

It was the first time this installation was operated at the installation. Membrane technology for the production of hydrogen is being developed at this facility. The estimated cost of the facility is 2.5 million rubles. Now it is simply no more. According to specialists, there was no environmental pollution.

A competent commission has started investigating the causes of the accident.

Cosmonauts Redock Soyuz TM-9 Spacecraft

LD2102101290 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—TASS special correspondent reports from the Flight Control Centre

Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin redocked the Soyuz TM-9 vehicle from the astrophysical module Kvant to the axial docking lock of the station's transition section.

Before the redocking operation, the crew commander and engineer went over to the transport vehicle and locked the hatches. The space vehicles were separated at 6 hours 56 minites Moscow time [0356 GMT]. The crew used manual controls to fly around the orbital complex, close in and accomplish the docking.

The Soyuz TM-9 vehicle remained in autonomous flight for 19 minutes.

Work is being continued on board the Mir orbital research complex.

Anatoliy Solovyov and Aleksandr Balandin are feeling well.

Raduga Communications Satellite Launched 15 Feb

LD1602094590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0900 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 16 Feb (TASS)—A routine Raduga communications satellite was launched in the USSR on 15 February, 1990 by means of a Proton carrier rocket. It has on board retransmission apparatus intended to ensure telephone and telegraph radio communication and the transmission of television programs.

The Raduga satellite has been put into a close to stationary orbit with the initial parameters:

—distance from the surface of the earth 35,903km;
—period of rotation around the earth 24 hours 4 minutes;
—inclination of orbit 1.3 degrees.

The apparatus installed on the satellite is working normally. The command and measurement complex is carrying out control of the satellite. Exploitation of the communications and television apparatus of the satellite will be carried out in accordance with the planned program.

Military

Army General Discusses Changes in Armed Forces

LD2002230990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0800 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—"The USSR Armed Forces make a worthy contribution to strengthening the country's defense, first and foremost thanks to their qualitative features," [This and following additions and variations are reported by TASS in English at 1304 GMT on 20 Feb in a similar report. Here TASS in English reads: "The Soviet Armed Forces are making a significant contribution to the strengthening of the country's defences, primarily through their improvement."] stated Army General Dmitriy Sukhorukov, USSR deputy defense minister. Today he gave an interview to a TASS correspondent in connection with the anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces, which will take place on 23 February.

The general recalled that the second half of the 1980s became a landmark. [TASS in English reads: "...second half of the 80's was a crucial time."] According to Dmitriy Sukhorukov, awareness of the danger of a new world war and practical possibilities to prevent it require a new political thinking in the approach to the matter of war and peace, and at the same time they serve as major reasons for elaborating the content of the Soviet military doctrine. "In the nuclear age war can no longer be an efficient extenstion of politics," [TASS in English reads: "In a nuclear age a war can no longer be a rational continuation of policy."] remarked the deputy minister.

At the same time, in the conditions of a reduced Armed Forces and military budget, underlined Dmitriy Sukhorukov, Soviet servicemen are doing everything necessary to provide a safe guarantee of the security of the USSR borders and of the borders of its allies, persistently mastering modern battle technology, and weapons, and perfecting field, air and sea training. [TASS in English reads: "At the same time, in conditions of the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces and the military budget, Soviet officers are doing their utmost to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. They persistently study modern hardware and weapons and improve their skills at field, air and naval exercises."]

As the general said, increasingly evident improvements in the life and well-being of servicemen, and in their cultural life and welfare have taken place recently. The state has passed a number of measures for this purpose: The financial allowance for officers and ensigns has been increased, and their rent has become compensatory, and other benefits have been introduced. "Many servicemen have been awarded state awards in connection with the Army and Navy anniversary," said Army General Sukhorukov in conclusion.

Draft Concept for Army Reform Proposals Discussed

PM1602121790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed article in response to reader's query under the rubric "Dialogue. Ask Questions!": "The 17 Servicemen's Draft"; first two paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] I know that that several documents prepared by groups of deputies, including officers, were circulated at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Can we not familiarize ourselves with them?
[Signed] P. Ivanov, Moscow.

Indeed, groups of USSR people's deputies prepared and circulated their drafts and proposals at the congress. Thus, for example, 17 deputies who are servicemen submitted a "draft concept for military reform" and are insisting that it be examined at the third USSR Supreme Soviet session.

A commission is working on this draft. We interviewed one of the authors of the draft, USSR People's Deputy Major Vladimir Lopatin.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Vladimir, first of all, how did the idea of creating such a draft arise?

[Lopatin] It has long been in the air. When we—originally we were six servicemen-deputies—first tackled the matter, it became clear that similar groups were creating something similar without suspecting each other's existence. Military scientists, sociologists, economists, and psychologists came to our assistance. Then the number of deputies grew to 17. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov's moral support helped us a great deal. He said that when elaborating military reform, which he is convinced of the need for, both senior and junior officers must be heeded.

It must be said that the views of the Defense Ministry leadership have recently evolved considerably—from total rejection of any kind of proposals "from outside" (although how can we professional military men be called "outsiders"?) to dialogue.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So what is the main thing in your draft that provokes the hostility of some people and the support of others?

[Lopatin] The main idea is a phased transition to a regular professional Army with training of a mobilization reserve on a territorial basis.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In other words, the universal military service obligation and Army service are not the same thing?

[Lopatin] That's it exactly. We need to separate these two concepts. What we must have is a strong force of ranking professionals, plus reservists undergoing training "at home."

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The idea of a professional Army is a good one, but it is expensive, Vladimir, and where would the money come from? The country can barely make ends meet as it is.

[Lopatin] And who said that maintaining professionals (please do not confuse them with mercenaries, or that will make miners and professors mercenaries too) will be more expensive for the state? Who has worked out how much money will be needed? And we are talking about a phased, I stress, a phased transition. No one, incidentally, has calculated the losses from, for instance, the damage and accidents to highly complex military equipment elegantly phrased in documents as "occurring through the fault of the personnel." Being in the Army, I can see that officers are increasingly carrying out duties of mechanics and technicians, that is, they are doing things that soldiers and sergeants should in theory be doing. Are they looking for work for themselves? No, they are afraid of letting anyone near the equipment. [Lopatin ends]

The draft has been studied by Defense Ministry experts. While agreeing with the need to carry out reform in the Army, the experts say that the Army is part of society and is chiefly dependent on the state of its economy, so that if society changes, the Army will change too. But, the experts stress, despite the fact that there is still no precise concept of perestroyka in the country, the Defense Ministry is already elaborating a concept for the development of the USSR Armed Forces through the year 2000. Possibilities of a transition to a mixed principle of staffing the Army and the Navy are being examined. Preparations are being made to carry out a corresponding experiment in the Navy. But in the current conditions the question of a professional Army staffed on a voluntary basis cannot be raised on a practical level, and this is perhaps the main conclusion of the examination.

Draft Concept for Military Reform

Effective leadership of the whole sphere of the country's defense and the accountability of the military department to supreme state organs and to society as a whole are to be ensured, with full glasnost and the greatest possible openness.

The structure of the Armed Forces, priority directions in developing equipment and arms, and the financing of

military building are to be brought into line with the level of real military danger and defense sufficiency.

The main idea of the reform is the phased transition to a smaller regular professional Army staffed on a voluntary basis and with part of the reserve being trained on a territorial principle.

Budget allocations for such an Army are to be obtained by substantially reducing the arms and personnel of the Armed Forces and the number of military schools and creating an optimum, economical system for training military cadres; changing the staff structure of control organs; extending the use of civilian experts in the Army and Navy; standardizing civil and military production; eliminating expensive privileges for high-ranking chiefs; and so on.

The transition to a professional Army is to be made in stages, starting with the strategic nuclear missile and assault forces, the Navy, the Air Force, and then the Ground Forces and the Air Defense Forces

The management of the Armed Forces is to be changed, ensuring real participation by the whole of society in implementing military policy and principles, ways, and methods of defense building. Supreme leadership of this sphere must be surrendered to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government. Questions regarding the building, improvement, financing, and spending of the military budget and the training of the Armed Forces must be discussed annually at Congresses of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The CPSU's role must be characterized by a switch from directly supplanting state organs in defense leadership to implementing its own policy through servicemen who are communists. This requires a resolute reduction in the number and staff of political organs, the introduction of a system of appointment by election, and reorientation of work toward elevating the serviceman's status and protection.

It is necessary to humanize the Army and change the status of the individual serviceman and the conservative and closed nature of the setup within the Army and the tenor of barracks life; to ensure that servicemen have equal civil rights and social protection; to create a concrete mechanism for the protection of the individual serviceman; and to promote the establishment of principles of justice and one-man command on a rule-of-law basis...

Military Prosecutors on Discipline, Crime Rate

PM2102111390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel L. Nechayuk report: "In the Main Military Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] During the past year the Military Prosecutor's Office, seeking to strengthen discipline and law and order in the Army and Navy through its own resources, has shifted the center of gravity in its work to the protection of people's rights and legal interests and of a regime of legality in all spheres of life and service of the staff.

As is well known, crime has increased by almost a third in the country, and by 14 percent in the Armed Forces. As before, the majority of infringements of the law were in military construction units. This is caused by unresolved legal and socioeconomic problems and the chronic lack of amenities for military construction workers.

"Military Prosecutor's Office organs are now investigating more keenly and on a greater scale questions of the legal status and working and living conditions of military construction workers, particularly those assigned to the national economy and also servicemen and draft-eligible men involved in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station [AES] accident, the Armenian earthquake, and in transporting the harvest.

The results of all this were summed up at an enlarged session of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. It was held under the chairmanship of A. Katusev, main military prosecutor and USSR deputy general prosecutor.

Participating in the collegium's work were USSR people's deputies V. Semenko, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order; Army General K. Kochetov, USSR first deputy defense minister; N. Petukhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium; Lieutenant General V. Grebenyuk, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate; prosecutors from military districts, groups of forces, and fleets; and representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the law enforcement organs.

Zaykov Interviewed at MiG Assembly Plant

LD1502213690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Video report on visit of L.N. Zaykov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Mikoyan machine-building works in Moscow on 15 Feb by correspondent G. Sedov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the party's 28th congress continues. Today, this was the focus of attention when Comrade Zaykov met with the work collective of the Mikoyan machine-building works in Moscow.

[G. Sedov] The familiarization with this celebrated enterprise began in the works museum. Its expansive exhibits tell of the 50-year history of the works where the

family of famous MiGs—combat aircraft famous throughout the world—were created and continue to be created. This is the assembly workshop; a MiG-29 is on the stocks. This is a highly maneuverable plane. In its flight technical capabilities and in other parameters, it surpasses all fighters which exist today. A conversation with the workers took place. Here production problems, services, wages were discussed, but the main theme was the Central Committee plenum and the platform of the party's Central Committee for the 28th congress.

[Zaykov, addressing Sedov in the workshop] Regarding those proposals which have been expressed today—I think the main bulk of them has been incorporated. Part of them should be taken into consideration in the new rules on which we are working. We have already had a first reading.

[Sedov] Yuriy Nikolayevich, precisely what proposals have stuck in your memory?

[Zaykov] Here now... Well, take for example direct elections, alternative elections to the 28th congress. They were supported at the plenum, too. To tell you the truth, I supported them, when working as first secretary of the Moscow City Committee, too, and today. I consider this correct. What caused me concern, at the first conversation? We are always talking about our needs to receive initiative from the bottom, from the communists. What are the communists proposing today? And very many proposals are coming in. They are being examined today and are being summed up. And some people are still waiting for decisions from the top and ready-made decisions sent down to the bottom. Probably this is not in the spirit...

[Sedov] This is the inertia of the past.

[Zaykov] I said precisely this during the meeting.

[Sedov, providing background] The problem of conversion is topical at the works, just as in the entire defense industry.

[Zaykov, addressing Sedov and works officials] I consider, for instance, that as regards our golden treasury of designers and technologists and our golden hands of workers in model production plants, it is impossible to suddenly retrain everybody and let....

[Sedov] ...let them produce saucepans.

[Zaykov] Saucepans, or anything one likes. This is nonsense. This is nonsense. It is impossible to do this.

[Sedov] One must not lose what has been attained.

[Zaykov] And as to what has been attained today, it is necessary to work for civil aviation.

[Unidentified works official] We are developing it.

[Zaykov] For the meantime, you are developing things poorly. I have not noticed anything yet.

[Second unidentified works official] What do you mean?

[Zaykov] [laughs] For the meantime, I say, for the meantime, for the meantime. Second, these are machines of world renown, the MiG-29s and MiG-31s, and they are in demand today. Moreover, it is necessary for queues not to form. I, for example, am in favor of selling them, and as many as will be bought. Today, not always, but today, we need dollars. We need to buy things for them, and we need to buy machine tools for ourselves; we do not have enough. As for equipment, it will pay for itself. And the chief designer, the director, and the minister today should not wait until asked. Today, it is necessary to approach things in a different way, to seek those who need the aircraft and to propose a sale. The workers will be pleased. They will know that they have made 10 extra aircraft, and they have received hard currency for those 10 planes. For the hard currency, they make up their mind what equipment and what goods can be purchased today, the very thing. It is necessary to act like that.

New Soviet Military Supplement To Be Published

PM1602154390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Publication of SYN OTECHESTVA—First Soviet Military Weekly"]

[Text] In the next few days a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA sociopolitical supplement will appear at main administration for the distribution of printed matter kiosks.

The editorial collective intends to make the weekly a popular mass publication and to find interested and loyal readers in all corners of our country. The theme of the Motherland, its sufferings, hopes, achievements, and defense will always take priority in the publication.

As the editorial staffers see it, the weekly will be a forum for political discussions on the most urgent problems of concern to society, the Armed Forces, and young people in the Army and in civilian life. It will also discuss the concerns of young people in the Army and the difficulties encountered on the way to the military system by schoolchildren, by students at secondary vocational and technical schools, technical colleges, and by other students.

Descriptions and sketches of people in uniform and those who share their joys and disappointments and whose loyalty helps them to overcome their difficulties—their mothers, wives, and fiancees—will have a prominent place in SYN OTECHESTVA.

Think pieces will be published on moral and ethical subjects, as well as on culture, aesthetics, education, and our country's history. Readers will also find works of art—poems, stories, humor, sketches, tales, and novels (primarily adventure novels)—in the publication.

The inquisitive will obtain information on interesting facts and incidents, and will be able to fill their notebooks with information on traditions and military rituals in the Russian Army and other states' armies.

The first and subsequent issues of SYN OTECHESTVA will publish chapters from Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov's book "Reminiscences and Thoughts" which, for reasons of short-term expediency, were not published in full. Yegor Isayev, the well known poet and Lenin Prize winner, will share his thoughts on the eternal concepts of Fatherland, patriotism, and duty. The same issue will begin the publication of the action-packed novel "The Seventh Circle of Hell" by I. Bolgarin and G. Severskiy, which is the sequel to their work "His Excellency the Adjutant."

The weekly will have 16 pages and will cost 10 kopeks.

Will Carry Zhukov Memoirs

LD1902143790 Moscow TASS in English 1242 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—"The main topic of the first issue of the SYN OTECHESTVA (Son of the Fatherland) weekly will be hithereto unknown chapters from Marshal Zhukov's book 'Memories and Thoughts,' which were not published in full in the first editions in the early seventies for political reasons," Colonel Nikolay Velikanov, editor of the weekly, told TASS after the first issue of the new magazine came off the press. The weekly is a socio- political supplement to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, newspaper of the USSR Defence Ministry.

Velikanov said the weekly would publish discussions of problems worrying Soviet society, the Armed Forces and young people, both military and civilian. It will also carry materials on morals and ethics, as well as articles on culture, aesthetics, education and the country's past.

"The weekly will also publish fiction, verses, tales, funny stories, essays and adventure novels," Velikanov said.

PRAVDA Comments

PM2102094990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[A. Safonov report: "SYN OTECHESTVA"]

[Text] It is noteworthy that this new weekly came out just before Soviet Army and Navy Day. In a message to the editorial office collective, Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, notes that SYN OTECHESTVA [Son of the Fatherland] is to become a platform for the further restructuring and democratization of military life and widespread glasnost and an active participant in the struggle for high-quality combat training.

A sociopolitical supplement of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the weekly and its material are meant primarily for young people—soldiers, young officers, their wives and companions, and those who are about to enter Army service. The publication will cover the history of our state and its Army. The very first issue has already made a good start. Readers will be interested in excerpts from Marshal G.K. Zhukov's book "Reminiscences and Reflections" [Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya] which are being published for the first time and which, due to time-serving considerations, were not included in a single one of the nine editions of the famous military leader's memoirs published in our country.

The first issue of SYN OTECHESTVA carries material by poet Yegor Isayev, artist Yuriy Nikulin, and other authors. A large part of the weekly is devoted to material on moral and cultural topics.

Defense Ministry Social Research Center Founded

LD1602154390 Moscow TASS in English 1457 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 16 TASS—A social and psychological research centre, recently set up by the Soviet Defence Ministry, will help raise the efficiency of education and organisation, study reasons and find ways for eliminating drawbacks and strengthening order and discipline in the armed forces.

Centre head Major General Leonid Ushakov told TASS that they decided to set up the institution last autumn as the significance of social and psychological factors in solving military construction tasks increased.

The centre studies the opinions of military men, the state of interethnic relations in military collectives and social and psychological problems of personnel policy.

"We are seeking a scientific base to control ideological processes in military collectives," Ushakov noted.

He also noted that the centre is an applied scientific research organisation, which aims to fill the gap between science and control. "We want to have military psychologists in every unit and on every ship and military sociologists in all headquarters and military educational establishments, "Ushakov aded.

Commander Comments on Role of Afghan Veterans

LD1602120690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GT 15 Feb 90

[Text] Exactly a year has elapsed since the memorable day when the last serviceman of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan crossed the bridge over the Amu-Darya linking the Afghan town of Hayraton and our town of Termez. The brutal nine-year war had come to an end, but the sorrow and regret for thousands of fallen soldiers remained.

A political assessment of the decision to put our troops into neighboring Afghanistan was given at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. As emphasized in a report by the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on International Affairs, no circumstances can justify this

step which was taken in violation of the USSR Constitution and the norms of human morals. The past must not be repeated. Our boys must no longer die on foreign soil through miscalculations in big-scale politics. This has been said at get-togethers and meetings of those who formerly served as servicemen in Afghanistan, relatives of the fallen, and public representatives that were held today in many cities of our homeland.

Among the last to cross the Soviet-Afghan border was hero of the Soviet Union Gromov, who commanded the 40th Army and who is now a colonel-general commanding Kiev Military District. Listen to an interview with him:

[Begin recording] [Gromov] For me Afghanistan has now become probably most of all a memory—a memory of our people, both those living and those who never returned, and a memory of the country where we were—that is, the people, above all the ordinary Afghans which we assisted, and we gave a great deal of assistance there. After all, we did not only wage military actions. We were indeed giving assistance.

[Unidentified correspondent] Now with the passage of time, these 365 days, do you not feel that society has begun to treat the men who served in Afghanistan somewhat differently?

[Gromov] Yes, that is indeed so. In general, I consider that this has not even happened with the passage of the 365 days. Unfortunately, this most probably began a long time ago. It has simply reached its greatest intensity, as it were, at the present time. I find it offensive to be always hearing and reading about this—offensive inasmuch as, you know, who needs an Army that does not carry out the orders of its own government and people? In the given case, one has an Army that was sent into Afghanistan and the people who fought there. Why are they being treated in such a way? It should certainly be quite the opposite. I would say in general that the attitude, of course, throughout the country is not bad, but the things that have been happening in a number of regions including Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad are food for thought.

[Correspondent] Boris Vsevolodovich, which of the many days that you spent in Afghanistan do you recall today?

[Gromov] I clearly remember how at the end of 1987 there were heavy losses during heavy military actions south of Kabul. I felt somewhat heavy at heart, but there are such moments when nothing goes right.

[Correspondent] Boris Vsevolodovich, the Afghans [reference to Soviet troops who served in Afghanistan], both those on the reserve and those still serving, are an enormous strength. What places do you see for the employment of this strength?

[Gromov] Well, the places where this strength can be employed are unlimited, certainly in our country, especially at the time we are now going through. First and foremost, probably, it can be employed in work with young people and in patriotic education, but indeed it must be said that very many former Afghans, as we call them—both military and civilian comrades—are occupying fine positions from the point of view of making use of their organizational capabilities and attaining results that are needed both for enterprises and for the oblast and rayon and for the country as a whole. [end recording]